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Abstract 
This thesis is about the origins and development of freedom of information laws. The 
number of countries with these laws has risen dramatically in recent decades, and now 
stands at around ninety. This is widely taken as evidence that governments across the 
world are converging in their institutional arrangements because they face similar 
challenges and demands. Access to information is increasingly claimed to be a human 
right, essential to the effective functioning of democracy and fundamental to legitimate 
public administration in the information age. This thesis seeks to challenge this as-
sumed causal homogeneity by explaining why countries in which these principles were 
well-entrenched legislated at different times. 
The explanation offered here emphasises institutions: the manner in which important 
political actors are organised, and the structure of authority and accountability rela-
tions between them. It shows that differences in these institutional arrangements 
meant access laws were introduced at different times in different countries because 
they were introduced for different reasons and in response to different pressures. It 
supports these claims by conducting a comparative historical study of freedom of in-
formation in Sweden, the USA, France, the UK and Germany,  
This thesis contributes to empirically-oriented scholarship on a prominent aspect of 
contemporary government. It provides a framework for further rigorous comparative 
scholarship. It also provides detailed accounts of how access developed in two countries 
which have not received much attention in English-language scholarship, France and 
Germany, and original insights into three others about which more has been written. 
Whether one is interested in improving actually-existing laws or understanding demo-
cratic government in the information age, this study is valuable because it comple-
ments visions of why transparency laws are desirable with historically-informed com-
parative knowledge about why they are introduced at all. 
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Introduction 
If a mother living in Britain in 1980 wanted to read the comments made by her child’s 
teachers and kept on file by the school, her request would probably have been turned 
down. Schools considered these files to be their own property, and regularly denied 
that parents had any right to view them. This was despite the fact that their contents 
could have important consequences for things like the child’s employment prospects 
for decades afterwards (Newell 1982:81-90). Welfare recipients trying to find out the 
basis on which their benefits had been calculated also frequently met with official re-
fusal (Phillips 1982:196-205). Journalists, for their part, found it extraordinarily difficult 
to discover all sorts of important information, such as which ministers were members 
of which Cabinet committees (Hennessy 2000), and were regularly excluded from meet-
ings of local councils despite the existence of laws dating back to the 1960s purporting 
to grant them access (Harrison 1988:1-2). 
Thirty years later, the situation is quite different. Government departments now rou-
tinely publish enormous amounts of formerly-secret information, including internal 
rule–books, guides to corporate structure, contact details for many civil servants, and 
performance data on operational units (Harrison 1988:29-41; Robertson 1999:141-56). 
Access to unpublished material held in government files has also become steadily easi-
er, culminating in the introduction of a general right under the Freedom of Information 
Act 2000. This was introduced as part of a programme of constitutional renewal by the 
Blair government, and was hailed as both a triumph for democracy and a victory for the 
Campaign for Freedom of Information after sixteen years of lobbying. The Liber-
al/Conservative coalition government elected in 2010 has built on this with its so-called 
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“Transparency Agenda”, which includes the pro-active publication of government con-
tracts, salaries, spending and databases. For a country which once enjoyed a well–
earned reputation for pervasive official secrecy, this constitutes something of a minor 
revolution. 
It is, however, not yet clear just how profound or permanent this revolution will prove 
to be. Politicians, academics and civil servants in the UK increasingly emphasise the 
importance of access to information as an essential principle of good government. On 
the other hand, this rhetorical shift appears to have had an uneven effect on adminis-
trative and political practice. Support within the political élite is far from assured, as 
Tony Blair’s recent admission he considers the Freedom of Information Act to be one of his 
biggest mistakes demonstrates (Blair 2010:516-7; Kettle 2010). During the period when 
this thesis was being researched, national security and public finance constituted two 
prominent areas of controversial, ongoing secrecy in the UK. The combination of ex-
pansive police powers to conduct covert surveillance and detain suspects, coupled with 
restrictions on the right to challenge how these powers are used, were a significant 
cause of concern among many commentators during the twilight of Blair’s premiership. 
On-going concerns over access to information were also apparent in controversies over 
whether the use of privatisation, outsourcing and public–private partnerships to pro-
vide roads, hospitals, schools and other public infrastructure undermined accountabil-
ity over how public funds were spent. On a more fundamental level, many of the struc-
tures which underpinned traditional forms of state secrecy remain in place, although 
their role appears to be shifting as the economic, technological and social environment 
changes. Despite all the changes to the state over the last thirty years, political authori-
ty remains centralised in Cabinet and Whitehall to a very great degree. The infamous 
Official Secrets Act (which criminalises certain unauthorised disclosures of information 
  3 
by civil servants) remains on the law-books. There are, however, increasingly signifi-
cant obstacles to exercising the kind of centralised control over official information it 
envisages, a fact starkly demonstrated in November 2010 when a large number of Amer-
ican diplomatic cables were posted online by WikiLeaks, and several British newspapers 
subsequently decided to ignore a Defence Advisory Notice and publish reports based on 
their contents. 
Britain embraced the “transparency revolution” relatively rapidly and relatively re-
cently, but its experience is by no means unique. Since the early 1970s, the general 
availability of information held by most democratic governments has become a promi-
nent matter of debate among politicians, civil servants, academics, activists and even 
the public at large. Since the mid-1990s a broad consensus has emerged that transpar-
ency is a good thing, at least in principle. Just as in Britain, however, the practical ef-
fects of this recognition have been neither uniform nor universal. The easing of access 
to official information has occurred at different rates and to different extents in differ-
ent countries; some have proved far more resistant than others, and in rare cases offi-
cial information has become more difficult to obtain rather than less. 
The Question This Thesis Seeks to Answer 
This thesis grew out of a desire to understand the complex, shifting and often contra-
dictory relationship between secrecy and transparency in contemporary government. 
The original intent was to examine how changes to normative views about where the 
legitimate boundary between the two ought to lie produced different levels of “actual” 
transparency in different countries. 
It rapidly became clear, however, that there were two significant obstacles to pursuing 
the project as originally conceived. The first is that normative factors are a poor basis 
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for explaining cross-national variation. The rhetoric used to advocate and justify great-
er transparency is so similar as to be virtually indistinguishable between countries. Ad-
vocates everywhere couch their efforts in terms of a syncretism of information eco-
nomics, liberal individualism and participatory democracy, and emphasise the moral 
necessity of transparency given the high degree of technological development and so-
cial fragmentation prevailing in the late 20th Century. In some countries, opponents of 
access have also justified themselves with reference to democratic norms. The near-
universal prevalence of these norms suggested that an adequate explanation for varia-
tion ought to focus less on beliefs and more on the believers: on who thinks transparen-
cy is a worthy goal, and the conditions under which they are able to see it enshrined in 
law. It suggested, in short, a focus on struggles over political power and authority ra-
ther than over norms and meanings. 
The second obstacle to the project involved measurement of the dependent variable. It 
has proved formidably difficult to translate intuitive consensus about differing levels of 
secrecy and transparency into a valid and reliable standard suitable for rigorous analy-
sis. Attempts to compare the secrecy or transparency of whole countries by focussing 
on the supply of information are hampered by the fact that information is not valuable 
in the abstract; rather, certain information matters because it allows specific actors 
embedded in definite social and political relations to pursue particular courses of ac-
tion. The meaningful measurement of supply-side transparency is predicated on the 
selection of particular social and political relations for analysis and the rejection of oth-
ers. The more general the conclusions one wishes to reach using this approach, the 
more aspects of society one would need to consider, with the logical conclusion being 
that a truly comprehensive assessment of transparency would require examining the 
whole of any given society. The practical challenges to this should be obvious. 
  5 
Demand-side approaches are also limited in significant ways. Evidence of dissatisfaction 
among requester communities or civil society organisations is problematic, because as-
sessments of whether information can be withheld legitimately vary from place to 
place despite the prevalence of similar normative rhetoric, and similar practices of dis-
closure often produce differing assessments of secrecy. Making proper use of this evi-
dence depends, in a sense, on having already understood the very thing this project set 
out to explain: why transparency varies. Secondly, objectively-measurable demand for 
official information is usually extremely low, and the available data are surprisingly dif-
ficult to interpret. An absence of demand is equally consistent with a high degree of 
pro-active disclosure (where information does not need to be explicitly sought) and 
pervasive secrecy (where the unlikelihood of success discourages demands before they 
are made), not to mention a whole host of other situations including effective interme-
diary organizations, ignorance, and a rational calculus of negative marginal utility on 
the part of the voting public. Once again, interpreting differences requires a good deal 
of precisely the kind of contextual knowledge which a satisfactory explanation might 
provide. 
In order to overcome these problems, this thesis adopts a narrower focus and conducts 
a comparative historical analysis of the introduction of freedom of information acts in 
five consolidated democracies: France, Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the 
United States. The specific question it seeks to answer might be put most simply as: 
“why did these five countries introduce freedom of information acts at such different 
times?”. 
The adoption of freedom of information was chosen because it permits an investigation 
of important aspects of the relationship between transparency and its broader political 
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and cultural context without falling prey to these difficulties. The specific theoretical 
and methodological grounds for this claim are laid out in detail in Chapter One, but 
among the most important of these is that the differences between these countries are 
large and cannot be easily explained within the terms of the existing literature. The 
general consensus is that the adoption of access laws is an instance of convergence 
driven by a small number of common causes which are assumed to have arisen at more 
or less the same time everywhere in the late 20th Century. This thesis seeks to challenge 
this assumption about causal homogeneity. It shows that countries which faced circum-
stances often held to contribute to the adoption of these laws reacted very differently: 
in some, a vigorous political debate over the merits of access rights and campaigns in 
favour of a law arose quite rapidly, whereas in others these either took much longer to 
arise or were entirely absent. In some, legislation swiftly followed the onset of putative-
ly-favourable conditions, in others it took much longer or occurred for unrelated rea-
sons, and in others again the contribution of widely-cited causes is revealed to be more 
limited and contingent than often supposed because they arose after efforts to enshrine 
access in law were already well underway. 
The Answer this Thesis Offers 
The explanation this thesis offers for these differences emphasises political institutions, 
for reasons laid out in Chapter Two. It draws on Max Weber’s sociology of bureaucracy 
and the insights of historical institutionalism to argue that any minimally plausible ex-
planation for why countries adopt access laws at different times must be grounded in 
an appreciation of how control over the distribution of information constitutes a re-
source in conflicts over the distribution of political power. It then argues that a study of 
differences in the adoption of freedom of information should focus on the disputes over 
information and power which arise within five basic political relationships. These are 
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discussed in turn in the five empirical chapters, and are as follows: the electoral rela-
tionship between voters and politicians, the relationship between individual citizens 
and the administrative state, relations between peripheral interest groups and the po-
litical executive, those between core economic interest groups and the state as a whole, 
and the dynamics which arise between elected politicians and the administrative bu-
reaucracy. Chapter Two concludes by arguing that the comparative method is the best 
means of tracing these dynamics, and explains why the five countries identified above 
are worthy of detailed examination given the constraints imposed by this methodology. 
The five empirical chapters show that, within each of these five relationships, attitudes 
towards information held by the state, the implications of public access to it, and the 
influence which interested parties can bring to bear on routine disclosure, are all influ-
enced by political institutions. The term “institutions” is understood here to include 
formal rules which enable and constrain the exercise of state authority, established pat-
terns of interaction which are treated by those involved as if they were formal rules, 
and the organisational structure the relevant actors take. These chapters show that the 
relationship between specific institutions and transparency is conjunctural: each of the 
five countries entered the post-war era with distinctive institutional arrangements, and 
these facilitated the articulation of different kinds of pressure for reform due to the dis-
tinctive way they mediated endogenous effects, demographic change, the emergence of 
new political imperatives and technological innovation (among other things). It also 
shows that contemporary rules and practices of disclosure evolve in an historically-
contingent and path-dependent manner, in that the resolution of disputes over particu-
lar kinds of access was affected by the institutional context in which they were con-
ducted, and transformed the terms on which future disputes were resolved. 
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The concluding chapter draws these separate analyses together. It shows that the dif-
ferent arrangements of institutions relevant to the politics of information were associ-
ated with different historical paths leading to the establishment of legally-protected 
rights of access to official information in each of the five country-cases. Institutional 
differences account for a good deal of this variation: freedom of information developed 
at different times because it developed for different reasons in different institutional 
environments. This thesis demonstrates, in short, that existing explanations for the 
adoption of this important law, which emphasise the similarity of causes, are deficient. 
A more comprehensive and satisfactory understanding of why freedom of information 
laws exist must take account of country-specific differences in the structure of political 
power and accountability. 
The History of Freedom of Information in the Five Consolidated Democracies 
Since this thesis proposes to assess the relative merits of competing claims about the 
adoption of freedom of information in light of the political and legislative history of five 
countries, it may be helpful to provide a brief overview of historical events in each 
here, at the outset. 
Sweden is home to the world’s oldest continuously-existing access law, the Tryckfri-
hetsförordning (Freedom of the Press Act 1809). This law was passed as part of the re-
establishment of a constitutional monarchy after thirty-seven years of absolutist rule. It 
represented a re-introduction of the world’s first formal legislative access right, origi-
nally introduced in 1766 as part of an attempt by a small number of liberal politicians 
and luminaries to establish a free press. Sweden’s access regime thus pre-dates the 
modern democratic system by over a century, and in fact forms part of the emergence 
of its liberal state. It was significantly amended in 1937 and 1949 as a result of the social 
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and political transformations which accompanied mass enfranchisement in the 1910s 
and 1920s, and the following chapters largely focus on these more recent modifications. 
Since then, there have been occasional amendments, the most significant as part of the 
constitutional reform of 1976. These were all of a routine nature: the idea that the prin-
ciple of transparency should form a fundamental part of the political system in Sweden 
has been a matter of widespread consensus for the whole post-war era (Sweden 
2001:587). 
The USA’s Freedom of Information Act 1966 is among the oldest modern laws, and is often 
described (especially by Americans) as the impetus for the spread of freedom of infor-
mation over the post-war era. This Act is often portrayed as the fruit of a long domestic 
tradition of concern for ensuring an informed voting public, and is thus rhetorically 
associated with the First Amendment, a Progressive-era line of jurisprudence on priva-
cy, and a scattering of state-level access rights introduced in the early decades of the 
20th Century. More narrowly, the Freedom of Information Act emerged as a reaction to the 
failure of access provisions introduced as part of the Administrative Procedure Act in 1946. 
It was significantly extended in 1974 and 1996 to overcome bureaucratic evasion. Unlike 
Sweden, transparency remains a fairly prominent matter of political debate in the USA, 
and enjoys a large and vocal supportive constituency in Congress, the media and the 
legal fraternity. Reflecting this ongoing political prominence, the 2009 amendments put 
in place under President Obama were partly aimed at improving its practical effective-
ness, but also partly undertaken to associate the incoming Democratic administration 
with support for the principle of transparency-driven accountability. 
France’s Law 78-753 of 17 July 1978 lies at the cusp of a second wave of access legisla-
tion, which began in the late 1970s and also included the Netherlands and the Westmin-
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ster countries. This law is something of a conundrum: access to official files has never 
been a prominent matter of political debate in France, and the law was introduced on 
the initiative of the parliament in the absence of active support from either the presi-
dency or civil society. It was amended in a minor way in 2000 to address inconsistencies 
revealed by subsequent jurisprudence, in a move whose inconsequentiality stood in 
stark contrast with the government’s lofty rhetoric about transparency and accounta-
bility. It has not developed a supportive constituency in the thirty-odd years since its 
introduction, and although no figures are available activists and civil servants alike 
agree that it is almost never used (the Commission d’Accès aux Documents Administratifs, 
which oversees the law, first gained the power to collect such statistics in 2000, and be-
gan putting in place the infrastructure to do so in 2005; the only reliable statistics cur-
rently available concern appeals against refusals to disclose). French politicians, admin-
istrators, civil society organisations and citizens have shown far more interest in spe-
cial-purpose disclosure laws applying to things like party finances and personal data 
than to general public rights of access to official information. 
The UK was a late adopter compared with the other democracies. The Freedom of Infor-
mation Act 2000 entered into force in early 2005, after several decades of campaigning by 
civil society groups. Calls for an access law first emerged in the 1970s, initially in reac-
tion to the perceived threat to individual liberty and democratic accountability posed 
by the growth of post-war domestic regulation by a paternalistic and profoundly secre-
tive bureaucracy. As in the USA, access in the UK is routinely framed as essential to 
democratic liberty and accountability, and it remains a prominent matter of debate 
with consistent support from diverse constituencies including opposition, backbench 
and minority-party MPs, journalists, academics and civil society organisations. The Act 
has not yet been significantly amended, but there have been several attempts to do so. 
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A restrictive amendment bill, which would have removed Parliament from its scope and 
created a new exemption for MPs’ correspondence with public authorities, was passed 
by the House of Commons in 2007 but found no sponsor for its passage through the 
House of Lords. The Conservative/Liberal Coalition’s Protection of Freedoms Bill, which 
will extend access to electronic datasets among other things, has passed the House and 
received its first reading in the House of Lords in mid-October 2011. 
Germany also introduced its law – the Informationsfreiheitsgesetz - in 2005. Unlike the UK, 
however, the idea that public rights of access to information might be a contributor to 
democracy tended to be less prominent than the idea that official secrecy contributes 
to important goals like ensuring social order, and protecting personal privacy and 
commercial confidentiality. Its social bases of support are much narrower: its main con-
stituency is the environmental movement, which advocated them as a means of ensur-
ing public participation in decisions concerning planning, pollution control and other 
large-scale spill-overs from industrial production. The legislative history of access 
rights in Germany is characterised by far less competition and debate than in the UK or 
the USA, and its fortunes are closely associated with the emergence and rise to power of 
the Green Party. The earliest proposals were made by some of the first Green deputies 
in the Bundestag in the mid-1980s, and the law itself was eventually introduced under 
the red-green coalition which took office in the late 1990s. 
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Chapter 1: The Importance of 
Access to Information 
This thesis seeks to explain why democratic countries adopted freedom of information 
acts at different times. It does this by conducting a comparative historical study of the-
se laws in five consolidated democracies: Sweden, the USA, France, the UK and Germa-
ny. Its immediate goal is to show that the causes of this phenomenon are more complex 
than is often claimed: that countries may adopt freedom of information laws for a range 
of different reasons. In so doing, it also seeks to achieve a broader aim: to illuminate 
some of the socio-political factors which influence the boundary between secrecy and 
transparency, and particularly to explain why it lies in different places in different 
countries. This chapter explains the rationale behind these choices: why variations in 
transparency deserve attention, why decisions to introduce (or significantly amend) 
freedom of information acts are likely to yield important insights, and why variations in 
the adoption of these laws in the consolidated democracies merit particular scrutiny. 
Why Variations in Transparency Matter 
The use of the term “transparency” to describe the way governments work and the way 
they ought to work has undergone a meteoric rise in popularity in recent decades. As 
recently as the 1970s, it was little more than an idiosyncrasy peculiar to academics in-
terested in public sector finance and accounting, especially French political economists 
studying the European Union (Hood 2006b:3-4). By the late 1990s, it was used so fre-
quently and so approvingly by administrators, activists and scholars alike in so many 
countries that it is now almost a ritual requirement of writing about public administra-
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tion to argue that the legitimacy of administrative authority depends, at least in part, 
on its transparency (Roberts 2006c:1-2). 
This thesis proposes to examine transparency for two reasons related to this normative 
consensus. First, because public access to information is important, as a great deal of 
the a large and growing literature on this subject is at pains to point out. Secondly, be-
cause this existing literature has tended to focus on establishing the theoretical merits 
of access at the expense of a serious engagement with why countries differ in their ap-
proaches to transparency. The following discussion elaborates on each of these claims 
in turn. 
The Value of Transparency 
Transparency deserves scrutiny, and has emerged as a topic of widespread academic 
inquiry, because official information and the terms on which it is available to outsiders 
go to the very heart of contemporary democratic politics and public administration. Its 
pervasive and fundamental importance are clear from the various rationales offered for 
making information more readily accessible to the public at large. These are now so 
numerous that it has become something of a sport among scholars to see how many can 
be identified in the wild. Ben Worthy, for example, found six through an examination of 
official and academic publications in the UK alone in the lead-up to the introduction of 
its Freedom of Information Act (Worthy 2010:564). Others have found anywhere between 
twelve and two dozen allegedly distinct rationales depending on the country and the 
era (Hazell, et al. 2010). Some reasons for this tendency towards multiplicity are dis-
cussed below, but from a strictly conceptual point of view it is not particularly helpful. 
Almost all the common rationales are, ultimately, variations on one of four broadly 
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democratic claims about the positive effect of routine disclosure on relations between 
individuals and bureaucratic states. 
Firstly, access to information is increasingly claimed to be an important precondition 
for individuals to meaningfully exercise many civil, political and social rights (e.g. 
Banisar 2005; Birkinshaw 2006a; Florini 2007a). Some authors emphasise it as a func-
tional requirement for the classic liberal communicative rights of freedom of speech 
and freedom of opinion (Ponting 1987). Others argue that it contributes to the preserva-
tion of personal autonomy (Heald 2006:64) by empowering individuals in their relations 
with institutions and structures of both public authority and private power (Birkinshaw 
2006b:56 et passim). A cognate concern grounded in anarchist political theory appears 
to be a significant motivation behind contemporary disclosures by WikiLeaks (Assange 
2006). A related claim identifies transparency as a contributor to the enjoyment of a 
range of social and economic rights by making it easier for people to become aware of 
their circumstances and entitlements (Belski 2007:5); this claim is especially common in 
discussions of transparency in the developing world (Darch and Underwood 2007; 2010). 
Secondly, transparency is frequently advocated for its salutary effects on democratic 
accountability. In representative democracies, this is usually framed in terms of im-
proved electoral control (e.g. Relyea 1975:8; Bathory and McWilliams 1977; Bay 1977; 
Perritt 1997; Relyea 2003; Lott and Wyden 2004; Piotrowski 2007:107-8; Ramkumar and 
Petkova 2007:283 et sqq). From this perspective, transparency is valuable because it im-
proves the capacity of citizens to cast informed, effective votes which ensure the im-
plementation of policies they support and punish officials who misbehave (cf. Manin, et 
al. 1999b; Strøm 2000). The importance of informed public opinion to the operation of 
ideal-typical representative democracy means that freedom of information is often dis-
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cursively linked with other foundational communicative rights like freedom of the 
press. In transitional democracies, transparency is often also seen as an important 
mechanism for establishing the normative legitimacy of the new regime and settling 
accounts with its predecessor (e.g. Treviño Rangel 2007:140-1). 
Thirdly, transparency is sometimes advocated on the grounds that it improves govern-
ment decision-making by facilitating active, ongoing and meaningful public participa-
tion (Sunstein 1986:890 et sqq; Bunyan 2000). Participation arguably improves both the 
legitimacy and the quality of democratic processes in several ways. It is sometimes ar-
gued to be more consistent than representation with the idea of democracy as govern-
ment by the people. It is also regularly advocated on the more practical grounds that 
widespread active participation addresses the structural problems of control inherent 
to representative politics far more effectively than strengthening the electoral system 
can. Critics of representative systems have long remarked that individual citizens often 
do not understand what their governments do, and hold preferences which are either 
mutually incompatible or which cannot be reconciled with those of their fellow citizens 
(including, famously, Schumpeter 1992:Chapter XXI). This presents something of a 
problem for governments whose legitimacy rests on responsiveness to the will of the 
people, since it may be quite unclear what any individual person – much less “the peo-
ple” as a whole – wants; indeed they may want quite contradictory things. Participation 
is argued to address this by encouraging citizens to learn more about what government 
is and does (Pateman 1970; Mill 2003). Participation is conducive to individual citizens 
learning about the contradictions and implications of their own views, and the opinions 
and preferences of others. At their best, advocates claim, discursive and participatory 
forms of democracy are preferable because they produce collective policy preferences 
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which are more coherent, reasonable and reasoned than those which develop under 
representative systems (cf. Habermas 1984; 1995). 
The fourth and final widespread justification for transparency is somewhat newer, and 
is most common in the literature on public administration inspired by economic analy-
sis of imperfect information (e.g. Stiglitz 1985; 2000; 2003b). Here, access is valued be-
cause it encourages public authorities to be responsive, predictable, efficient and effec-
tive in the formulation and execution of public policy (Florini 1998:53-6; Finkelstein 
2000:6-7; Roberts 2003:14-20; OECD 2005:2; Heald 2006:64). This is often formalised in 
terms of agency theory: transparency is valuable, so the argument runs, because it dis-
courages graft and corruption while encouraging the rational allocation of public re-
sources (Birkinshaw 2006b:56). Two complementary causal mechanisms are usually 
held to be at work here: transparency encourages responsiveness in governments by 
facilitating the articulation of specific demands by affected groups; it also encourages 
public officials to anticipate those demands and accommodate them before they are ar-
ticulated (the so-called “law of anticipated reactions”; Maravall 1999:155). This dis-
course has become particularly popular among international organisations since the 
early 1990s: it is implicit in the very name of Transparency International, an international 
NGO founded in 1993 which campaigns against corruption, and is also to be found in 
policy documents produced by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and others 
(Vishwanath and Kaufmann 1996; G-22 1998; OECD 2000:72-4; Stiglitz 2003a; OECD 2005; 
IMF 2007).1 
                                                                           
 
1 These four meta-rationales have been distilled from the literature, and this list is not intended to constitute an ex-
haustive typology of mutually-exclusive categories. It is, however, fairly comprehensive, and most rationales ap-
parently left out are either different ways of expressing similar ideas or hybrids of two or more of the four. One 
good example of this is trust: transparency is sometimes argued to be valuable because it increases public trust in 
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The Imperfect Understanding of Variation 
Individually, any of these rationales provides reasonable grounds for welcoming the 
greater availability of official information and opposing official attempts to withhold it. 
Collectively, their sheer diversity testifies to a basic shortcoming in much of the exist-
ing literature on the subject. This shortcoming was neatly expressed by Christopher 
Hood in an influential review essay, when he argued that transparency is “more often 
invoked than defined, more often preached than practiced” (2006b:4). 
It is widely assumed that levels of transparency vary over time and between jurisdic-
tions, but these variations have not so far been satisfactorily explained. This is partly 
because, a great deal of the academic literature on this subject is not primarily interest-
ed in explanation at all. Like much of the literature on public administration more gen-
erally, many works in this field are written by lawyers, scholars, politicians, officials 
and activists who are primarily interested identifying “current problems (the present) 
and desired solutions (the future)” (Raadschelders 2010:253). They are, in other words, 
intended as advocacy rather than analysis, and focus on establishing the theoretical 
merits and likely practical benefits of making governments more transparent. The 
normative consensus outlined above is due in no small part to these efforts, and the 
sheer diversity of rationales is in part a reflection of the diversity of different discipli-
nary perspectives represented in this literature. 
One result of this predominantly normative focus is a tendency to engage in somewhat 
instrumental empirical analysis. Within a mode of argument which seeks to build a case 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
 
government (e.g. Worthy 2010). Trust, in turn, is argued to have a number of beneficial effects, including increasing 
compliance with official decisions and facilitating difficult policy choices by allowing governments greater leeway 
in making trade-offs between private interests. In fact, trust is arguably not a distinct rationale in its own right, but 
an alternative way of conceptualising the second and fourth rationales. It goes to the heart of how principals exer-
cise control over their agents under conditions of incomplete information, and the conditions under which the 
principals perceive direct supervision of their agents to be necessary at all. This is elaborated in Chapter Three. 
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for reform on the basis of its normative desirability, the real world is principally inter-
esting insofar as it provides evidence that there is indeed a problem to be solved (e.g. 
Meade and Stasavage 2006; Naurin 2006). Even among works which do not adopt this 
explicitly instrumental approach, it is often assumed that there has been – or, at least, 
that there ought to have been – a shift towards transparency-in-practice in parallel 
with the growing normative consensus. Both approaches have the unfortunate side-
effect of encouraging empirical analysis which is framed primarily as a search for an-
swers to the question “why are governments less transparent than they should be?” 
rather than on understanding whether and why they might have become more trans-
parent at all. Shortfalls in transparency are routinely assumed to exist on the basis of 
assertions by journalists and civil society organizations, and are explained as a result of 
active resistance from those in power, motivated by an absence of commitment to the 
ideal and enabled “defective” institutions which block the realisation of self-evidently 
desirable outcomes (e.g. Prat 2002:2). 
There are at least two reasons why this framing is unsatisfactory. The first is that trans-
parency is not the only desirable feature of modern government, and trade-offs be-
tween competing goals might be necessary. Systematic recognition of this possibility 
among scholars has been rare, mostly normative in nature, and usually confined to con-
sideration of the balance to be struck against either personal privacy or commercial 
confidentiality (e.g. Hazell 1998). David Heald, by contrast, identifies seven closely-
related principles which might either be served by or conflict with transparency de-
pending on the circumstances, including effectiveness, trust, accountability, autono-
my/control, confidentiality/privacy/anonymity, fairness and legitimacy. From this, he 
draws the somewhat unorthodox but eminently sensible conclusion that there are 
many reasons why a society might legitimately choose a level of transparency lower 
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than the theoretically-possible maximum (2006:60). Dismissing these choices out of 
hand as failures of commitment is not an approach which is obviously well-adapted to 
understanding why they have been made or what the implications of alternative choic-
es might have been. 
Normative complexity does not simply involve conflicts between transparency and 
other desirable features of government. Although it is relatively straightforward to de-
fine in general terms, transparency has extremely complex and often contradictory im-
plications when applied to concrete situations, and it is possible for different kinds of 
transparency to be in conflict with one another. The rationales discussed above all seek 
to empower non-state actors in their dealings with their governments. But each focus-
ses on different beneficiaries, favours the disclosure of different kinds of information, 
and draws on slightly different overall visions of how politics ought to work. A repre-
sentative-democratic rationale, for example, privileges the disclosure of the past behav-
iour of those holding office and the policy platforms of those competing to hold it in 
future. Financial transparency, by contrast, privileges the availability of timely, accu-
rate, aggregated numerical data on public budgets and expenditures. This sort of in-
formation is most useful to those with a financial stake in the state, and is so technical 
that many voters are incapable of making much practical use of it. Financial transpar-
ency is not necessarily incompatible with democratic control. Several scholars have 
shown, however, that it has proved to be so, particularly since the 1990s, because it has 
allowed financial interests to resist attempts by elected governments to pursue policies 
which are popular with the electorate but incompatible with the prevailing neoliberal 
orthodoxy (Roberts 2003:14-5). For those interested in improving the way governments 
actually work, these distinctions matter. Indiscriminate use of incompatible rationales 
may make it difficult to decide in retrospect whether attempts to make governments 
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more transparent have been successful. It may also have the opposite of the desired ef-
fect if socially-determined power relations mean that actors in conflict with one’s cho-
sen beneficiaries also benefit from reform. These distinctions are frequently ignored, 
especially in the activist literature which routinely cites as wide a range of rationales as 
possible when advocating reform in an apparent effort to strengthen its case (e.g. 
Sunstein 1986:896-8; OECD 2005:1-2; Carter Center 2010). 
A second problem arises from the tendency to explain variation in terms of “defective” 
transparency institutions. The problem is not that such institutions are irrelevant – far 
from it! It is unquestionably the case that attempts to obtain official information often 
provoke self-interested refusals from bureaucrats, and that poorly-drafted laws and 
weak enforcement mechanisms have frequently made this easier (Roberts 2006b:109-
18). Furthermore, differences in operational and enforcement provisions have been 
shown to influence the frequency with which people make use of their rights to obtain 
official information: lower fees and simpler procedures are associated with higher re-
quest rates (e.g. Hazell and Worthy 2010:358). But the widespread tendency to focus on 
the specific features of transparency mechanisms is problematic because it has encour-
aged incomplete and possibly misleading diagnoses. It assumes that the specific aspects 
of transparency mechanisms which are identified as “defective” really are important, 
and encourages unduly pessimistic assessments of whether countries are transparent 
or not because the analyst’s attention is drawn to the absence of features which are 
held to be necessary, while being diverted from practices or alternative institutions 
which might ensure access to important information in other ways (or render the 
whole question of access otiose for the purposes of a particular normative justification). 
There is increasingly widespread consensus among empirically-oriented scholars in this 
field that attention to social and political context is required for a comprehensive un-
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derstanding the operation of transparency mechanisms (Darch and Underwood 
2005:77-8,85; McDonald 2006:133; Darch and Underwood 2007; Hazell and Worthy 
2010:358). But it is precisely these contextual factors which have usually been neglected 
as a result of the tendency to focus on specific features of access mechanisms. One of 
the contributions this thesis hopes to make is to illuminate some of these social and po-
litical influences on struggles over public access to official information. 
The Challenges of Empirical Analysis 
The need to move beyond this strongly normative approach to transparency research 
has been recognised, but progress in developing alternatives has been slow. One reason 
for this is that the concept of transparency has proved formidably difficult to measure 
(Finkelstein 2000:2; freedominfo.org 2005). This, in turn, has made it difficult to trans-
late intuitive consensus about differences in secrecy and transparency into a valid and 
reliable basis for rigorous cross-case analysis. 
The root cause of these difficulties is sometimes identified as the absence of a common-
ly-agreed definition of “transparency” (Florini 2007b:4), but this is not quite true. 
Scholars regularly provide definitions which are broadly consistent with each other and 
common sense. Examples include “government according to fixed and published rules, 
on the basis of information and procedures that are accessible to the public” (2001:701) 
and “the degree to which the existence, content, or meaning of a law, regulation, ac-
tion, process or condition is ascertainable or understandable by a party with reason to 
be interested in that law, regulation, action process or condition” (Mock 1999:1082). 
The problem, rather, lies in the fact that these definitions are surprisingly difficult to 
operationalise. They apparently suggest that transparency might be measured simply 
by determining how much official information is “accessible” to – or alternatively “the 
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extent to which” it is “ascertainable” or “understandable” by – some important group 
outside government (usually “the public”). This might, for example, be operationalised 
in terms of the supply and demand of information: the proportion of the administration 
about which information is readily available, or the proportion of citizens who actually 
try to obtain information, perhaps complemented by data on the proportion of those 
attempts which meet with success. This approach is especially appealing for the practi-
cal reason that, in many countries, laws designed to encourage transparency require 
governments to publish data which seem to make these kinds of assessments possible. 
Attempts to compare the secrecy or transparency of whole countries by focussing on 
demand for information are hampered by problems of data quality and availability. Of-
ficial statistics are the most widely-used source, perhaps because – where they exist at 
all – they are authoritative and the costs of producing them are borne by the govern-
ment. Several important countries publish no statistics at all, however, and among 
those that do the transparency mechanisms, parts of government and specific kinds of 
requests they cover often vary across time and between jurisdictions. One particularly 
common difficulty concerns separating (frequent) requests for personal data from (rel-
atively rare) requests for other official documents. In some countries, access to personal 
information is provided through standalone data protection or privacy laws, and statis-
tics are reported separately; in others, requests are made under freedom of information 
laws, and are reported in ways which make it difficult to separate out the two kinds of 
request (cf. United Kingdom 1995:24-5). Some of these difficulties might be reduced by 
adopting a common set of standards for the collection and reporting of data, but such 
standards do not yet exist and as a result the existing data are of extremely limited use 
for cross-national comparison (cf. Vleugels 2009:13-15; Hazell and Worthy 2010:354). 
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Even if high-quality data did exist, the validity of using them to explain variations in 
transparency would still be open to challenge on more fundamental grounds. Assessing 
the effectiveness of transparency laws entails comparing a known quantity against an 
unknown – and often effectively unknowable – quantity. One common measure is the 
number of requests as a proportion of the total population, but this produces rates so 
low that the most rigorous conclusion which can reasonably be reached is something 
like “no more than a fraction of one percent of the population in any country has ever 
formally requested access to an official document under a statutory scheme”. These low 
rates are problematic because they mean that even quite small fluctuations in behav-
iour can dramatically alter results.2 They also mean that the most interesting questions 
concern the reasons why people do not seek information, and on these questions such 
statistics are much less useful. Do people not show up in official statistics because they 
do not know rights of access exist, because they do not know important information is 
there to be requested, because they consider refusal a foregone conclusion, because 
they consider the risk of official retaliation too high, because sufficient information is 
already available (perhaps through third parties such as the press), because they are so 
satisfied with their government that they see no need to pay it close attention, or for 
some other reason? In short, are low request rates a sign defective institutions and low 
transparency, or effective alternatives and high transparency? 
Attempts to overcome these problems by focussing on the supply of information are 
hampered by the fact that information is a non-fungible good. It is not valuable in the 
abstract, and thus quantity, extent and degree are not a particularly meaningful ways of 
conceptualising its availability (Bennett 1991:51). Rather, information is a dimension of 
                                                                           
 
2 The Scottish Information Commissioner reported in 2010, for example, that the 100% increase in requests by com-
mercial entities was due to a single firm submitting 34 requests to different public bodies (Scotland 2010).  
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social interaction (Terrill 2000:5-7), and individual “pieces” of information are im-
portant because they help people achieve particular goals in the context of specific so-
cial and political relations – perhaps by reducing their uncertainty about other actors 
or their environment (e.g. Arrow 1979:306), or by providing a measure of control over 
power relations within which they are embedded (e.g. Bok 1982:105-12). Transparency, 
in short, means different things in different contexts. 
Aggregate, quantitative measures are, consequently, most meaningful as part of at-
tempts to assess the availability of particular kinds of information. This, in turn, implies 
the selection of particular social and political relations for analysis rather than others. 
Studies which make this choice can often be extremely informative. Large-scale surveys 
conducted by civil society groups, which rely on carefully designed suites of standard-
ised requests submitted to multiple authorities, have suggested that low request rates 
in some countries may be at least partly due to problems of supply such as systemic bias 
against particular socioeconomic groups, rather satisfaction or disinterest (e.g. 
Open Society Justice Initiative 2006; RaaG and NCPI 2009). There also exists a small 
number of detailed interviews and ethnographic studies of particular stakeholder 
groups, usually the press, administrators or politicians, which provide similarly rich 
accounts (e.g. Hazell, et al. 2010). 
There are practical and theoretical problems with these studies, however, at least for 
present purposes. These studies are formidably resource-intensive and time-
consuming, and so few have been conducted that data are not yet available for enough 
countries or requester groups to allow comprehensive cross-national comparison of all 
possible contributory factors. They constitute one possible source of evidence on which 
a more general explanation could draw, but they do not themselves provide it. More 
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fundamentally, they are informative because they are focussed; the more general the 
conclusions one wishes to reach using this approach, the more aspects of society one 
would need to consider. This inverse relationship between meaningful results and 
scope means that a truly comprehensive direct assessment of transparency would re-
quire examining the whole of the political system – in the broadest sense of the term – 
of each society. Even if such data were available, synthesising it would probably pose a 
near-insurmountable problem on its own. 
Why Study the History of Freedom of Information? 
It is clear that the question “why does transparency vary between countries?”, however 
interesting or important it may appear, is too broad to be answerable within a single 
work – indeed, it may not be answerable in any meaningful sense at all without sub-
stantial qualification. This thesis therefore seeks to answer a much more specific and 
more easily answered question: why did the consolidated democracies introduce free-
dom of information acts at different times? This section of the chapter explains why 
treating freedom of information acts as the outcome of interest and studying them 
from an historical perspective is worthwhile, and the next section discusses the reasons 
why variation among the consolidated democracies is particularly significant. 
The Significance of Freedom of Information 
Freedom of information acts provide a “set of rules for framing arguments” about ac-
cess which embody a general presumption in favour of disclosure rather than official 
discretion (McDonald 2006:136; Roberts 2006b:121-2). They have four essential ele-
ments: they are (1) primary laws (2) providing a general right of access on request (3) to 
original documents produced by the government in the ordinary course of carrying out 
its activities, (4) subject to a limited number of specified exemptions which must be ex-
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plicitly invoked by officials when seeking to withhold documents.3 Laws which meet all 
four of these criteria are worthy of attention because their introduction constitutes an 
attempt to shift politics and administration in a particular society decisively away from 
secrecy and towards transparency. They are among the most important mechanisms 
regulating public access to official information, regardless of which of the four norma-
tive perspectives outlined earlier one happens to prefer. 
If transparency is justified as a means of limiting state power, as most of the normative 
rhetoric discussed earlier in the chapter suggests, then the most important mechanisms 
are the ones which are most likely to favour release against the wishes of those in posi-
tions of authority. Primary laws are important because they are more likely to be effec-
tive than non–legislative mechanisms such as executive orders, internal administrative 
policies, and the kinds of informal information–sharing habits which often arise be-
tween administrators and prominent stakeholder groups. These alternatives can only 
reasonably be expected to work so long as the government itself considers an exchange 
of information beneficial; their informality means that particular groups can usually be 
excluded – or information withheld entirely – without fear of formal sanction if the 
government chooses. 
Freedom of information is also more likely to favour public access to information than 
laws which do not establish a firm presumption in favour of disclosure to the public at 
large. The alternatives are generally of two types: those where the requester must 
demonstrate a specific legally–sanctioned interest in the information in question, and 
those in which the exemptions are not clearly defined (as is the case with most consti-
                                                                           
 
3 This definition is consistent with common scholarly usage, although some include the additional requirement of 
dispute resolution and enforcement mechanisms (e.g. Birkinshaw 2006b; Worthy 2010). This arguably confuses the 
right itself with the circumstances under which it is exercised, and has been omitted here to the extent that en-
forceability is not already implicit in the concept of “a legislative act”. 
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tutional rights of access). Under such regimes, information which the government 
would prefer to withhold is typically only available through the courts, either by re-
questers bringing suit on their own initiative, or via discovery, disclosure and cognate 
mechanisms designed to ensure natural justice in matters already under dispute. Alt-
hough these mechanisms are beneficial to those who succeed in using them, recourse to 
the courts is expensive, time–consuming and uncertain in outcome. These regimes es-
tablish much higher barriers to reliable disclosure than freedom of information, under 
which the courts are generally a last resort. Their specifically democratic value is corre-
spondingly lower, especially given the time–sensitive nature of politically–relevant in-
formation: governments may be able to render themselves opaque by delaying disclo-
sure through an abuse of requirements to show standing or forcing dissatisfied re-
questers to go to the time and expense of litigation. 
Access to original documents is also normatively more desirable than access to other 
kinds of information. Original documents constitute the record the government main-
tains for itself of important matters like the distribution of responsibilities throughout 
its constituent organisations, the procedures and principles to be applied when making 
decisions or taking action, the identities of decision–makers, which decisions they made 
or actions they have taken, and the reasons or factors on which those decisions were 
based. Access to these documents is important because official files constitute the au-
thoritative record of these matters, in the dual sense that they are often the only at-
tempt at comprehensive documentation of factors relevant to a matter (however in-
complete such attempts must always necessarily be), and also because the information 
they contain directly underpins the exercise of state authority. There are many other 
ways in which access to this sort of information might theoretically be achieved, such 
as requirements that the administration answer questions (e.g. when asked by the 
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press, as under the German Landespressegesetze), and requirements that the government 
collect and publish information relevant to certain policy domains which would not 
otherwise exist (also known as “targeted transparency mechanisms”; cf. Fung, et al. 
2007). Required–response laws are normatively less desirable for the same reason as 
non–legal access mechanisms: they depend on the cooperation of the executive, and 
hence their reliability in cases of conflict is open to doubt. Targeted transparency and 
related publication schemes are undesirable on slightly different grounds. By providing 
access to specific sorts of information, these mechanisms implicitly focus on specific 
political relationships, policy domains and outcomes. Freedom of information is prefer-
able because it embodies the presumption that requesters should be the ones who de-
termine what information matters.4 
The Value of Comparative-Historical Knowledge 
Freedom of information laws merit attention because they allow an examination of 
some of the neglected social and political contextual factors which influence broad 
trends in government secrecy and transparency. Access laws allow this because they 
are widely understood by direct participants in disputes over access to information - 
politicians, lawyers, administrators, journalists, activists and academics – to be an im-
portant influence on the outcome of those disputes. It is easy to see why: almost every 
freedom of information act in existence replaced a confusing tangle of limited, and of-
ten ineffective, access mechanisms, and explicitly overrode a great many other rules 
which gave officials a great deal of discretion in what to disclose, when, and to whom. 
                                                                           
 
4 It is important to underline one claim which is not being made here: that any of these other instruments or practic-
es is irrelevant to understanding transparency. Many will play a crucial role in later chapters, allowing subtle shifts 
in underlying power relations to be traced with more precision than can be done by relying on a single law alone. 
The claim here is merely that the alternatives are less desirable than freedom of information as a primary indicator 
of broad attitudes towards transparency, because they conform less fully to the ideal whose implementation is at 
stake. 
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This belief makes these laws a site of intense conflict and negotiation, conducted 
through formal and semi-formal processes which produce a rich documentary record 
suitable for historical analysis: official inquiries and reviews, press debates, and high–
level negotiations between politicians, bureaucrats and interest groups, not to mention 
the legislative process itself and subsequent judicial proceedings resolving disputes 
over implementation. This evidence can be used to identify the identities, goals, tactics, 
strategies and interpretations of the various competing parties in these struggles, the 
kinds of information which became the subject of dispute in different countries, the 
beneficiaries whose interests were invoked to justify disclosing it to the public, the 
power relations protagonists were aiming to transform, the problems they sought to 
solve, the manner in which they understood and attempted to resolve the inevitable 
complex trade–offs with competing goals, and the factors which influenced their suc-
cess. In short, these laws are interesting because “conflicts over institutions lay bare 
interests and power relations” (Thelen and Steinmo 1992:27). 
A comparative-historical perspective is desirable because it is likely to produce richer 
insights into this social and political context than can be gained from a study of indi-
vidual countries at single points in time, however significant those points might be. 
This is because the context in which laws are embedded is neither given nor fixed; it is a 
dynamic system whose features at any point are the product of complex processes un-
folding over time. Access laws do not sit apart from this system, they are produced by it 
and form part of it in turn. The fundamental effects they are supposed to have means 
that these laws are likely to have far-reaching feedback effects, but political systems are 
complex, and usually evolve slowly and unpredictably. Participants in disputes over ac-
cess to information, who naturally constitute a major source of evidence for historical 
and contemporary studies alike, cannot be uncritically relied upon to provide a com-
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prehensive picture of the dynamics at work. The disputes to which they are party are 
almost always confined to particular jurisdictions, and frequently involve information 
of direct relevance to localised political debates. These actors may not fully appreciate 
the impact of structural features whose significance might only become apparent when 
systematically compared with other places or over longer periods of time. Careful com-
parison which is sensitive to temporal dimensions such as sequencing, duration and in-
teraction is less likely to mistake causes for effects, or to find spurious associations be-
tween factors which may be causally-unrelated despite strong normative claims to the 
contrary.  
Although a study of the history of access laws is likely to be informative, it must be rec-
ognised that there are some things this approach cannot hope to explain. The existence 
of a law is not, in and of itself, evidence that any given citizen will find it easier to ob-
tain a copy of a specific document. The forces which produce a law are only one set of 
influences among many on the way it is used, abused, implemented or resisted once in 
place. Indeed, they may well be very weak or indirect influences when compared with 
things like the effectiveness of dispute resolution and enforcement mechanisms, the 
attitudes of the individuals involved, the immediate significance of the kind of infor-
mation at stake, and so on. A study of the history of these laws offers the possibility of 
understanding the macro-level politics of access to information, and of attempts to es-
tablish transparency as a broad principle. On its own, it cannot predict the outcome of 
micro-level attempts to obtain official information; it cannot, in other words, offer a 
sufficient explanation for the varying effectiveness of access laws, however that might 
be defined. 
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Methodological Merits of a Comparative-Historical Approach 
A comparative historical study of freedom of information acts also has several method-
ological advantages. The first is clarity. It uses unambiguous, widely–understood and 
easily–verifiable data. The existence of a law meeting the four criteria outlined above 
and the date on which it was introduced or modified can be established by consulting 
the legislative record of the country in question, or alternatively by using one of several 
secondary sources on the subject (e.g. Banisar 2006; Vleugels 2009). In this way, it is 
easy to eliminate the more egregious cases of laws which provide access in name only. 
Zimbabwe’s notorious Access to Information and Protection to Privacy Act 2002, for example, 
is widely understood to constitute a censorship rather than an access regime (Banisar 
2006:20,27; Vleugels 2009:16). 
A second advantage is cross–case reliability: freedom of information acts are remarka-
bly similar in their four essential respects. They therefore constitute a sound basis for 
comparison, because it is possible to be reasonably certain that observed differences 
between cases will not be due to differences in the measure itself. These laws are not all 
entirely identical, of course, and as noted earlier differences in things like fees and en-
forcement mechanisms can influence request rates. But once the law is treated as the 
outcome to be explained rather than a potential cause, these differences can legitimate-
ly be ignored as “relatively tangential” (Bennett 1997:217).  
The main area in which significant differences might potentially arise concerns the kinds of information exempted 
from disclosure.   
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Table 1 documents the common categories of exemption in the laws in the twenty-
three consolidated democracies.5 It shows that there is a small set of exemptions which 
are common across all cases, protecting the core interests of state (such as national se-
curity and top–level political and economic decision–making) and important third–
party interests. The exemptions which appear in every law have been shaded for ease of 
identification. There also exists a small number of other widespread exemptions cover-
ing things like the commercial operations of government and information obtained in 
confidence. Where exemptions do differ markedly, they often concern matters which 
need to be protected in a country due to particular institutional arrangements (e.g. 
communications between the political executive and the royal family in constitutional 
monarchies), or matters whose exemption is largely idiosyncratic (e.g. many of those 
subsumed under the heading “Administration – Research Activities”). Although these 
kinds of information may be perceived as important enough to protect in these coun-
tries, they do not undermine the claim that these acts are a sound basis for cross-
national comparison. 
  
                                                                           
 
5  The rationale for the selection of countries in 
 
Table 1 is discussed in the next section of this chapter. This table is intended to give an overview of the kinds of in-
formation exempted by each access law, and as a result the column headings do not necessarily reflect the exact 
wording of specific exemptions in each law. In some cases, information is marked here as exempt even though it is 
not explicitly mentioned in the law. One example is Sweden, where the law only applies to “finished” documents 
and therefore excludes draft documents by implication. In other cases, several narrow categories from different 
laws have been combined into a single broader category for the sake of brevity and readability (e.g. “Administra-
tion - Research Activities”).  
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Table 1: Exemptions from Administrative Transparency Laws 
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Australia •  • •  • • • • • • • • • •  • •  • • • •   • • • • 
Austria6 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - • 
Belgium   •    • •  •  •    •    • • •   •  • • 
Canada    • • • •   • •  • •     •   • •   • • • • 
Costa Rica7  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Denmark   • • • •   • • • • •    •   •  • •     •  
Finland •  • •  •  •   •  •   •   •  • • • •    • • 
France     •  • •   •  • •        • •     • • 
Germany •       •   • • •      •  • • •   •  • • 
Iceland • • • •       • • •    •     • •     •  
India •          • • •    •   •  • •     •  
Ireland •    • • • •   • • • •   •  • •  • •   •  • • 
Israel  • • • •      •  •      •  • • •   •  • • 
Italy    • •  •  •  •  •      •   • •     • • 
Japan •   • • •     •  •        • • •   •  •  
Luxembourg7 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Netherlands •          • • •   •  •    • •     •  
New Zealand •    •  • • • • • • • •   • • •   • •   • • •  
Norway8   • •   •    •  •    •  •   • ¢ • •   • • 
Sweden •  •    •    •  •   •      • •     •  
Switzerland   •  •  • •  • • • •         • •   •  • • 
United Kingdom   •  •  • • • • • • • •  •  •  •  • •   • • • • 
USA9   • •    •   • • •   •      • •     ¢ • 
Source: National freedom of information laws in each country. 
Key: • = law explicitly exempts this information; ¢  = law implicitly exempts this information. 
                                                                           
 
6 The data for Austria reflects the ambiguous nature of the Auskunftspflichtgesetz (Duty to Grant Information Act 1987). It 
provides no right of access to documents, and Article 1 explicitly preserves existing exemptions and statutory du-
ties of secrecy. From the perspective of requesters, it therefore fails to deliver certainty, and has been shown here 
as exempting all categories in order to maintain a rough degree of comparability with other regimes.  
7 These countries do not have access to information laws, and have been presented as if they contained all exemp-
tions exhibited by the other countries listed here, for the same reasons as Austria (discussed above). 
8 There is no explicit general exemption for commercially-sensitive data in the Norwegian act, but s5a refers to ex-
plicit exemptions in other statutes, and a range of specific-purpose laws require officials to maintain the secrecy of 
financial and other commercially-sensitive information. 
9 The USA is listed as partially protecting personal privacy because several exemptions in the Freedom of Information 
Act specifically mention privacy concerns as relevant in particular contexts; a separate law protecting privacy also 
exists in the USA, but is generally agreed to be weaker than those in other countries (Flaherty 1989:305).  
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The final methodological advantage is that the law provides a convenient point around 
which to orient a comparative study of the processes within each country by which of-
ficial control over information became defined as a problem, by which general public 
rights of access were identified as the appropriate solution, and by which that solution 
was put in place. The dates on which different countries adopted their laws constitute 
points of comparable significance, at which they can reasonably be said to have made 
similar formal public commitments to transparency; it is certainly a much sounder ba-
sis than a single calendar date (e.g. 1976, as used by Bennett 1991). Comparison on the 
basis of points of common significance makes it possible to examine more rigorously 
whether countries were all subject to similar pressures for reform (by, inter alia, exam-
ining whether the causes were actually present, whether they pre-dated the outcome, 
and whether there is historical evidence to suggest they were relevant), and whether 
countries experiencing similar pressures were equally sensitive to them (measured, for 
example, by how much time elapsed after the onset of putatively-favourable conditions 
for debate to arise and for legislation to be enacted). The legislative process also pro-
vides a convenient source of counterfactuals for comparative analysis, in the form of 
proposals for freedom of information which are rejected. The dates of adoption deci-
sions are useful, in other words, because they allow systematic assessment of the rela-
tive importance of different potential contributory factors through attention to se-
quencing, duration and possible causal relevance.  
Why Study the Consolidated Democracies? 
The adoption of freedom of information acts around the world is depicted in Figure 1 
below. This shows the number of countries with a law in every year between 1700 and 
2009. For most of this period, only one country had one: Sweden, which adopted its first 
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in 1766 and, after a hiatus later in that century, the direct ancestor of its current regime 
during the parliamentary restoration of 1809. Colombia was the second, in 1888.10 Fin-
land was next in 1951, consolidating a long–standing tradition of transparent adminis-
trative practice inherited in part from the time when it was part of Sweden. A turning 
point appears to have occurred in the 1960s. Since then, an increasing number of coun-
tries have passed laws, and in 2009 the number was just short of ninety (the exact num-
ber depends on whether analysts include self–governing territories as “countries”, and 
whether they count especially “strong” subordinate legislation; both have been exclud-
ed here). 
Figure 1: Countries with Freedom of Information Acts 
 
Source: (Vleugels 2009) 
 The global spread of access laws is interesting because it is explained in very similar 
terms to the global recognition of transparency discussed earlier in the chapter. Very 
broadly, if somewhat schematically, these explanations emphasise one of three kinds of 
                                                                           
 
10 The available sources are unclear on the specific rights provided by this law, and also on whether it applied to the 
whole of Colombia or only the municipal administration of Bogotá. It has been treated as a full access law for the 
purposes of Figure 1 on the basis that it is often mentioned as such in the secondary literature, but does not feature 
prominently in the body of the thesis for reasons explained later in the chapter. 
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factors: ideological change, agency, and transformations in the social and political con-
text in which governments operate. 
The adoption of access laws is widely assumed to be at least partly due to the emer-
gence of the widespread consensus about the normative desirability of transparency 
discussed in the first part of this chapter, and especially its democratic merits (Florini 
2007b; Margetts 2011:518). The link between the two is, however, often based more on 
assertion than on hard evidence. This is especially true of works by activists and practi-
tioners, who routinely portray adoption as a consequence of officials accepting the le-
gitimacy of open government and popular democratic participation (e.g. Archibald 
1993:726-8; Relyea 2001; Banisar 2005; Shrivastava 2009). The small number of rigorous 
scholarly works on this subject tend to emphasise coercive or mimetic rather norma-
tive isomorphism. One influential early study emphasised the importance of the diffu-
sion of ideas among policy élites about how to address domestic problems rising from 
state growth rather than an international democratic consensus (Bennett 1997). Two 
subsequent studies have downplayed the importance of domestic factors, pointing in-
stead to advocacy by international governmental organisations and the desire by local 
élites to signal acceptance of particular norms to international markets (Grigorescu 
2003; Roberts 2003). 
Ideological explanations often overlap substantially with agency-based explanations, 
and are common in studies of the development of many kinds of political institutions, 
not just freedom of information. These usually hold that institutions exist because they 
are consciously and deliberately created by those who benefit from them, and that they 
persist and evolve because of the ongoing support of those same actors (Thelen 2003; 
Pierson 2006:105). Activists usually emphasise the agency of domestic political actors. 
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The introduction of access laws is widely held to be a response to demand from their 
primary supposed beneficiaries – “the public” and civil society organizations. Cases of 
surprisingly late adoption are attributed to resistance by government officials motivat-
ed by political or institutional self-interest. Scholars, by contrast, have tended to em-
phasise the agency of international rather than domestic actors, and to be more sensi-
tive to the importance of unintended consequences. An important body of scholarship 
grounded in international relations argues that transparency mechanisms have spread 
under pressure from powerful national governments because they represent a cheaper 
alternative to regulation through coercive inspection and military intervention (e.g. 
Florini 1998; Mitchell 1998; Finel and Lord 1999; Blanton 2002b; Hale 2004). They are 
preferable, so the argument runs, given both the increasing interdependence of nation-
al economic, political and military networks and the recent generalised shift towards 
market–based mechanisms for resource allocation. A smaller but growing body of polit-
ical science literature emphasises the role of donor organisations like the World Bank, 
cooperative forums such as the OECD, and international civil society organisations like 
Article 19, Access Info Europe and Amnesty International (e.g. Bennett 1997; Grigorescu 
2003). 
Third and finally, many works on this subject also emphasise the importance of adapta-
tion to new social, administrative and technological conditions such as the financialisa-
tion of the global economy, the development of a free press and the emergence of post-
materialist political concerns (e.g. Hood 2006a:214-5; Lord 2006:5-10; McDonald 
2006:129; Relly and Cullier 2010). Perhaps the most basic structural contributor of all is 
the development of the bureaucratic state, since the question of administrative trans-
parency would probably not arise in the absence of official capacity to engage in secre-
cy (Bennett 1997; Florini 2007b:7-8). Bureaucracy is of enormous importance, and its 
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influence is discussed at considerable length in the next chapter. By far the most com-
monly-cited structural factor, among academics and activists alike, is the popularisa-
tion of the Internet. By reducing the transmission and reproduction costs of infor-
mation, so the claim runs, the ‘Net has produced new patterns of demand, made possi-
ble new patterns of political and administrative communication and collaboration, and 
thereby rendered traditional, highly rule-bound bureaucratic governance obsolete 
(Holzner and Holzner 2006; Margetts 2006; e.g. Fung, et al. 2007; Margetts 2011:518). 
These factors are all plausible explanations for the recent surge in interest in the poli-
tics of information among academics and policy professionals, and as subsequent chap-
ters show, many have contributed to recent legislative activity in at least some coun-
tries. But as explanations for the differing adoption of freedom of information acts, they 
are somewhat unsatisfactory. With a small number of recent and partial exceptions dis-
cussed below, scholarship on this subject has been framed a search for features shared 
by adopting countries, and it is routinely assumed that these causes have the same ef-
fect wherever they are present. There is, thus, a significant possibility of selection bias 
in many existing accounts (cf. Geddes 1990). The possibility that the same factors might 
also be present in countries without access laws is rarely given serious consideration, 
nor is the possibility that particular causes might only be relevant in some countries or 
under certain circumstances. This lack of attention to causal complexity means that 
relatively little serious attention has been given to the possibility that the adoption of 
freedom of information might be an instance of “equifinality” rather than classic con-
vergence – that the same outcome might be the result of more than one set of causes, 
and that there might be considerable variation in causes among countries which all 
share the outcome of interest. 
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There is good reason to suspect that the causes of freedom of information are indeed 
more complex than has hitherto been recognised. The presumption of causal homoge-
neity is inconsistent with the primary and secondary evidence for many countries, 
which bear witness to a very great degree of causal heterogeneity (e.g. Lasserre, et al. 
1987; Vincent 1998; Terrill 2000; Higgs 2004; Wegener 2006). One need only consider the 
fact that at least half a dozen countries had introduced access laws well before the pop-
ularisation of the Internet in the mid-1990s, while many have yet to do so almost two 
decades later, to see that a prominent and widely-cited cause like information technol-
ogy has had very different effects in different countries. That existing approaches are 
unsatisfactory is also strongly suggested by the fact that the small number of rigorous, 
empirically-oriented studies in this field often proceed by rejecting the conclusions of 
other studies, but then produce results for which they are unable to account – such as 
that stronger democracy does not seem to contribute to (perceptions of) greater trans-
parency (Relly and Sabharwal 2009:155), that higher numbers of veto players make 
freedom of information more likely despite theoretical expectations that they should 
encourage policy stability (Berliner 2010:25), or that different information policies are 
adopted at different rates despite rapid diffusion of knowledge (Bennett 1997:227-8). 
The Evolving Relationship between Democracy and Transparency 
This thesis seeks to show that these causes are more complex without necessarily being 
completely random or idiosyncratic: that cross-national variation can be understood 
and explained in systematic terms. It does so by focusing on the adoption of freedom of 
information among the consolidated democracies. This focus has been adopted three 
reasons. First, the differences between these countries are large. Second, they cannot be 
easily explained as mono-causal convergence on a highly-participatory, liberal individ-
ual kind of democracy, as is often assumed (or occasionally claimed) by existing works. 
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And third, these differences have been largely neglected even by the small portion of 
the scholarly literature which has attempted to provide genuinely causal explanations. 
These countries thus provide an appealing basis for building a more nuanced under-
standing of the adoption of freedom of information, and of the broader political signifi-
cance of general public rights of access to information – one which is more sensitive to 
causal heterogeneity, complexity and equifinality than has so far been offered. The fol-
lowing chapters examine many of the specific contributory factors mentioned above; 
the following discussion justifies the selection of the consolidated democracies by 
demonstrating the insufficiency of one of the most widespread explanations of all for 
the diffusion of freedom of information laws: democracy.  
The idea that there might be an association between access rights and democracy is not 
implausible. Apart from the enormous body of theoretical literature discussed earlier, 
the earliest modern access laws were introduced in democratic countries.11 On the oth-
er hand, the relationship is not nearly so straightforward as might be imagined.  In 
most countries, the attitudes towards access of the major protagonists have been highly 
variable: not all bureaucrats have resisted access laws with equal vigour, and not all re-
sistance can plausibly be attributed to a lack of commitment to democracy (Robertson 
1999:1-7). On an ideological level, democratic accountability has frequently been in-
voked against access rights, often successfully (Robertson 1999:2), while the relation-
ship between democratic institutions and access laws has also varied between countries 
and over time. 
                                                                           
 
11 The term “modern” is employed here to distinguish laws passed in the 20th and 21st Centuries, which meet all four 
criteria outlined earlier, from earlier laws in places like Sweden, Finland and Colombia which met some, but not all. 
The Swedish law, for example, lacked specified exemptions until the 1930s. 
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The variable relationship between freedom of information and democracy can be readi-
ly demonstrated with cross–national time–series data on political institutions. Several 
suitable datasets exist, and although none are without shortcomings (Munck and 
Verkuilen 2002), two of the most widely–used are suitable for present purposes. These 
are the Polity IV data series (Marshall and Jaggers 2009b) and Tatu Vanhanen’s (2009) 
Measures of Democratization. Polity IV provides coded qualitative data on the political 
characteristics of 140 major countries from 1800 onwards, and can be used to establish 
the existence of formal political institutions and practices such as free and fair elections 
and checks on the exercise of government authority. Measures of Democratization pro-
vides data on two key aspects of democratic practice – electoral turnout and major–
party share of the vote – for 190 countries from 1810 onwards. It shows whether voters 
had, and whether they exercised, a meaningful choice between viable alternative gov-
ernments. As might be expected from sources which provide different data and are 
based on different assumptions, there are some discrepancies. Applying a fairly restric-
tive set of criteria to Polity IV reveals that 71 countries could be considered fully demo-
cratic in 2008;12 according to Measures of Democratization there were 130.13 The apparent 
discrepancy of 59 countries is less significant than it appears: 19 are small countries not 
covered by Polity IV, while the focus in Measures of Democratization on electoral politics 
rather than checks on the exercise of executive power means it tends to rate countries 
                                                                           
 
12 Polity IV includes a composite indicator for the institutionalisation of democracy, but it is unsuitable because it adds 
together values for distinct categorical variables. Since the argument to be developed in this thesis is that different 
configurations of institutions have different effects, a more specific set of criteria were applied (an approach the 
authors themselves recommend; cf. Marshall and Jaggers 2009a:14). A country is considered to be democratic here 
where political participation is widespread and organised around enduring national political organisations, where 
those in power do not systematically attempt to disenfranchise their opponents by changing the rules of the game, 
and where power is won through open, competitive elections. These criteria are consistent with definitions used in 
other influential studies (cf. Rueschemeyer, et al. 1991:43-4; Linz and Stepan 1996:7-15). They were applied both to 
the legislature, and also to the chief executive in countries where that position is separately elected. In terms of the 
Polity IV dataset, the specific criteria were: XRReg=3 and XRComp=3 and XROpen≥3 and XConst≥2 and (ParReg=2 or 
ParReg≥4) and ParComp≥3. Throughout this thesis, “Germany” refers to West Germany prior to reunification, and 
the unified Federal Republic thereafter.  
13 Following Vanhanen’s own suggestion (2003:65), the criteria applied to Measures of Democratization were Competi-
tion≥30 and Participation≥20. 
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as democratic earlier, and this inflates its total somewhat. The differences between the 
two datasets are not contradictory, but merely evidence of different emphases. 
Figure 2 below shows the same data as Figure 1, together with the number of countries 
which were democratic in that year and which remained continuously democratic until 
2008 according to the two indices.14 This figure is prima facie consistent with Bennett’s 
(1997) claim that democracy was a necessary condition for the development of access 
rights during the 20th Century, but that it was not sufficient. The number of democra-
cies and the number of countries with access laws have both risen over the course of 
the 20th Century, and their rate of increase has itself risen over time. If the two excep-
tionally early cases of Sweden and Colombia are excluded, there were more democra-
cies than countries with access regimes until sometime around 2005 at the earliest, and 
until the late 1990s every country which had an access law was a democracy. On the 
other hand, not all democracies have access laws, even today.  
Figure 2: Democracies and Countries with Freedom of Information Acts 
 
Source: (Marshall and Jaggers 2009b; Vanhanen 2009; Vleugels 2009) 
                                                                           
 
14 In order to ensure the data are comparable, Figure 2 has been truncated at 2008, the last year covered by all three 
datasets. Vleugels provides data for 2009. 
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The relationship between democracy and transparency was more complex in the mid-
1990s, although this is not obvious in Figure 2. The dramatic increase in laws during this 
period was largely the result of activity in countries which had recently democratised. 
This suggests that the third wave of democratisation occurred at a time when access to 
information was considered part of democracy, alongside things such as free and fair 
elections, and rights to free speech and assembly (cf. Roberts 2006a:107-123). 
The transformation in the relationship between access rights and democracy can be 
seen more clearly in Figure 3. Each point on this chart represents a democratic country 
with an access to information law. The horizontal axis shows the year of transition to 
the current democratic regime according to the two datasets being used here. The ver-
tical axis shows the number of years after that transition before an access law was in-
troduced. Note that the distance between the points and the horizontal axis becomes 
shorter as one moves to the right: the period between the transition to democracy and 
the introduction of a transparency law has become shorter over time. 
Figure 3: Gap Between Democratisation and Freedom of Information Law 
 
Source: (Marshall and Jaggers 2009b; Vanhanen 2009; Vleugels 2009)  
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The countries depicted at the far right of Figure 3 suggest that, by the early 21st Centu-
ry, freedom of information had apparently become more than just an accepted part of 
what it was to be a democracy. 15 By this time, several countries introduced laws prior to 
making the transition, and as of 2008 four non–democratic countries had introduced 
access laws (Pakistan, Tajikistan, Thailand and Uzbekistan). Democracy is apparently no 
longer even necessary for the introduction of an access law; these laws are, rather, a 
means for countries to present themselves as democratic despite lacking other essential 
features of a functioning democracy. 
Consolidated Democracies as the Universe of Significant Cases 
Scholarly studies of freedom of information have only recently begun to seriously con-
front the possibility that the relationship between democracy and access is far less 
straightforward than usually supposed. Most of these recent efforts have focussed on 
adoption decisions in parts of the world where the case for a democratic explanation is 
far weaker – whether it be recent adopters in the developing world (Berliner 2010), or 
parts of the world to which freedom of information has diffused only very unevenly 
(Relly and Cullier 2010). There persists a largely unexamined assumption that strong 
democracy favours transparency, and relatively little attention has yet been paid to the 
considerable differences which exist between the consolidated democracies, where 
conditions should have been most favourable. 
For present purposes, the “consolidated democracies” are defined as those countries 
which met either the Polity IV or Measures of Democratization criteria outlined above in 
                                                                           
 
15 To make it easier to see the changes which have occurred over the course of the 20th Century, Figure 3 omits two 
early outliers (Sweden and Colombia) which legislated a long time before democratising and which should appear 
well below the x-axis. The four countries which have access laws but are not democratic according to either dataset 
(Pakistan, Tajikistan, Thailand and Uzbekistan) might be placed just off the bottom right corner, but have not been 
included because their location is by definition unknown. Similarly, the five countries that have access laws but are 
not tracked by either dataset (Kosovo, Serbia, Aruba, the Dutch Antilles, and Liechtenstein) do not appear either.  
  45 
every year since 1955. There are twenty–three such countries: Australia, Austria, Bel-
gium, Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, India, Ireland, 
Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Swit-
zerland, the United Kingdom, and the USA.16 Interestingly, although the countries 
which qualified as democratic under each dataset diverge for other periods, the two are 
in almost complete agreement here; the only difference is that Measures of Democratiza-
tion counts Iceland and Luxembourg as democratic, whereas Polity IV does not provide 
data on either. 
The year 1955 has been chosen, perhaps somewhat arbitrarily, for two reasons. Firstly, 
it marks the end of the Allied occupation of Austria, and is as good a point as any to 
mark the end of the disruptions caused by the War to regular self-government. Second-
ly, this period covers the introduction of access laws in every country except Sweden, 
Finland (which introduced its access law in 1951 but which shares much of the relevant 
constitutional, political and administrative history with Sweden), and Colombia (which 
has been excluded from this study because it was not democratic throughout the post–
war era). It thus captures those countries which were already firmly democratic well 
before the idea of freedom of information became widely-accepted as part of the idea of 
democracy, and which have remained so continuously to the present. 
That there is considerable variation in the timing of their legislation can be seen in Figure 4 below, and in   
                                                                           
 
16 Of these 23 countries, only France and India failed to qualify as democracies according to both criteria for the en-
tire post-war period. Both experienced severe disruptions to regular democratic government: France with the col-
lapse of the Fourth Republic and the establishment of the Fifth in 1958; India with the Emergency of 1975-77. De-
spite this, the periods during which they failed to qualify as fully democratic were brief departures from an overall 
democratic experience; they are, moreover, the only two countries which fail to qualify under only one of the two 
measures. All other candidates for the title “consolidated democracy” fail to qualify under both at some point. 
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Table 1 on page 48. A small number legislated before the 1970s, and there was a burst of 
legislation in the five years between 1978 and 1983. A later, and more sustained period 
of reform occurred in the 1990s and continued into the new millennium. By 2005, only 
two countries on this list did not have a regular law enshrining access to information. 
These are Costa Rica, where proposals have been raised in parliament but no action has 
been taken, and Luxembourg, where legislation is pending as of early 2011. Two other 
countries had laws which are sometimes described as freedom of information acts but 
which failed to meet one or more of the four criteria laid out above for some or all of 
this period: Italy, which only qualified from 2005, and Austria.  
Figure 4: Consolidated Democracies with Freedom of Information Acts 
 
Source: (Marshall and Jaggers 2009b; Vanhanen 2009; Vleugels 2009) 
These countries are also worthy of examination because the differences between them 
cannot be explained solely with reference to the existence or “strength” of democracy. 
The USA, for example, had been democratic for at least a century according to one of 
the definitions proposed above before it introduced a functioning right of access in 
1966. This is arguably the most influential and widely-used access law in the world, and 
transparency is both prominent in American political discourse and routinely framed in 
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terms of popular democratic control. Clearly, even in an environment as propitious as 
this, the mere existence of a democratic system is not a sufficient explanation. More 
problematic still are countries like the UK, which had been democratic since 1918, and 
Germany which was democratic throughout the post–war era. Both were slow to legis-
late, only doing so in the new millennium once democratic aspirations had apparently 
become a sufficient condition in countries with far weaker traditions of democracy-in-
practice. Why did these countries wait so long, despite the USA serving as a clear exam-
ple? These are not isolated cases. Switzerland was recognisably democratic for over 155 
years according to Polity IV before introducing a law at the national level in 2005. Why, 
if democracy is the explanation, did it take almost forty years longer than the USA? 
And, finally, can any explanation which works in these countries also be applied to 
Sweden, a nation which became fully democratic in the 1920s, but which introduced its 
law a century and a half before full male adult suffrage? 
These are, furthermore, all countries in which the rule of law generally prevails, where 
the bureaucracy is (with certain partial exceptions) well-resourced and professional, 
and where civil society and the media are free and active. They are, in other words, 
countries in which differences in adoption cannot readily be attributed to the absence 
of the material preconditions which might reasonably be expected to ensure an effec-
tive access law. Legislation cannot reasonably be explained in terms of governments 
wishing to appear democratic with no expectation that they will ever be put into prac-
tice. Quite the contrary, the fact that access laws are more likely to be effective here 
than elsewhere means that disputes over their introduction are more likely to be based 
on and to reveal reasonable expectations on the part of important political actors about 
their effects than might otherwise be the case.  
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Table 2: Information Access Rights in Consolidated Democracies17 
 Constitutional Rights Legislative Rights 
Australia Nil Freedom of Information Act 1982 [1983,2004] 
Austria18 Art 20(a), Constitution of 1987 Law on the Duty to Grant Information 1987 
Belgium Art 32, Constitution of 1831 [1993] Law on Transparency in Administration 1994 [2000] 
Canada Nil Access to Information Act 1982 [2007] 
Costa Rica Art 30, Political Constitution of 1949 Nil 
Denmark Nil 
Party Access Law 1965; Act on Access of the Pub-
lic to Documents in Administrative Files 1970; 
Access to Public Administration Files Act 1985 
Finland Nil Freedom of the Press Law 1919 [1951]; Act on the Openness of Government Activities 1999 
France 
Art 14, Declaration of the Rights of Man and the 
Citizen 1789 (1970); Art 34, Constitution of 1958 
(2002) 
Law Number 78-753 of 17 July 1978 [2000] 
Germany Nil19 Act to Regulate Access to Federal Government Information 2005 
Iceland Nil Information Act 1996 [2003] 
India s19(1)(a), Constitution of 1950 (1975) Right to Information Act 2002 [2005] 
Ireland Nil Freedom of Information Act 1997 [2003] 
Israel Declaration of Independence 1948 (1953,1990) Freedom of Information Law 1998 
Italy18 Nil Law No. 241 of 1990 [2005] 
Japan Nil19 Law Concerning Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs 1999 [2003] 
Luxembourg Nil Nil 
Netherlands Article 110, Constitution of 1983 
Act on Public Access to Information 1978; Gov-
ernment Information (Public Access) Act 1991 
[2005] 
New Zealand s14, Bill of Rights Act 1990 Official Information Act 1982 [1993] 
Norway Art 100, Constitution of 1814 [2004] Freedom of Information Act 1970 [1992, 2004] 
Sweden Freedom of the Press Act 1809 Freedom of the Press Act 1809 [1937,1949, 1976] 
Switzerland Nil19 Federal Law on the Principle of Administrative Transparency 2004 
United Kingdom Nil Freedom of Information Act 2000 
United States Nil Freedom of Information Act 1966 [1974, 1986, 1996, 2008] 
Source: (Banisar 2006; Vleugels 2009; Author's own research) 
                                                                           
 
17 Dates in brackets in the column on Constitutional Rights indicate when the relevant provisions were actually put in 
place, since these were almost always introduced via amendment. Dates in round brackets indicate judicial deci-
sions; dates in square brackets indicate legislative amendment.  
18 In some sources, Austria’s Auskunftspflichtgesetz is described as a freedom of information act (Banisar 2006; Vleugels 
2009), but in others it is not. On its face, the law does not grant a right of access to original documents as such, but 
rather imposes a duty on the administration to answer questions. In this thesis, Austria will generally be treated as 
“opaque”. Similarly, Italy’s 1990 law is routinely described as a freedom of information act, but on its face actually 
provides something like a Common Law right of discovery; it became an access law as that term is defined in this 
thesis only in 2005, when legislative amendments were put in place to bring the text of the law in line with an in-
creasingly liberal line of jurisprudence (in which the kind of “interest” required was broadened to the point where 
it effectively meant “any citizen”). Italy is treated as opaque before 2005. Both laws have been included here for the 
sake of consistency with the quoted sources. 
19 The constitutions of these countries refer to something which appears to be “freedom of information”, but this has 
been interpreted by their courts to mean a prohibition on demand-side censorship (i.e. on states punishing citizens 
for consulting sources which are intended to be publicly available, such as newspapers) not a right to access official 
files (which are defined as not intended to be publicly available). 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that a comparative historical study of freedom of information 
acts in the consolidated democracies would make a valuable contribution to scholarly 
knowledge on a matter of increasing theoretical and practical importance. 
Freedom of information acts have, rightly, received considerable attention because 
they touch on issues which go to the very heart of democracy in the information age. 
The ready availability of information about what governments do and why is increas-
ingly recognised as an important contributor to the exercise of numerous civil and po-
litical rights, and as essential to efficient, responsive, legitimate public administration. 
These acts are one of many mechanisms by which access to important official infor-
mation is provided. But, as the mechanism with the broadest scope and the strongest 
presumption in favour of requesters deciding what they should be able to see, they pro-
vide an appealing basis for this study because they come closest of all the alternatives 
to embodying a legislative commitment to transparency in its broadest sense. 
A comparative study of the history of these laws is desirable because most of the exist-
ing literature on this subject addresses the theoretical merits of access to information, 
and the small amount of empirically-oriented work generally focusses on deviations 
from normative standards. This has left it in a surprisingly poor position to explain why 
countries make the normative trade-offs they do, and what the actual interests at stake 
in the politics of access to information might be. 
The consolidated democracies are worthy of attention because differences between 
them cannot be readily explained on the basis of the normative assumptions which un-
derpin most of the literature on this subject. A study of these countries is therefore like-
ly to reveal important influences which have hitherto been neglected. 
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An historical approach, finally, is appealing because it allows a systematic investigation 
of the broader politics of transparency which is more sensitive to local context than as-
sessment against predetermined normative framework. Freedom of information acts, 
like most laws, are the outcomes of long processes of negotiation and conflict. These 
processes reveal the kinds of information which are understood to be important, the 
interests which public disclosure serves or disadvantages, and the circumstances which 
favour attempts to realise these goals specifically through public rights of access rather 
than other means.  
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Chapter 2: Hierarchy, Secrecy 
and Power 
The previous chapter laid out an ambitious project: to explain variations in the adop-
tion of freedom of information acts among the twenty-three countries which have been 
democratic throughout the post-war era. This chapter explains how the rest of the the-
sis will accomplish that aim. 
It begins by justifying the decision, foreshadowed in the Introduction, to explain this 
variation primarily in institutional terms. It does so on two complementary grounds. 
The first is that institutions have proved an extremely fruitful basis for explaining 
cross-national variation in the development of many features of modern democratic 
politics and government. The second is that information derives a great deal of its value 
in contemporary democracies from the institutional structure of a small number of po-
litical processes, and that freedom of information constitutes an attempt to shift the 
balance of power in these processes by altering their operation without changing their 
formal structure.  
The chapter then identifies the specific institutional arrangements most likely to be 
relevant. It does this by building on Max Weber’s work on bureaucracy, and specifically 
his insight that there is a mutually-constitutive relationship between control over the 
distribution of information, hierarchical organisational structure, and the rules which 
regulate the exercise of state authority. Through a critical engagement with this and 
with more recent literature on bureaucracy and democracy, it identifies five institu-
tionalised political relationships common to the consolidated democracies within 
which qualitatively distinct disputes over public access to official information arise. The 
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five empirical chapters which follow demonstrate that the manner in which these rela-
tions are organised and institutionalised very largely explain when and why different 
countries adopted freedom of information acts. These relationships are: the electoral 
bond between voters and politicians; the administrative relationship between citizens 
and the state; negotiations between peripheral interest groups and the political execu-
tive over the formulation of public policy; patterns of interaction between established 
(economic) interest groups and the state as a whole; and relations between elected po-
litical executives and the administrative bureaucracy. 
The chapter concludes by arguing that the goal of explaining institutional change in a 
way which is sensitive to causal complexity using historical evidence strongly favours 
the use of comparative methods inspired by John Stuart Mill. It also shows how one of 
the most important shortcomings of these methods, namely the practical impossibility 
of applying them to large numbers of cases, will be addressed: by focussing on five 
countries which exhibit considerable variation in their institutional arrangements and 
adoption of freedom of information, namely France, Germany, Sweden, the UK and the 
USA. In the course of doing all these things, this chapter also considers those rare works 
which explicitly confront causal complexity and cross-national variation in transparen-
cy, highlighting the strengths on which later chapters draw and the weaknesses which 
they seek to address. 
Why Institutions Matter 
Politically-oriented social scientists have become increasingly interested in institutions 
over recent decades (Thelen and Steinmo 1992; Rothstein 1998; Rhodes 2008), in part 
because they help to explain differing outcomes in countries facing broadly similar 
pressures for change. The previous chapter noted several common explanations for the 
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increasingly widespread introduction of legislative rights of public access to official 
files. In conceptual terms, these are of three types: the diffusion of ideas about the way 
government ought to work, changing patterns of political demand, and transformations 
in the social and technological environment within which governments operate. Each 
of these might plausibly be invoked as a contributor to the overall trend towards legis-
lating access, but as this and subsequent chapters will show, none is capable on its own 
of explaining the different position occupied by individual democracies within that 
trend. It is now widely recognised that interactions between these kinds of pressure 
and existing institutional configurations propel countries along distinctive national tra-
jectories rather than bringing about rapid convergence on a single common outcome 
(Thelen and Steinmo 1992; Pontusson 1995; Hall and Taylor 1996; Amenta 2003; 
Goldstone 2003; Skocpol 2003), and that they do this in at least three ways. 
Firstly, institutions mediate between patterns of demand and political outcomes. Insti-
tutions governing political competition and the exercise of public authority vary be-
tween countries in ways which provide similar groups with different opportunities to 
pursue their interests. Legislatures and political executives differ, for example, in their 
capacity to resist pressure from external interest groups for reasons which are related 
directly to their organisational structure, rules of operation and position in the overall 
constitutional order (cf. Kitschelt 1986; Dryzek 1992). Within the legislative process it-
self, the number, identity and interests of players with the capacity to block proposals 
for reform or resist them once in place also vary from system to system (Tsebelis 2002; 
Pierson 2006:145-7). Institutions also embody particular conceptions of what consti-
tutes a legitimate political demand in the first place, and of how these demands ought 
to be made; these can also systematically favour some outcomes over others. Chapters 
Three and Five show that civil society demand for access rights led fairly directly to 
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their emergence in some countries, but that campaigners met with success much earli-
er in some than others due to precisely these kinds of institutional variations. 
Secondly, institutions matter because they influence the configuration of interests at 
stake in disputes (Immergut 1998:18 et sqq). One reason for this is that institutions 
serve, among other things, to realise particular conceptions of how government ought 
to work, and serve to balance different normative goals when they cannot all be real-
ised in full – and as the previous chapter showed, this is almost certainly true of trans-
parency. Institutional arrangements vary from country to country as a result of distinc-
tive processes of historical development, with the result that proposals to improve per-
formance against any one normative goal are likely to imply different trade-offs in dif-
ferent jurisdictions. Formally-identical reforms like freedom of information acts can 
thus have quite different implications depending on the context into which they are 
introduced (Cain, et al. 2003:118). Institutions matter, in other words, not just because 
they structure the opportunities available to those who seek reform, but also because 
they help determine whether specific reforms are considered valuable in the first place. 
This touches the third important feature of institutions: they tend to exhibit inertia. 
The reasons for this have been extensively examined by Paul Pierson (2006), who high-
lights features which are distinctive to the political sphere (including coordination 
problems, the uncertainty and opacity of political processes, and the fact that institu-
tions tend to entrench the power of particular actors), and those shared by institutions 
in many spheres (including adaptive expectations, sunk costs and increasing returns). 
One result of this inertia is that political institutions tend to exhibit “path dependence”: 
choices made early in the process of institutionalising a particular process, conflict or 
policy domain tend to reflect a wide range of influences and even a degree of outright 
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chance (Mahoney and Schensul 2006). But over time, the range of feasible options tends 
to narrow as choices which are radically inconsistent with existing arrangements be-
come increasingly difficult to make. Later reforms tend to be consistent with existing 
institutions, and entrench the status quo still further by producing a densely-layered 
arrangement of mutually reinforcing institutions. 
Historical institutionalism is sometimes criticised for explaining stasis at the expense of 
change, so it is important to note that the concepts of persistence and inertia are de-
ployed here as a means of explaining variation within an overall trend. The working as-
sumption here is not that institutions fully determine outcomes or are immune to re-
form of any kind, merely that radical departures from existing arrangements should be 
rare because institutions constrain behaviour. Change is still possible because institu-
tional arrangements are never perfectly coherent, and they may evolve in several ways. 
Arrangements which once existed in a relatively stable dynamic equilibrium might be-
come unstable due to the (unintended) consequences of incremental reforms elsewhere 
(Thelen 2003:225-8). Indeed, freedom of information itself relies on precisely this effect, 
as the next section of the chapter discusses. Alternatively, arrangements which are sta-
ble under particular social, technological, economic or environmental conditions might 
become less so if conditions change, thereby making deliberate reform easier to 
achieve. The effects of destabilisation may not be straightforward, however, because 
any given change is likely to affect different institutions to differing degrees. Where 
institutions are densely layered, the effect of new conditions will still be mediated by 
unaffected institutions. 
Historical institutionalism suggests that, even if a group of countries arrive at the same 
formal outcome and exhibit the same set of broad, theoretically-relevant causal factors, 
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the precise manner in which they arrive will probably differ significantly from case to 
case. One implication of pervasive interaction between institutions is that the resilience 
of any particular institution when faced with a particular kind of pressure for reform 
may well vary depending on the presence or absence of other institutions with which it 
interacts. Similarly, particular combinations of institutional structures may only be sus-
ceptible to particular combinations of pressure for reform. This so-called “multiple con-
junctural causation” implies that there need not be any particular threshold of, say, 
demand or technological development above which all countries introduce access laws; 
those which are particularly susceptible to the identification of access rights as a solu-
tion to political disputes may well do so at extremely low levels, whereas those with in-
stitutional arrangements which are more robust (or which are able to adapt to pressure 
in other ways) may do so only at much higher levels. 
The Institutional Politics of Information 
Historical institutionalism is an appropriate paradigm for examining cross-national 
variations in the adoption freedom of information because these laws are simultaneous-
ly the outcome of highly-institutionalised forms of political conflict and attempts to al-
ter the terms on which that conflict occurs. The previous chapter showed that trans-
parency is valued because of its effects on the ways political authority is won, exercised, 
legitimised, constrained and held to account. These are all highly-institutionalised pro-
cesses, both in the sense that they are governed by formal rules (cf. March and Olsen 
2008:3), and that many of the most important participants in them are collective actors 
whose existence, structure, capacities and interests are influenced by formal rules 
(Pierson 2006:104). Freedom of information seeks to achieve the normative goals out-
lined at the start of the previous chapter by redistributing an important political re-
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source rather than by directly altering the formal institutional structure of democratic 
politics. But the capacity of collective actors to control or make use of information is 
very largely related to their organisational form, while their attitudes towards disclos-
ing it to or obtaining it from others are highly likely to vary with their position in the 
overall structure of power. In short, the kinds of information which are seen to be use-
ful, the capacity to make use of them, and the interests which are served by enforced 
public disclosure are inseparable from the way politics and government are organised 
and conducted (cf. Robertson 1999:159-60). 
The insight that control over the distribution of information is both cause and effect of 
the institutional structure of government is conventionally attributed to Max Weber 
(Robertson 1982:19-21), who argued that governments are secretive because they are 
bureaucratic (Weber 1968b:956 et sqq., esp. 992-3). Weber’s sociology of bureaucracy 
forms the basis of the following discussion, partly because it identifies the bureaucratic 
state as an enormously important contributor to patterns of secrecy and disclosure in 
politics. This claim is consistent with a great deal of empirical evidence, and has en-
sured that Weber has been routinely cited by many subsequent academics, campaigners 
and politicians in this area (Rourke 1957; Moynihan 1988; 1997; Rozell 2002). Historical-
ly, the bureaucracy has been the most consistent source of opposition to the introduc-
tion of formal access rights in most countries, and once access laws are in place, it is 
widely agreed that bureaucratic opposition is a crucial determinant of how well they 
are implemented (Roberts, in Ackerman and Sandoval-Ballasteros 2006:125). 
Weber is also useful because his explanation for why bureaucracies are secretive pro-
vides a basis for identifying the specific institutional structures which are likely to in-
fluence the emergence of freedom of information. The following discussion builds on 
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Weber’s work to argue for an examination of the interactions between four collective 
political actors: the bureaucracy, elected politicians, the public at large, and organised 
interest groups. It shows that the various bilateral relationships between these four 
give rise to different struggles over information. It also argues that differences in the 
development of legal rights of access in different countries are likely to be the result of 
the degree of centralised hierarchical organisation prevailing within each of these four, 
the structure of authority and accountability relationships between them, and the 
manner in which the actors involved balance the competing demands of the various 
relations in which they are embedded. These are the hypotheses tested in the following 
chapters. 
The Bureaucratic Sources of Secrecy 
Weber’s argument about government secrecy employs the term “bureaucracy” in two 
senses: as a purely technical description of a form of organisation, and to refer specifi-
cally to the administrative machinery of the state. The distinction is important because 
each corresponds with a different source of secrecy: the first is a consequence of the 
organisational form itself, and is likely to be present in all organisations to the extent 
that they approximate the ideal type; the second flows from the position of the state 
bureaucracy in the political system. 
Organisational Capacity for Secrecy 
Weber defines bureaucracy in ideal-typical terms as an organisation in which authority 
is distributed hierarchically, whose structure and operations are rationally-ordered, in 
which official business is conducted on the basis of fixed, impersonal rules and recorded 
in written documents, and which is staffed by officials employed on the basis of compe-
tence and expertise (Weber 1968b:956-958). Bureaucratic organisations are, he argues, 
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predisposed towards secrecy because they constitute a means of exercising “domina-
tion through knowledge” (Weber 1968a:225). Bureaucracies exist to control information 
and to exercise control through information, and are secretive because secrecy is a 
means to both ends. Four features of the form are conducive to secrecy: hierarchy, the 
use of written files, authority, and expertise. 
All other things being equal, hierarchical organisations tend to be more secretive than 
“flat” structures (Robertson 1999). This is partly because flatter structures, such as net-
works, depend on communication to facilitate coordination between their constituent 
elements, whereas hierarchies rely primarily on authority relations. Hierarchies also 
tend towards secrecy because the chain of command linking “insiders” with each other 
also constitutes a clear, natural boundary between them and “outsiders” around which 
secretive practices can develop; such boundaries are usually less sharply-defined under 
other forms of organisation. Finally, hierarchies are conducive to secrecy because they 
constitute an effective mechanism for enforcing discipline on the communicative prac-
tices of large numbers of people: senior officials can establish de facto secrecy by in-
structing their subordinates on the kinds of information which can be disclosed, and 
the terms on which that disclosure can occur. 
Instructions governing the disclosure of internal information will only be effective if an 
organisation is capable of controlling access to information it holds in the first place. 
The use of written files makes this possible because it means bureaucracies can prevent 
outsiders from obtaining information in a number of ways. They can deny the very ex-
istence of a file, refuse to disclose its contents, use indices which make it difficult to lo-
cate relevant information, record partial information, refuse to record some infor-
mation in the first place, or even maintain parallel sets of files (one for “external con-
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sumption”, and another constituting a more complete record). These sorts of tactics 
were reportedly widespread in Weber’s own time (Weber 1968b:994), and have their 
modern equivalents today in such (possibly apocryphal) practices as the use of Post–It 
notes to record sensitive information so that it can be removed before a file is disclosed 
(cf. Verkaik 2005; Kelly 2006; Woolf 2006; Moss 2007). A further source of control flows 
from the authority to make decisions which is implied by the very existence of a bu-
reaucracy. Organisations which monopolise decision-making authority in a particular 
domain can, should they so choose, also engage in secrecy by refusing to allow interest-
ed parties to participate in the processes by which decisions are made. This might, for 
example, take the form of refusing to publicise the existence of meetings, or imposing 
onerous conditions on participation. 
The opportunities for secrecy provided by direct control over files and processes are 
reinforced by the fact that relations between the bureaucracy and outsiders are usually 
characterised by profound asymmetries of expertise. An ideal–typical Weberian bu-
reaucracy is staffed by experts with specialised training in administrative law (Weber 
1968b:958). Actually–existing public administrations have approximated this ideal type 
to varying extents (Weber 1968a:224), but the principle of merit selection has always 
entailed some kind of minimum qualification, and this in turn has favoured the devel-
opment of a bureaucratic élite distinguished from the rest of society by its specialist 
knowledge. In addition to their specialised training, bureaucrats also enjoy (if that is 
the word) long–standing familiarity with the administrative process itself. In combina-
tion, these two factors constitute a kind of secrecy insofar as they mean that the capaci-
ty to make full use of the contents of official files is largely restricted to bureaucrats 
themselves. Non–expert outsiders, even if they have access to relevant official docu-
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ments, confront bureaucracies from a position of ignorance, and are therefore at a dis-
advantage when examining or criticising their actions and decisions. 
Organisational Sources of Variation in Secrecy 
Historically, the existence of a bureaucratised public administration has been necessary 
for the development of demand for formal rights of access to official information (cf. 
Bennett 1997:228). Given a bureaucratised state, almost all disputes over the availability 
of official information boil down to disputes over access to documents drawn up or held 
by bureaucrats. Given, furthermore, that bureaucracies are a quintessentially rule-
bound form of organisation, the introduction of formal rules mandating disclosure is a 
natural way to correct abuses of power over information. There are, however, two as-
pects of bureaucratic organisation which are far less widespread than Weber imagined, 
and which deserve scrutiny because their absence suggests actually-existing bureau-
cracies may not always be so capable of engaging in secrecy as he assumed. These are 
the loyalty and discipline of officials, and the manner in which the state is organised; 
each is discussed in turn below. 
Weber’s account of administrative secrecy appears to have taken for granted that indi-
vidual bureaucrats would be loyal to the administration and act consistently with its 
institutional interests. There is, however, a considerable body of scholarship testifying 
to the fact that maintaining discipline in anything approaching an ideal-typical bureau-
cracy presents considerable challenges (e.g. Crozier 1965). One indicator of these diffi-
culties is laws criminalising the unauthorised disclosure of official information. These 
exist in every consolidated democracy, although their scope varies widely and has gen-
erally become narrower over the post-war era as access laws have spread. All apply, at 
minimum, to the unauthorised disclosure of information affecting national security to 
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hostile foreign powers; some (such as the notorious British Official Secrets Act and its off-
spring elsewhere in the world) apply to any unauthorised disclosure of any official in-
formation. These laws testify both to the pervasive interest in secrecy among bureau-
cratised states, and to the fact that senior officials everywhere have apparently felt suf-
ficiently unsure of the loyalty of their subordinates to resort to the criminal law as a 
supplement to internal disciplinary measures. Given Weber’s emphasis on social status 
as a contributor to bureaucratic loyalty, it is perhaps no coincidence that official secrets 
laws emerged in their modern form in the late 19th Century, a time when the state was 
expanding so rapidly that bureaucrats could no longer be recruited solely from privi-
leged classes whose loyalty to the state could be taken for granted (United Kingdom 
1972a:120-2; Vincent 1998:214). 
Weber’s account is also incomplete in that it implicitly portrays secrecy as an outcome of 
discipline. In fact, the relationship between the two is more complex than this. Simmel 
(1906) notes that many clandestine societies impose obligations of secrecy on junior 
members specifically as a disciplinary measure: secret knowledge is disclosed progres-
sively as a reward for demonstrated loyalty, a practice which encourages stronger in-
ternal cohesion and a sharper appreciation among subordinates of their status as “in-
siders”. These practices have parallels in the public sector in many countries, perhaps 
the most famous being the British tradition of requiring all civil servants to sign a copy 
of the Official Secrets Act on taking up their position and leaving the service 
(United Kingdom 1972a:19). This ceremony was legally meaningless, but constituted an 
unambiguous signal that confidentiality was integral to the very identity of the civil 
servant. These practices suggest that internal discipline is not just a precondition for 
the exercise of secrecy: secrecy may also contribute in turn to internal discipline; com-
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municative practices both construct and reflect internal organisational structure and 
power relations. 
The complex, mutually-constitutive relationship between secrecy and bureaucratic or-
ganisation, combined with the likelihood of imperfect internal discipline, suggest that 
attitudes towards freedom of information should vary within bureaucratic organisa-
tions. Senior officials should be more uniformly hostile than their subordinates, be-
cause access laws undermine one of the foundations of their authority within the or-
ganisation itself as well as in its external relations. This makes freedom of information 
fundamentally unlike most other policies: the state bureaucracy is an influential partic-
ipant in all policy debates because of its technical expertise and the expectation that it 
will probably be responsible for implementing whatever policy is eventually chosen. 
But in debates over access to information, state officials as such are also inescapably in-
terested parties because their core institutional interests are doubly at stake. 
This leads to the second problematic aspect of Weber’s ideal type: the organisation and 
distribution of authority within the bureaucracy. No state is ever organised into the 
perfectly coherent hierarchy Weber imagined; authority is usually shared out among 
departments, agencies, and other organisational units which often have inconsistent 
missions, overlapping responsibilities and competing constituencies. Just as hierarchy 
and discipline make it possible for individual organisations to engage in secrecy, so it 
also seems reasonable to suppose that a state which is organised into a coherent, cen-
tralised hierarchy of authority might present a less favourable environment than one 
which is fragmented or decentralised. This is partly because, even if all bureaucrats 
share a basic interest in retaining control over the terms on which official information 
in general is disclosed, the absence of centralised control means constituent units of 
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less centralised states have more opportunities to develop and act upon idiosyncratic 
preferences with respect to the disclosure of specific kinds of information (some of the 
influences on these preferences are discussed below, including the tactical uses of pro-
active disclosure in negotiations with external interest groups and other departments 
of state). If a state is sufficiently fragmented, it may prove impossible to impose any co-
herent information policy from the centre even if political will exists. Central govern-
ment officials are likely to find it particularly difficult to resist demands for freedom of 
information when they eventually arise because the presumption that information is 
generally available will probably already be firmly entrenched in the country’s political 
institutions, culture and practices. Chapters Three, Five and Six suggest that the USA 
constitutes an example of precisely this phenomenon. Even in states where authority is 
relatively centralised and coherently organised, fragmentation may still facilitate the 
development of access rights if it prevails in certain strategic policy domains; examples, 
discussed below, include environmental management and economic regulation. 
Parliaments as Crucial to Overcoming Bureaucratic Secrecy 
The role of organisation in the formation and pursuit of bureaucratic interests raises 
the question why bureaucracies develop a sense of having independent interests in the 
first place. Weber did not examine this issue in any great depth, but reading between 
the lines it seems likely he had two separate contributors in mind. Firstly, he appears to 
have assumed that a sense of identity would develop naturally among bureaucrats due 
to their elevated social status, disciplined organisation and the role of the state in en-
suring social order in a mass society. This can be gleaned from his discussion of the 
emergence of a caste mentality among bureaucrats, in which he emphasises the esoter-
ic nature of their knowledge, the fact that specialist qualifications typically favour the 
entry of members of the upper social strata into the bureaucracy, and the prestige at-
  65 
tached to holding a position which wields the sovereign power of the state (Weber 
1968b:959-63). This strongly reflects the example on which Weber based his ideal type, 
the German imperial administration of the late 19th and early 20th Centuries; the differ-
ent ways in which contemporary democratic states relate to those under their authori-
ty are considered in a moment. Before that, the second set of incentives Weber identi-
fies must be examined; these flow from relations between the bureaucracy and its polit-
ical masters: 
The question is always who controls the existing bureaucratic machinery. And such 
control is only possible in a very limited degree to persons who are not technical spe-
cialists. Generally–speaking, the highest ranking career official is more likely to get his 
way in the long run than his nominal superior, the cabinet minister, who is not a spe-
cialist (Weber 1968b:224-5). 
Weber’s analysis is consistent with (although considerably richer than) contemporary 
scholarship on agency theory, which identifies problems of accountability and control 
as problems in the distribution of information between principals and agents. Princi-
pals face structural barriers to directly observing the behaviour of their agents, a fact 
which hampers their ability to select the right agents or distribute appropriate pun-
ishments and rewards for past actions. Agents, in turn, have systematic incentives to 
engage in secrecy because it provides them with greater leeway to pursue their own 
interests rather than those of the principal. Weber assumes that this structural conflict 
between officials (agents) and politicians (principals) encourages both the development 
of a sense of independent identity in the bureaucracy, and also a recourse to secrecy to 
insulate itself from unwelcome external pressure (cf. Weber 1968b:1393 et sqq): 
The concept of the “office secret” is the specific invention of the bureaucracy, and few 
things it defends so fanatically as this attitude which, outside of the specific areas just 
mentioned [diplomacy and military administration], cannot be justified with purely 
functional arguments. In facing a parliament, the bureaucracy fights, out of a sure pow-
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er instinct, every one of that institution’s attempts to gain through its own means (e.g. 
through the so–called “right of parliamentary investigation”) expert knowledge from 
the interested parties. Bureaucracy naturally prefers a poorly–informed, and hence 
powerless, parliament – at least insofar as this ignorance is compatible with the bu-
reaucracy’s own interests (Weber 1968b:992-3). 
Elected politicians remain central to the contemporary politics of information, in part 
because they are in a uniquely powerful position to exert control over the bureaucracy. 
Weber himself emphasised the importance of the democratic mandate in contributing 
to this. His reasoning is subtle and difficult to summarise, but essentially boils down to 
the claim that winning a popular vote can overcome the bureaucracy’s political influ-
ence by providing an alternative source of authority to that grounded in technical ex-
pertise (Weber 1968b:993 et sqq). By contrast, hereditary monarchs and other autocrat-
ic rulers have neither expertise nor a mandate, and have only personal prestige to fall 
back on – a far weaker power resource. Elsewhere, Weber elaborates on this by arguing 
that however much influence bureaucrats may be able to bring to policy debates, in the 
long run they make poor politicians because the dispassionate application of techno-
cratic knowledge which characterises bureaucratic power cannot replace the charisma 
and personal commitment required to build support for the trade-offs which must al-
ways be made in the selection of political ends in any moderately complex society 
(Weber 1998b:95). 
Contemporary scholarship continues to emphasise the importance of politicians in the 
politics of information, but has generally focussed on the formal powers which the 
democratic mandate also confers. The most important of these for present purposes is 
direct personal participation in the legislative process. Other powers which are also rel-
evant to the broader politics of information vary from country to country, but include 
rights to question officials and obtain copies of official documents, and a measure of 
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influence over the form and operation of other important institutions such as the 
budget and the organisational structure of the administrative bureaucracy. 
Elected politicians are also of fundamental importance because they have a range of po-
tentially conflicting interests with respect to the disclosure of official information, and 
under the right circumstances these can find expression as support for general public 
rights of access. Their role as principals in an agency relationship with the bureaucracy 
provides a structural incentive to use their powers to force it to disclose information to 
them, provided this disclosure improves their own capacity to control it. There is some 
evidence that support for transparency among politicians is partly related to the man-
ner in which they exercise this control: systems where politicians lack organisational or 
other resources required to effectively monitor the behaviour of the bureaucracy, or 
where they lack formal hierarchical authority over it, are claimed to be particularly fa-
vourable (e.g. McCubbins and Schwartz 1984). Scholarly opinion on whether this intra-
government struggle for control has actually contributed to general public rights of ac-
cess in specific countries is divided, however. One detailed study of the UK argues that 
since the late 1970s, successive governments have introduced progressively more com-
prehensive rights, partly as a means (and partly as an unintended consequence) of ex-
erting more effective hierarchical control over the civil service (Robertson 1999). Stud-
ies of other countries, by contrast, argue that similar reforms have fatally weakened 
freedom of information regimes (Roberts 2001a; 2004). This divergence of opinion is so 
extreme and surprising that the impact of administrative reform will be a major focus 
of Chapter Seven. 
Politicians have conflicting interests because they are not just principals; they are also 
agents of the voting public, and this provides a set of countervailing incentives similar 
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in some respects to those under which the bureaucracy operates in its dealings with 
parliaments. As part of government in the broad sense of the word, politicians may well 
find it advantageous to restrict the routine public availability of official information. 
The kinds of information which elected politicians might seek to control is, however, 
likely to differ with the institutional structure of political authority and accountability. 
A small but important body of scholarship argues that, where members of the legisla-
ture are not responsible to the electorate for the failings of the bureaucracy, the incen-
tives to resist disclosure laws are likely to be lower (Robertson 1982; McCubbins and 
Schwartz 1984). The ongoing Congressional preference for freedom of information in 
the USA is widely cited as an example of this (Relyea 1979:328; Archibald 1993:726), and 
is examined in Chapters Three and Five. 
Politicians also need to secure (and re-secure) the democratic mandate on which their 
authority over the bureaucracy depends. Electoral competition is widely-understood to 
provide strong encouragement to actively release information which reflects well on 
past performance, to propose policies which the electorate will find appealing, and to 
act against their own structural interest as agents in withholding meaningful infor-
mation (e.g. Lupia and McCubbins 1998:207-9). The possibility that these systemic in-
centives to engage in managed publicity might lead to support for fully-fledged access 
rights has sometimes been raised, but remains largely a matter of anecdote and conjec-
ture based on evidence concerning a single case (the USA). The nature and extent of the 
contribution which electoral competition has made to transparency are considered 
primarily in Chapter Three, and are also relevant to Chapters Five, Six and Seven. 
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Institutional Aggregation as a Substitute for Organisation in Electoral Politics 
Retrospective electoral accountability looms large in the normative literature on trans-
parency. When democracy is viewed as an agency relationship, transparency is argued 
to be valuable because it helps to overcome one of the more important barriers the 
public faces in exerting effective control over its representatives in parliament, and by 
extension the whole of government: the structural asymmetry of information which 
arises between principals and agents. Scholars and activists alike frequently assume 
that this normative position also constitutes a reasonably accurate empirical descrip-
tion: that the public recognises the benefits of information, considers more widespread 
routine availability of official information as valuable, and actively demands infor-
mation be disclosed (e.g. Rosendorff and Doces 2006:100). 
Taken at face value, these normatively-grounded claims have a certain appeal, but they 
are ultimately implausible. The public as such is large and disorganised, and the bene-
fits of transparency are highly diffuse. The costs, by contrast, are borne by a small 
number of actors, principally the bureaucrats and politicians whose job security and 
scope for independent action it affects. Furthermore, it was argued earlier in this chap-
ter that hierarchical organisation plays an important role in favouring the development 
and pursuit of coherent preferences with respect to the distribution of information. Un-
like bureaucracies and elected politicians, the voting public is notable for its lack of in-
ternal organisation, for its relative incapacity to form coherent preferences (Ferejohn 
1990:709; Weber 1998a:225-6; Radcliff and Wingenbach 2000), and the difficulties it faces 
in organising to act on its interests (Olson 1965; Ansolabehere 2006). It must therefore 
be considered unlikely that the public as a whole will strongly and decisively demand 
access to information, a hypothesis confirmed by Chapter Three. 
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This does not mean that public opinion is irrelevant to the development of freedom of 
information, but it does mean that the terms on which it influences the course of events 
is likely to be indirect. The influence of public opinion rests on a small number of in-
termittent institutionalised processes, all of which serve to aggregate the preferences, 
demands and grievances of its individual members. The single most important of these 
is the vote, which exerts a crucial influence on the behaviour of elected officials for rea-
sons discussed above. Its effects are considered in detail in Chapter Three. Other im-
portant aggregating institutions include administrative and legal dispute resolution 
mechanisms, as Chapter Four shows. The growth of the administrative bureaucracy in 
the immediate post-war era implied a number of changes in the way states interacted 
with their citizens: the increasing breadth and complexity of interactions between the 
two increased the need for cooperation and posed problems for dispute resolution 
mechanisms, and encouraged officials and citizens alike to frame these issues in terms 
of the distribution of information. Chapter Four shows that the extent to which existing 
mechanisms of administrative control were able to cope with these changes, and the 
relationship between these mechanisms and the political system, constituted an im-
portant additional element in structuring the predisposition of countries towards fram-
ing individual disputes in terms of general rights of access to information. 
Organised Interest Groups and Negotiated Access to Information 
The persistence of unrealistic assumptions about the electoral dynamics underlying the 
development of transparency is symptomatic of a failure to distinguish adequately be-
tween “the public” and the organised groups within it. Although it may not be reasona-
ble to expect public demand to lead straightforwardly to legislation, there is a long tra-
dition of political and sociological literature attesting to the fact that relations between 
the state and organised interest groups influence the kinds of problems which are 
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deemed worthy of policy intervention and the kinds of solutions which are proposed in 
response. Smaller groups do not face anything like the same organisational barriers as 
the public, and just as for the bureaucracy, their organisational form provides both the 
means and the motivation to influence the manner in which the state discloses infor-
mation it controls. 
The influence particular actors enjoy rests, to a very great extent, on their capacity to 
mobilise resources on which others, especially the state, depend (Marsh and Rhodes 
1992; Rhodes and Marsh 1992; Rhodes 1996). Patterns of resource mobilisation and de-
pendency are relevant to transparency because the different groups with a stake in any 
given policy typically coordinate their activities and resolve their differences through 
sharing information. Patterns of disclosure and secrecy are thus likely to reflect, at least 
in part, the uneven power relations prevailing between actors in the policy process. 
Conversely, selective disclosure can also be used as a means of establishing favourable 
configurations of interest and influencing the conduct of policy negotiations. Senior 
political and administrative figures are in a particularly powerful position to use selec-
tive communication to this end, because of the central role they play in integrating di-
verse demands into coherent policies. States can encourage the provision of resources 
they do not control, and favour the articulation of particular demands by divulging 
their intentions to and consulting with relevant groups. 
There are two distinct paths by which interactions between interest groups and the 
state might influence the development of access rights, and these are discussed in 
Chapters Five and Six. The first concerns the notion of the network boundary. Although 
it is currently fashionable in some quarters to attribute the spread of transparency to 
the increasingly widespread reliance on networked cooperation between states and ex-
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ternal interest groups (Nye 1999), networks are really only transparent to those on the 
inside; to those on the outside, they can seem extraordinarily opaque. Freedom of in-
formation might be advocated by groups whose interests are affected by decisions made 
within a policy network, but who are unable to break into it due to a lack of control 
over policy-relevant resources or active resistance by the state. The prospects of a 
country developing freedom of information in response to demands from the periphery 
of policy networks are likely to depend heavily on the degree of autonomy enjoyed by 
state officials. Chapter Five considers whether, where the political executive is able to 
autonomously manage the policy agenda and decide which demands to incorporate in-
to policy without undermining its own perceived legitimacy, the prospects for freedom 
of information are indeed less rosy. This resource dependency argument implies that 
the core members of a network probably have a structural interest in resisting general 
public rights of access in order to hamper the articulation of competing peripheral in-
terests. Chapter Six considers whether the structure of relations between resource-rich 
groups and the state might provide countervailing incentives, by focussing on relations 
between states and producer interests in neo-corporatist and pluralist countries. 
On the Absence of Diffusion and International Factors 
One apparent omission from the preceding discussion which may surprise readers fa-
miliar with historical institutionalism is international influences such as other states, 
international government organisations and transnational civil society (cf. Skocpol 
1985:9-11). This omission might seem all the more surprising given the prominence of 
these factors in the literature on transparency discussed in the previous chapter. 
Diffusion and international pressure do not feature prominently in this thesis because 
they are not particularly relevant to explaining cross-national variation among the 
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consolidated democracies. Most studies which invoke them are either interested in ex-
plaining the adoption of transparency measures at the international level, assume that 
pressure from international organisations is decisive at national level, or assume that 
such policies are self-evidently so beneficial that it will be adopted relatively straight-
forwardly once the idea is introduced from abroad. The first addresses questions be-
yond the scope of this thesis, while neither of the two other assumptions can be accept-
ed uncritically. 
The problem with explaining the adoption of access rights in terms of overt pressure 
from international sources is that the consolidated democracies tend to be in a reason-
ably strong position to resist it. As the previous chapter noted, several studies have 
shown that access rights in newly-democratising countries in Eastern Europe, Latin 
America and Southeast Asia are correlated with membership of international organisa-
tions. These countries generally occupy relatively subordinate positions in the interna-
tional political and economic system, and their governments may well have felt unable 
to resist requirements from international donor organisations that they legislate, espe-
cially where doing so was a condition of financial aid. The consolidated democracies 
generally do not occupy quite so subordinate a position (with the possible exception of 
Costa Rica, which has not yet introduced an access law), and tend not to be the subject 
of quite the same degree of pressure for reform.20 
Explanations for cross-national variation in access rights which emphasise the spread 
of ideas have two problems: they make unrealistic assumptions about the attitudes of 
local élites, and are inconsistent with the available evidence. Both are clearly evident in 
                                                                           
 
20 This is not intended to imply that the development of transparency in places like Latin America is solely a result of 
pressure from international organisations. I am grateful to my colleague Javier Treviño Rangel for reminding me 
that, in places like Mexico, the state often “accepted” changes suggested by international actors because doing so 
also served domestic political purposes. The point here is merely that such explanations are even less plausible still 
when applied to the consolidated democracies. 
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Colin Bennett’s (1997) study of the ombudsman, privacy and freedom of information. He 
argues that the spread of these three institutions among the consolidated democracies 
is a result of political élites in each country drawing lessons from the experience of 
their counterparts elsewhere in solving problems posed by large administrative bu-
reaucracies in democratic societies. He argues differences in timing of legislation are a 
result of how long it took for ideas to spread between countries, but his own data show 
variations which cannot be accounted for in these terms. Privacy and data protection 
laws were adopted by most OECD countries in a period of less than a decade starting in 
the early 1970s (1997:224), suggesting that there were no serious barriers to the rapid 
transmission of knowledge about information policies across national borders. Yet de-
spite this, freedom of information acts spread much more slowly than either data pro-
tection or the ombudsman. Furthermore, the countries he examined implemented the-
se reforms in quite different orders. Sweden, for example, was an early innovator on all 
three counts. Germany was an early adopter of privacy legislation, but a laggard on 
freedom of information and has still not established an ombudsman. The USA has no 
ombudsman at federal level and a weak privacy law, but was an early adopter of free-
dom of information. France was fairly early on all three counts. The United Kingdom 
was one of the earliest countries outside the Nordic world to establish an ombudsman, 
and was late but fairly thorough in implementing the other two. These differences can-
not be explained purely in terms of élite awareness or the normative merits of the poli-
cies. Even the very best ideas need powerful supporters if they are to be implemented 
(cf. DiMaggio and Powell 1983:148-53), especially where the ideas in question collide 
directly with the institutional interests of those in power (cf. Beckert 2010:152-4). As 
Bennett himself comes close to admitting (1997:226-8), differences in the adoption of 
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these policies exist because each interacts with local configurations of power in its own 
way. 
Although diffusion has not yet produced a satisfactory explanation for the varying 
adoption of freedom of information, excluding it entirely from this study would be un-
wise. Social–scientific analysis is usually conducted on the presumption that changes in 
the outcome of interest in any one analytic unit are determined solely by changes oc-
curring within that same unit, independently of changes occurring elsewhere. If this 
assumption does not hold because changes in one unit diffuse to another, then the 
boundaries between the units of analysis are weakened. The logical limit “if similarity 
within a group of systems is [solely] the result of diffusion, [is that] there is only one 
independent observation” (Przeworski and Teune 1970:52). As it happens, there is relia-
ble historical evidence that the idea of freedom of information had spread among policy 
élites in many democracies before the late 1970s, and that advocates of reform invoked 
overseas experience to justify their demands. It is, therefore, at least possible that diffu-
sion might have affected adoption by influencing the attitudes of important domestic 
political actors, thereby producing similarities between national trajectories which 
would otherwise be erroneously attributed to some purely domestic cause. 
To avoid making unwarranted assumptions of causal independence, the historical anal-
yses in the following chapters take account of two possibilities: that the implementa-
tion of a law in one country might serve to convince officials in another that it consti-
tutes a less serious threat than they had originally supposed; and that powerful non–
state actors might learn about access rights elsewhere and advocate them at home, pos-
sibly for reasons which differ from those which gave birth to the policy in its original 
context. Domestically, relations between states have largely proved relevant as brakes 
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on the development of transparency: national security and diplomacy are everywhere 
recognised as legitimate justifications for the withholding of important information, 
and every access law contains exemptions recognising this. Interstate relations have 
occasionally made a positive contribution to the development of access rights where 
they have been used in an attempt to justify controversial acts of secrecy, and they are 
discussed in Chapter Three for their effect on domestic electoral competition. The in-
fluence of positive pressure for transparency from identifiable international actors is, 
for its part, examined in Chapter Five, while the importance of transmission of ideas at 
élite level through mechanisms such as the OECD is relevant to Chapter Seven. All these 
chapters demonstrate that the spread of ideas about transparency was insufficient to 
explain the adoption of access laws. 
The Case for a Comparative Approach 
In his seminal article on social-scientific methodology, Arendt Lijphart argued that the 
four main methods available to political scientists could be arranged in terms of de-
scending scientific rigour as follows: direct experiments, statistical analysis, compari-
sons of case studies and single case studies (Lijphart 1971). He also argued that re-
searchers should apply the most rigorous method possible. As a cross–national study of 
an historical phenomenon, neither the experimental nor the single case study method 
is appropriate here. This leaves the choice between statistical analysis and the compar-
ative method and – pace Lijphart – the nature of the phenomenon of interest in this 
study, its scope, and the kinds of evidence available all provide sound reasons to choose 
the second over the first. 
In a very general sense, comparison lies at the heart of all social scientific endeavour; 
the term “comparative method”, however, usually refers specifically to the explanation 
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of social or political phenomena using the techniques systematised by John Stuart Mill 
in his classic System of Logic (1865). Mill described several different methods of varying 
degrees of complexity, with the more complex being compounds of the two basic ap-
proaches, which he dubbed the methods of agreement and difference: 
If two or more instances of the phenomenon under investigation have only one circum-
stance in common the circumstance in which alone all the instances agree is the cause… 
of the given phenomenon... If an instance in which the phenomenon under investiga-
tion occurs, and an instance in which it does not occur, have every circumstance in 
common save one, that one occurring only in the former; the circumstance in which 
alone the two instances differ is... the cause, or an indispensable part of the cause, of the 
phenomenon (Mill 1865:Book III, Chapter 8, §§1-2; pp430-1). 
Strengths of the Comparative Method Compared with Statistical Approaches 
One of the main strengths of the comparative method is that it is well-suited to tracing 
how and why political institutions evolve over time using the kinds of historical data 
which are most readily available. These data tend to be made up of the documentary 
by-products of the processes of political negotiation and competition discussed in 
Chapter One. In some cases, interval-scale datasets exist which make it possible to con-
duct statistical analyses, but the previous chapter has already showed that this is not 
the case for transparency or freedom of information: the data which do exist are unus-
able for various reasons. Many studies seeking to conduct statistical analyses of the 
causes of transparency thus resort to proxies such as the perception of official trans-
parency among hypothetically–relevant groups such as business leaders (e.g. 
Rosendorff and Doces 2006; Relly and Sabharwal 2009). These proxy datasets are super-
ficially appealing, but of limited substantive value for this kind of analysis. Even if one 
ignores the problems of treating reported perceptions as an “objective” measure of an 
empirical phenomenon, the relevant data have generally only been collected in recent 
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years, fairly spasmodically and in a limited range of countries. This substantially limits 
their usefulness in assessing long-term historical trends. 
A second strength of the comparative method is its suitability for investigating com-
plex, interactive causal mechanisms. In statistical studies, the purpose of research is to 
produce models which are both parsimonious and readily–applicable to data other than 
those with which they were originally developed. This tends to encourage abstraction 
and simplification: real–world phenomena such as countries are disaggregated into ob-
servations of associated measurements of distinct variables (Przeworski and Teune 
1970:Chapter 1; Collier 1991; Goldthorpe 1997:1-2). In the models generally employed by 
political scientists, these variables are assumed to be uncorrelated with each other and 
to have the same effect on the dependent variable at all points in time and across all 
cases. These tendencies, and the problems they entail, are clear in one of the very few 
statistical studies to overcome the lack of data on transparency. Grigorescu’s fascinat-
ing study proposed several models for the emergence of transparency, which all as-
sumed that the various independent variables he identified combined additively 
(2003:658-9). He also assumed that freedom of information laws were introduced only 
one or two years after the onset of pressure for reform (2003:662). This, as he recog-
nised, is not a particularly plausible description of the consolidated democracies, where 
the duration of the political and legislative process was highly variable but in almost all 
cases took far longer than twenty–four months (2003:659). This short time-lag is a plau-
sible assumption only when applied to newly-democratising nations which legislated 
since the early 1990s, by which time there existed an international consensus on the 
merits of access and on what a good access law should look like. In fairness, it should be 
noted that Grigorescu is aware of this limitation (2003:660-4), but his rationale for these 
choices has the aura of an ex post facto rationalisation for choices imposed by the func-
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tional requirements of the statistical methodology, despite their inappropriateness for 
the phenomenon of interest. 
Comparative work, by contrast, seeks to generate quite different explanations. The fun-
damental unit of analysis is the case, a far less abstract construct than the observation, 
and one which usually corresponds more closely with commonplace understandings of 
political entities. Methodologically, cases are treated as organic, complex wholes whose 
features of interest might well be the product of complex interactions between multiple 
causal factors (Skocpol and Somers 1980:178). Thus, causation is often understood to be 
configurational rather than additive: the effect of a factor may vary depending on the 
presence or absence of others, and the effect of different factors may vary over time. 
Comparative research makes no particular presumption that a single phenomenon is 
the outcome of the same cause (or combination of causes) in every case; in fact, a com-
mon purpose of these studies is to identify and explain causal complexity (cf. Coates 
2005). A comparative approach makes sense in a study such as this one, which seeks to 
problematise overly–simplistic approaches to the causes of transparency. 
Techniques exist which allow statistically-oriented researchers to take account of en-
dogeneity and pervasive interaction between variables, but these are often difficult to 
use in explaining the evolution of political institutions. As the causal model grows more 
complex, the level of detail required by statistical techniques grows dramatically; even 
a relatively simple interactive model can rapidly outstrip the data available for analysis 
(Ragin 1987:64-7; Pierson 2006:169). There are two ways of resolving this problem: ei-
ther limit the scope of the study to a smaller population to which a simpler causal mod-
el can legitimately be applied, or increase the size of the population in order to increase 
the number of observations in the dataset. The first is often difficult to do because the 
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populations involved in institutional analysis are small to begin with, at least in statisti-
cal terms (Ragin 1987:65-6). Reducing them may jeopardise the validity of statistical re-
sults, and below a certain limit comparative methods are likely to produce more defen-
sible results. The second approach can easily make the problem worse by increasing the 
heterogeneity of the phenomena under analysis, thereby requiring ever more complex 
causal models (Pierson 2006:169-71) or leading to confusing and inexplicable results. 
This second problem is clearly evident in Relly and Sabharwal’s study, cited earlier. As 
of 2009, there were enough countries with access laws to make a statistical study of the 
whole population methodologically defensible. Yet, despite this, they reach a fairly im-
portant conclusion for which they feel unable to account: stronger democracy does not 
seem to contribute to (perceptions of) greater transparency (2009:155). The previous 
chapter has already shown that the relationship between democracy and transparency 
has changed over time. It seems plausible that this changing relationship might account 
for both the belief the two should be linked (in that freedom of information developed 
first in the consolidated democracies, and so is associated discursively with democracy) 
and also the lack of significant correlation (since the recent uptake in access laws has 
occurred in transitional countries where democracy is weaker). In seeking to build a 
sufficiently large dataset, their study has been forced to stretch concepts such as 
“transparency” and “democracy” to cover situations in which the terms clearly have 
substantively different meanings, rendering it unable to trace any clear relationship 
between them. The comparative method, by contrast, is much more amenable to identi-
fying these differences in meaning and tracing their effects because it relies on qualita-
tive data. 
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Shortcomings of the Comparative Method 
Although it may be superior to statistical approaches for the purposes of this study, the 
comparative method is not without shortcomings of its own. These have important im-
plications for the comparative strategies adopted in the following chapters. 
It is commonly argued, especially by those who prefer statistical methods, that compar-
ative studies are flawed because they “select on the dependent variable”: they examine 
cases in which the outcome of interest exists, or where there is too little variation in 
outcomes, rather than selecting cases for maximum variance on the outcome of interest 
to allow the effect of the independent variables to be properly tested (Lieberson 1991; 
Geddes 2003). Expressed in terms of the comparative paradigm, this is in effect a claim 
that the method of difference alone produces valid results, and it echoes a comment 
made by Mill himself to the effect that conclusions drawn from application of the 
method of agreement should always be considered provisional pending confirmation by 
some other means (Mill 1865:Book III, Chapter 8, §3). 
It is an open question whether this criticism is justified: Przeworski and Teune (1970) 
considered the method of agreement to be superior to the method of difference, and at 
least one contemporary theorist has argued that it is appropriate as part of an overall 
research strategy if used to eliminate unnecessary conditions (Ragin 1997; 2000). To the 
extent that variation on the dependent variable really is a requirement for producing 
valid results, it might be thought to present a problem for this thesis, since all but a 
handful of the consolidated democracies now have an access law. This problem is, in 
fact, less serious than it appears. The outcome of interest identified in the previous 
chapter is not the existence of a freedom of information act, but the considerable differ-
ences between them, conceptualised primarily in terms of the relative dates of their 
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adoption, but more fundamentally in terms of the different historical processes which 
led to adoption. When viewed in this way, there is considerable variation on the de-
pendent variable, as the previous chapter showed. 
A second criticism focusses on the fact that comparative studies tend to employ deter-
ministic modes of explanation formulated in terms of necessity and sufficiency. This is 
considered undesirable on two grounds. Theoretically, it purports to explain all the var-
iation identified as interesting even though social phenomena are inherently complex 
and contingent. Methodologically, it may inadvertently lead to the elimination of rele-
vant factors which might have been retained under a probabilistic analysis with a wider 
scope (Lieberson 1991:309-15). 
This thesis occasionally employs the standard vocabulary of comparative analysis, but 
does so in a way which is sensitive to these critiques. The terms “necessity” and “suffi-
ciency” are only employed here in a set-theoretic rather than a strictly philosophical 
sense: they are short-hand descriptions of systematic associations between causal con-
ditions and outcomes which have survived historical and comparative assessment in 
the population subject to analysis. Secondly, this thesis does not attempt to provide an 
explanation which completely excludes the possibility of contingency or the im-
portance of non-institutional factors. As a matter of principle, institutions – in the 
sense of formal rules – never fully determine social outcomes. They are interesting and 
important because they produce important regularities in collective behaviour by in-
fluencing the decisions of human agents who are ultimately free to choose otherwise if 
they wish. This thesis does, however, seek to show that institutions are fundamental in 
that they provide the context within which contingency, ideology and rational self-
interest operate. The final chapter argues that the importance of non-institutional fac-
  83 
tors varies considerably between the countries considered here because of the different 
characteristics of their institutional arrangements : transparency is more dependent on 
the operation of rule-bound processes in some, while in others it is more susceptible to 
contingency and the personal proclivities of particular individuals. 
A third cluster of criticisms focusses on the difficulties involved in selecting appropriate 
cases for comparison. The comparative method may be unable to eliminate irrelevant 
causes and may produce inconclusive results where the researcher lacks empirical cas-
es exhibiting the appropriate configurations of causes (Sartori 1970): the classic few–
cases–many–variables problem. The challenge of case selection is made all the more 
difficult by the fact that a literal reading of Mill would compel researchers to find cases 
which resemble or differ from each other in one and only one way. The unlikelihood of 
doing so when comparing things as complex as whole countries was one of the reasons 
Mill (1865:Book VI, Chapter 7, §§3-4) was even more pessimistic than Sartori about the 
usefulness of his methods for the social sciences. These problems are compounded by 
the fact that the amount of research required to conduct in-depth comparisons of more 
than four or five using Mill’s techniques usually surpasses the capacity of any single re-
searcher, even if more cases are available (Ragin 1987:34 et sqq). 
Contemporary social scientists mitigate these problems in several ways. The judicious 
use of theoretical assumptions allows researchers to examine only those potential caus-
al factors which might reasonably be expected to materially affect the outcome of in-
terest in their study. Theory provides a basis for identifying the universe of comparable 
cases and selecting the best cases within it for generating valid tests of hypotheses de-
spite their apparently irreducible uniqueness (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003:13-4). 
In addition, it is often possible to eliminate competing explanations and test for multi-
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ple causation by combining comparative analysis with a detailed examination of the 
historical record in individual cases. Any hypothesis which implies the existence of 
cross–national variation, ipso facto, implies the existence of particular factors or pro-
cesses within the individual countries which produce those differences, and whose ef-
fects can be tested against documents and other material traces of the past. These 
strategies are all employed here. 
One of the reasons this problem arises at all is that the comparative method requires 
relatively detailed evidence which is time-consuming to collect, interpret and deploy in 
an argument. This evidentiary burden imposes an upper limit on the number of cases 
which can conveniently be compared in any one study, and the limit is usually around 
five. This thesis is no exception, and for practical reasons as such is obliged to restrict 
itself to a consideration of five consolidated democracies out of the twenty-three it 
might have considered: Sweden, the USA, France, the United Kingdom and Germany. 
This choice of countries has been made on methodological, practical and substantive 
grounds. 
Methodologically, these five countries exhibit considerable variation in the outcome of 
interest. They introduced and amended their access laws on different calendar dates, 
and at very different times in relation to the onset of many potential causes within the 
five relationships outlined earlier in the chapter. They are also methodologically ap-
propriate in that they display a mix of similarity and difference in the institutional and 
organisational factors identified earlier as potentially relevant to explaining differences 
in transparency. 
These five countries are also appealing for the very practical reason that sources on the 
development of access rights in each are relatively easy to access, and in most cases 
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parliamentary, government and press documents are readily available online. Sweden 
represents a slight exception due to the sheer age of its access law; discussions in fol-
lowing chapters tend to focus on the way it operates at present, and to rely on second-
ary sources rather more heavily than historians might consider desirable. 
Finally, these countries are interesting on substantive grounds. They are prominent ex-
emplars of different approaches to democracy in academic and popular discourse alike, 
but academic attention to their very different approaches to the routine disclosure of 
official information has been extremely uneven. They are likely to yield insights of in-
terest in their own right, and provide the opportunity to test existing theories about 
transparency and freedom of information. The American law is the subject of a vast 
body of scholarship which generally eschews comparative perspectives, while 
knowledge of the Swedish law among English-language authors essentially amounts to 
anecdote and hearsay about its famed effectiveness rather than its origins. Germany 
and the UK, by contrast, were until very recently understood to be exemplars of official 
secrecy, with the UK having embraced transparency more wholeheartedly than Germa-
ny since the turn of the millennium. The UK has also been the focus of far more scholar-
ly attention, but usually only in comparison with the other Westminster countries. 
Broader comparative studies are extremely rare, while the English literature on Germa-
ny is essentially non-existent. Similarly, France is interesting because its access law was 
introduced relatively early but has not developed the kinds of supportive constituency 
most of the literature assumes will follow as a matter of course; the reasons for this 
failure have not yet been examined in a rigorous fashion – at least by scholars in Eng-
lish. 
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Conclusion 
The previous chapter argued that most of the existing literature on transparency is 
fundamentally concerned with its normative and ethical implications, and that the 
small amount of empirical work tends to display an overly-simplistic view of the poli-
tics involved. This chapter has argued for a richer, more accurate understanding of how 
transparency develops, one grounded in an appreciation of what counts as important 
political information, who controls it and the terms on which that control is exercised. 
Drawing on Weber’s sociology of bureaucracy, it has proposed that a focus on how four 
collective actors are organised, and the manner in which relations of authority and ac-
countability between them are institutionalised. These are depicted in Figure 5. 
Figure 5: A Model of the Democratic Politics of Information 
 
The following five chapters are arranged analytically, and examine different relation-
ships between pairs of the collective actors also shown above. Chapter Three examines 
relations between the voting public and the political executive, focussing on the differ-
ent ways in which officials reconcile the competing demands inherent in democratic 
responsibility for past behaviour with the need to secure re–election. Chapter Four con-
siders the relationship between the bureaucracy and the public, and focusses on the 
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limits to infrastructural power imposed by the practical need to minimise resistance 
and maximise cooperation from the subjects of administrative authority. The dashed 
lines in the figure indicate that these two relations are governed by institutions which 
aggregate the opinions and preferences of otherwise-disorganised individuals, rather 
than relatively organised collective actors capable of independent initiative. Chapters 
Five and Six consider the relationship between organised interest groups and different 
state actors. Chapter Five examines the ways in which the policy development process 
is structured through secrecy, and considers whether different ways of integrating pol-
icy demands might affect the development of freedom of information. Chapter Six ex-
amines patterns of organisation prevailing in the core of policy networks. Finally, Chap-
ter Seven considers relations between the political executive and the bureaucracy, and 
examines the ways in which disclosure to the public at large can be used as a power re-
source by one part of the state against another. 
An analytic approach has been adopted because it is more likely to allow systematic ap-
praisal of the dynamics at work in each of these distinct disputes over information in 
different countries. The alternative, which is more common among comparative histor-
ical works, is to treat each country as a coherent whole and to examine the interactions 
between complex sets of institutions and pressures for change in narrative fashion. Alt-
hough the ultimate aim here is to develop an historically-informed, integrated under-
standing of how the politics of information plays out in different countries, the narra-
tive approach is inadvisable here. There is a good deal of mythology and received wis-
dom surrounding freedom of information in the primary and secondary literature alike. 
This tends to be perpetuated because these sources are mostly narratives relying heavi-
ly on a mutually-reinforcing combination of the normative theory discussed in the pre-
vious chapter, and anecdotal and impressionistic evidence emphasising similarities be-
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tween countries. There is also a widespread tendency to apply explanations developed 
in one country (especially the USA) to other contexts where their relevance is less obvi-
ous. An analytic approach is employed here in order to guard against these biases in the 
source material. 
The empirical chapters all have a similar structure. Each begins by identifying the role 
played by information and communicative practices within each relationship, and the 
reasons why they might facilitate the development of freedom of information. Each 
then identifies institutions that vary among the five country-cases in ways which might 
encourage or prevent disputes over specific kinds of information developing into calls 
for public rights of access. These hypotheses are then assessed through paired compari-
sons of four of the five countries, with the selection of cases being based on practical 
and theoretical concerns particular to each chapter. 
The comparative strategies employed are broadly inspired by Mill’s methods, and in 
particular the method of difference. The goal is to demonstrate that changing political 
demands, the spread of ideas or the existence of objectively-favourable circumstances 
which are often assumed to drive the adoption of access laws are insufficient in and of 
themselves because countries facing similar conditions had different outcomes. It is on-
ly possible for this thesis to claim broad inspiration from Mill because the analytic ap-
proach adopted here does not treat its cases as coherent wholes as Mill demands, nor 
does it assume they differ in only one relevant respect. Rather, it employs an inverse 
method of difference to eliminate insufficient explanations. Combined with historical 
analysis, this allows it to argue that the mediating effect of multiple institutions, and 
the combined effect of struggles within the different relationships described above, can 
reasonably be considered responsible for the different outcomes experienced by the 
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five countries under review. The comparative strategy actually employed is thus closer 
to what Skocpol and Somers (1980) dub the parallel demonstration of theory (in that it 
seeks to show that claims about the role of institutions hold true in multiple countries), 
combined with elements of the contrast of contexts (insofar as it seeks to show that these 
institutional variations affect the working-out of putatively general social processes). 
Over the course of five chapters, this thesis builds a substantial body of evidence about 
the role of institutions in the politics of transparency in a selection of consolidated de-
mocracies: why freedom of information emerged when, where and in the way it did. 
Without further ado, then, let us begin. 
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Chapter 3: Electoral 
Accountability or Electoral 
Competition? 
This chapter examines the contribution to the development of freedom of information 
of struggles over information arising in the electoral relationship. The argument here is 
divided into three parts. 
The first part of the chapter argues against the widespread assumption that electoral 
politics contributes to greater transparency due to a widespread popular desire to hold 
governments more effectively to account through the ballot-box. Such a view is incon-
sistent with the low level of interest most voters show in these laws before they are in-
troduced, or in making use of the rights they provide once they exist. Nor can varia-
tions in the development of access laws be plausibly explained on the basis of varying 
intensity of public support. Rather, it argues that electoral politics is relevant because 
of the incentives which competition for public office places on those who make the law, 
especially following revelation of attempts by officials to avoid accountability through 
secrecy. 
This first part of the chapter then argues that the propensity of officials to advocate ac-
cess rights should be systematically affected by two features of the electoral system. 
The first is the structure of electoral competition. Two-party systems have lower in-
formation costs for rationally-inclined voters interested in basing their decisions on 
past performance. They are thus more likely to encourage competition on the basis of 
trust, and hence facilitate the emergence of rights of access as matters of public debate. 
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The second is the structure of electoral accountability. Where those who control the 
legislative agenda are also likely to see their own re-election prospects harmed by dis-
closure, resistance to the introduction of access laws is likely to be greater regardless of 
how prominent these laws may be as matters of public debate. 
These influences on officials produce a two-dimensional typology, which the chapter 
tests against historical evidence in the second and third parts by conducting a series of 
contrast-oriented comparisons. The first is between two two-party systems, the USA 
and the UK. In the former, where the legislative majority bears less electoral responsi-
bility for the behaviour of the executive, the prospects for legislative protection of 
rights of access did indeed prove more favourable. The second comparison, between the 
USA and France, suggests that the very different contribution made by crises to debates 
over access rights is due to the interaction between their presidencies and their differ-
ent party systems, rather than simply electoral competition. The third comparison in-
volves two countries in which the majority in the legislature bears a significant degree 
of electoral responsibility for the behaviour of the executive, Germany and the UK. It 
shows that the late development and low intensity of debate in the former can be plau-
sibly connected with the way parties in a multiparty system negotiate with one another 
once in parliament.  
Bounded Rationality, Information and Electoral Competition 
As the previous chapter noted, it is often assumed – and sometimes even claimed – that 
access rights develop in more or less direct response to popular demand. This is based 
on plausible conclusions which flow directly from central tenets of representative dem-
ocratic theory. Such systems are often described as a sort of principal-agent relation-
ship, in which the voting public appoints representatives through the ballot-box to do 
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the business of governing for it (Spiller 1990:269; Ferejohn 1999:133; Strøm 2000:266-8). 
Agency relationships have several well–known advantages, including harnessing the 
specialised skills of agents and allowing principals to pass their (limited) time doing 
other things (Dahl 1970:1-44). They also have several disadvantages, the most important 
of which for present purposes is that principals usually find it difficult to ensure that 
their agents are acting diligently and responsibly. This occurs, in part, because agents 
typically have technical expertise not available to the principals and also because 
agents necessarily have direct knowledge of their own actions whereas principals must 
make special efforts to find out what they are doing. 
Voters are assumed to demand access laws because information improves their ability 
to overcome these disadvantages with agency relationships. The single most important 
tool which democratic principals have for exercising this control is the vote (Manin, et 
al. 1999a:29). Indeed, according to some it is the only tool: although voters “are free to 
discuss, criticize and demand at all times, they are not able to give legally binding in-
structions to the government” except by way of periodic elections (Manin, et al. 
1999b:3). Broadly speaking, there are two ways in which voters can use this instrument: 
they can either consider the performance of the incumbents and evict those who fail to 
deliver – known as retrospective or sanction voting – or they can elect whichever can-
didate seems most likely to perform well in future – prospective or selection voting 
(Fearon 1999:56). Right to information laws are beneficial because informed voters are 
better able avoid the problems which arise from these two approaches: the risk of ap-
pointing unsuitable agents (adverse selection) and of not holding incumbents to ac-
count for their actions (moral hazard). 
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The problem with this assumption is not that it is prima facie unreasonable but rather 
that it is inconsistent with evidence about public attitudes. It is one of the ironies of 
freedom of information that most of the time those who are supposed to benefit show 
little interest in it. In every country where official statistics exist, they reveal that only 
a tiny fraction of the general population has ever formally requested access to a gov-
ernment document. In 2009, the ratio of requests to total population was 0.182% in the 
USA, 0.038% in the UK and 0.002% in Germany.21 Anecdotal evidence of the attitudes and 
the behaviour of elected officials suggests that freedom of information is not usually a 
crucial determinant of voting behaviour either. Relatively few political parties have ev-
er made prominent electoral commitments to introduce access laws, and only in a mi-
nority of those cases have their competitors followed suit (as they might be expected to 
have done if they were worried about electoral fallout from failure to support a policy 
of systemic rather than partisan appeal). Moreover, on several occasions parties have 
been willing to abandon commitments to introduce laws once in office. 
This widespread lack of public interest in either using access rights or voting to encour-
age their establishment is inconsistent with a view of democracy in which the public 
decides what it wants and officials respond, but it is not fatal to the claim that the de-
velopment of these rights might still be influenced by electoral politics. A line of argu-
ment running back at least as far as Joseph Schumpeter holds that individual members 
                                                                           
 
21 These figures are calculated using population data from the World Bank (2010) and reports on requests made to 
central government departments in the relevant countries (Germany 2009; United States 2009; United Kingdom 
2010b). Neither France nor Sweden publish data on requests, but there is no evidence to suggest Swedish rates 
would be much higher as a proportion of the population than in the USA, and the general consensus is that request 
rates in France are probably quite low (Rowat 1983; Banisar 2006:73; McDonald 2006:132). It cannot be stressed 
strongly enough that, even where data do exist, calculations such as these are neither rigorous nor comparable, and 
should only be used to reach general conclusions along the lines of “very few citizens ever make use of their rights 
under access laws, even in a country like the USA where they are well-established and prominent features of politi-
cal life”. The reasons for this were discussed in Chapter One, but a flavour of their consequences can be gained by 
comparing the figures here with those of the only other readily-available exercise of this type, conducted by Pat-
rick Vleugels (2009:15). His calculations, for which he provides no sources, suggest much higher but still tiny re-
quest rates of 0.49% (USA), 0.064% (UK), 0.02% (Germany) and, intriguingly given the absence of official data, 0.003% 
for France. 
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of the public are profoundly uninterested in and unengaged with political life 
(Schumpeter 1992:261-3), and frequently hold opinions which are mutually incompati-
ble when they are not radically indeterminate. Schumpeter argued that the essential 
core of democracy lay not in direct popular control of the government, but in competi-
tion for public office among political élites (Schumpeter 1992:269 et sqq.). Regular elec-
tions check, however imperfectly, the tendency of the powerful to seek private gain in 
public office by exposing them to the risk of punishment if abuses of power are discov-
ered. Competition between candidates provides strong incentives to candidates inter-
ested in maximising their vote to transform inchoate public mood into electoral sup-
port by making promises which are likely to find widespread favour. 
One problem with this élite-centred approach is its claim that access rights develop as a 
result of deliberate choices made by those to whom they constitute the greatest risk. 
This problem is, in fact, only apparent. Public disinterest in making use of access laws is 
compatible with élite competition over the idea of public access, provided one assumes 
that voters are rationally-inclined but that their rationality is bounded by the cost of 
information and the organisational challenges they face in developing or pursuing spe-
cific policy preferences.  
It has been recognised for some time among economists, and increasingly among politi-
cal scientists, that the information necessary for fully rational behaviour has high 
transaction and opportunity costs. In politics, one important implication of this is that 
the marginal benefit of information is likely to be so low that it cannot be assumed ra-
tional voters will necessarily seek to inform themselves as fully as they might before 
deciding how to cast their vote (e.g. Downs 1957:200; Simon 1957:196-200; Coase 1960). 
If politically-salient information has a low or negative marginal utility, rationally-
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inclined voters should generally cast votes on the basis of incomplete information, a 
phenomenon sometimes known as “rational ignorance” (Somin 1998; Ciepley 1999; 
Somin 2000). Under these circumstances, it is entirely plausible to imagine that freedom 
of information might be of little practical value to the average voter despite its theoret-
ical appeal. If so, voters might readily endorse it in principle if asked, but focus on other 
issues most of the time. There is some evidence that public opinion displays precisely 
this latent support for freedom of information as a second-order concern. Surveys sug-
gest that, when asked, voters consistently support legislative access rights. In the UK, 
for example, one survey of MPs and other opinion leaders conducted by Glasgow Uni-
versity (CFOI 1993b:1) found over 90% favoured the introduction of an access law; sur-
veys with samples more representative of the general population have usually found 
slightly smaller but still solid majorities of around two–thirds support (e.g. Kellner 1985; 
Rose 1986). 
Moreover, although the electoral politics of introducing a right of access do not appear 
to constrain officials particularly tightly, the politics of repeal do not seem to be nearly 
so lenient. Only one access law has ever been abolished outright: the original Swedish 
act of 1766, which suffered the same fate as the whole parliamentary system of gov-
ernment under Gustav III’s coup d’état of 1772. No government which has expected to 
face the voters in future has ever taken this drastic route, and even proposals to broad-
en exemptions or raise fees have often proved too controversial to carry through. The 
restrictions to the Irish law which were put in place in 2003 are a notable exception, 
and the South African government’s attempt to roll back that country’s iconic law – a 
move which is still underway as of this writing and which has encouraged widespread 
mobilisation among civil society groups and opposition parties – might perhaps provide 
another. Governments interested in rolling back disclosure after the introduction of an 
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access law have usually resorted to more selective and less prominent methods, such as 
standalone laws mandating secrecy under specific circumstances, introducing onerous 
procedural requirements, and tying unwelcome requests down in long-running dispute 
resolution proceedings (Nader 1970; Roberts 2006b:110-8). 
Trust as a Measure of the Perceived Electoral Utility of Information 
The assumption that voter rationality is bounded by information costs suggests that 
voters might be most susceptible to appeals based on rights of access if the perceived 
benefits of political information rise (or the perceived costs fall) sufficiently to encour-
age them to reconsider their assumptions about the marginal utility of being more fully 
informed. Significantly, it is not necessary for the “actual” marginal utility of infor-
mation (however that might be measured) to rise for this to occur, since if voters are 
ill–informed they will ex hypothesi be less able to make accurate calculations of utility. 
All that is necessary is for the perceived marginal value to change enough to encourage 
voters to reconsider their strategy. There are many factors which might contribute to 
this shift. One is a rise in cognitive capacity, perhaps due to education, which might 
lower utilisation costs and enable voters to make use of a wider variety of more com-
plex data and discourage habitual patterns of voting (cf. Dalton 1984). Alternatively, 
changes to the activities undertaken by the state or the manner in which it operates 
might impact on voters in ways which raise the benefits of being informed even if the 
costs remain high. These are not strictly related to electoral politics, and are considered 
in later chapters. A third alternative, which is directly related and is explored here, re-
lates to the different ways voters compensate for being uninformed. 
Rationally–inclined voters faced with high information costs are likely to take short–
cuts in making assessments of who to vote for, relying on “cheaper” information and 
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employing decision–making heuristics rather than the full–blown cost–benefit assess-
ment of policy platforms and candidate track records assumed by normative democrat-
ic theory (Popkin 1991). Voters who are more inclined to select might, for example, 
choose to endorse an eminent member of the local community who they consider wor-
thy of representing them at the centre of power, or to express solidarity with their fam-
ily, class or ethnic group, or on the basis of emotional or habitual attachment to a par-
ticular party. Sanction voters may well look no further than their own sense of econom-
ic security when deciding if the incumbents deserve ongoing support. Other common 
practices include following the advice of experts, using public opinion polls to leverage 
the efforts of others, and drawing inferences from small amounts of solid information 
they can readily observe about candidates and officials (Ferejohn 1990:10-12; Fiorina 
1990:336-41; McKelvey and Ordeshook 1990:283; Dunn 1999:59). 
Although these heuristics may well represent a satisfactory trade–off between infor-
mation costs and effective electoral control most of the time, they necessarily carry the 
risk of adverse selection and moral hazard: voters cannot be entirely sure that their as-
sessments correspond with what their government is actually doing. To the extent that 
voters eschew deciding on the basis of full information, they must assume that the 
short–cuts they are employing do not lead to wildly erroneous conclusions, and that 
those who take office are indeed acting diligently and honestly. In practice, the various 
strategies mentioned above are not mutually exclusive, and voters are likely to employ 
several at once in an effort to reduce this risk. They may, for example, use the past as an 
imperfect guide to an uncertain future while relying on the fact that, even if the cues 
they pick up on when selecting candidates are misleading, the threat of future sanction 
is likely to encourage incumbents to be anticipate negative public opinion. Although a 
mixed strategy may be partly successful, it will always be an imperfect solution: beyond 
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a certain point, rational ignorance implies uncertainty, and non–rational or heuristic 
voting strategies give voters little choice but to trust their governments to some degree 
(or, at least, hope that they are trustworthy). 
The inherent limits of electoral control under conditions of bounded rationality are 
most likely to encourage voters to see the benefits of informing themselves more fully 
when circumstances come to light which show that this trust has been misplaced. Since 
the future is inherently uncertain, this is most likely to occur when it becomes apparent 
that incumbents deserve to be punished for past misbehaviour, and especially when it 
includes by attempts at concealment in order to avoid accountability. Since voters are 
in a poor position to make precise calculations of the marginal utility of information, 
the most propitious circumstance for a decisive crystallisation of public opinion in fa-
vour of access rights is, in short, the aftermath of a major political crisis in which secre-
cy and deception on the part of those responsible was a major contributor. 
This proposed inverse relationship between trust and freedom of information is con-
sistent with survey data showing a long–term decline in trust since the 1960s (Chanley, 
et al. 2000; Brooks and Cheng 2001; Frost 2003), which is to say the period during which 
most access laws were introduced. It is also consistent with claims that access laws are 
direct responses to this decline, especially in places like Canada and the UK (e.g. Bay 
1981; John Ralston Saul, in Gillis 1998; O'Neill 2006). Similar diagnoses are implicit in the 
increasingly widespread claim that freedom of information acts are valuable because 
they increase trust (cf. OECD in Roberts 2006b:108). Claims that major crises involving 
state secrecy have been important contributors to debates over access rights are also 
widespread, occurring particularly frequently in Canada and Ireland (Kearney and 
Stapleton 1998:168; Murphy 1999; McDonagh 2003:1-2), and to a lesser extent in places 
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like Switzerland (Saxer 1993) and the Netherlands (Nillesen and Stappers 1987:496; 
de Vos 1993:127). 
The Influence of Electoral Competition on Public Officials 
Candidates might find it in their interests to propose freedom of information laws when 
trust is declining for several reasons. In seeking support from those (relatively rare) 
voters who happen to be sufficiently informed to approximate the assumptions of ra-
tional theories of voting, candidates should find it in their interests to do so because 
these voters both understand the benefits of these laws and be in a reasonable position 
to use them. If (as seems likely) most voters are rationally ignorant or otherwise in-
clined to employ heuristic shortcuts, proposing an access law might still represent an 
appealing electoral strategy because of its value as a signal. One shortcut many voters 
are likely to employ is to treat policy commitments as clues to the characters of the 
candidates. Proposing an access law constitutes a credible signal of trustworthiness. It 
suggests that the candidate recognises the importance of honesty in public life, the le-
gitimacy of public control over elected officials, and the right of voters to hold officials 
to account for past behaviour. Such promises are compelling because they are costly: 
access laws increase the risk to candidates of losing office at the next election – the risk 
of eviction – by making it more likely that the public will discover corruption and mis-
management, and by making it easier to hold those in power to account for taking un-
popular decisions. Promising an access law is, in short, a powerful signal of personal 
probity and commitment to democratic principles.  
The extent to which access laws represent an appealing basis on which to compete for 
public office is not solely a matter of how public opinion shifts over time; it is also likely 
to be influenced by specific institutional arrangements in place in each country. In most 
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cases, the benefits of transparency principally accrue to candidates competing for office 
and flow from associating themselves with the principle of public access. The costs, on 
the other hand, accrue principally to those who already hold office and whose re-
election prospects are threatened by the release of unfavourable information. This sug-
gests that politicians should generally be more willing to propose access laws than to 
introduce them, and that the prospects for freedom of information are likely to vary 
from country to country with the ways institutional arrangements distribute these 
costs and benefits among the different actors involved. 
The structure of electoral competition is likely to affect the propensity of politicians to 
compete by signalling their support for access rights. Although there are many combi-
nations of electoral and party systems, most countries fall into one of two broad types: 
those with competitive two-party systems and those with multiple parties (Lijphart 
1999:165-70). Each is likely to produce a distinct set of incentives. Two-party systems 
present high risks and high rewards, and candidates will be strongly tempted to pro-
pose access laws but just as strongly tempted to resist introducing them. Multiparty 
systems involve lower risk and lower rewards, providing fewer incentives to propose 
laws, but correspondingly lower incentives to resist if a proposal should arise. 
Two-party systems favour competition on access rights, in part, because they make it 
much easier for voters to identify those formally responsible for official decisions and 
cast their votes on the basis of past performance. In multiparty systems, the prevalence 
of coalition governments means that it is much harder to engage in retrospective sanc-
tion voting because inter–party negotiations often obscure lines of responsibility, and 
may even render such an inquiry otiose (cf. Lijphart 1968:8-10; Maravall 2010). The ease 
of sanctioning under two-party systems is reinforced by the fact that these systems are 
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often associated with single–member districts and majoritarian voting mechanisms. 
These present voters with simpler mechanisms for using the vote as a sanctioning tool. 
The proportional electoral systems usually associated with multiparty parliaments are 
far more complex, and make this kind of voting more difficult. In Germany, for exam-
ple, the electoral system uses both multimember districts and a nationwide proportion-
al top-up mechanism which considerably complicates the link between individual voter 
decisions and the eventual composition of the Bundestag (Dalton 1989:281-5). 
Competitive two–party systems are also more favourable to the framing of electoral 
competition in terms of trust and trustworthiness because they tend to encourage the 
view that politics is a zero–sum game among interest groups competing for the atten-
tion for catch-all parties. Governments in such systems are empirically more likely to 
ignore opposition voices when implementing policies than multiparty systems, where 
consensus is commonly held to be widespread (Lijphart 1999:31 et sqq). This, in turn, 
means that those who supported the losers in two–party elections are less likely to con-
sider incumbent governments as worthy of trust (Anderson and Guillory 1997). It also 
encourages the opposition to improve its own electoral prospects by emphasising the 
incumbents’ failings, since in a two-party system voting one party out almost always 
means voting the other party in. It might also be noted that freedom of information 
acts represent a greater risk in such systems because, in providing access to the public 
at large, they necessarily open government to the main group with the means and a 
structural interest in evicting the government – the opposition. In multiparty systems, 
by contrast, parties do not usually seek to hold office in their own right by gaining sup-
port from multiple, potentially competing constituencies. Rather, they appeal to specif-
ic sections of society and seek to represent specific ideological positions in parliamen-
tary negotiations. To simplify somewhat, their relationship with their constituents typ-
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ically emphasises selection over sanctioning, and their constituencies are not usually 
available for capture by other parties. In such systems, the incentives to compete on the 
basis of access rights might be expected to be much lower. 
A second set of effects flows from the institutional structure of political accountability. 
Once candidates are actually in office, resistance to the introduction of access laws 
should be lower where the information they release is unlikely to affect their electoral 
prospects (Robertson 1982). In most countries, access laws are principally designed to 
favour the release of information held by the administrative bureaucracy. Resistance 
should, as a result, be higher in parliamentary systems than in presidential regimes be-
cause in the former the political executive is drawn from the majority in the legislature, 
and those responsible for introducing the law are the same as those who stand to lose 
office in the case of unwelcome disclosures. In the latter, on the other hand, the inde-
pendent mandate of the chief executive means legislators can theoretically afford to be 
less concerned about the risk of disclosures concerning the executive (Persson, et al. 
1997), although they may be wary of extending access to the parliament or the parties. 
One special case arises in competitive two–party parliamentary systems: during the 
first few months after a change of government, resistance to implementation may well 
be lower because most disclosures are likely to reflect poorly on the outgoing incum-
bents; the appeal of access rights is likely to decline rapidly over time as the new gov-
ernment develops a track record of its own on which it can be judged. 
These two sets of incentives are analytically distinct, but highly likely to interact in 
practice. This suggests a four-fold typology of electoral dynamics represented in Figure 
6 below, which also shows the expected effects on electoral competition and legislative 
action. Access rights should develop earliest in Type I countries because conditions are 
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most favourable to the framing of electoral politics in terms of trust and access to in-
formation, and the costs to legislators of actually implementing such laws are lowest. 
The middle group of legislators should be composed of Types II and III. In Type II coun-
tries, the structure of electoral competition provides few incentives to campaign on the 
basis of access laws, but once the idea does appear on the political agenda legislators 
face relatively lower disincentives to resist. The idea of access rights should be a promi-
nent and long-standing matter of political competition in Type III countries, but these 
countries should also be relatively slow to act because the risks for legislators are high-
est. The precise timing in both is likely to depend on the influence of external factors 
on the balance of competing electoral incentives identified here. Finally, Type IV coun-
tries should be the last to develop access rights if electoral concerns are a significant 
contributor: these countries provide the fewest incentives to compete on the basis of 
accountability or trust, while governments face the greatest risks from implementation. 
Figure 6: Institutions Affecting the Electoral Politics of Information 
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Crises and the Politicisation of Information Rights 
This section tests the hypotheses related to Types I and III by comparing the USA and 
the UK, while the next tests those related to Types II and IV by considering France and 
Germany. With the exception of Type II, the choice of countries is relatively straight-
forward: each displays the necessary institutional configurations and exemplifies the 
kind of democratic politics they imply. Type II presents difficulties because none of the 
five countries examined here displays all the required institutions; France has been 
chosen because it comes closest. The Fifth Republic is a presidential multiparty system, 
but the four main parties have historically tended to form two relatively cohesive and 
competitive blocs. Despite this, the discussion below shows that France still allows some 
useful conclusions to be drawn about the likely effect of electoral competition and ac-
countability.  
The other possible candidate for Type II is Sweden. Despite the fact that it is a parlia-
mentary democracy, Swedish ministers are not formally responsible for administrative 
implementation of policy, and this has sometimes been argued to produce similar in-
centives as presidential regimes concerning the disclosure of information (Herlitz 1966; 
Robertson 1982). Even if this claim were accepted for the sake of argument, Sweden 
would still be unsuitable because of the sheer the age of its access law. Swedish politics 
and society in the late 18th and early 19th Centuries were, unsurprisingly, quite different 
from today, and to the extent Sweden resembled any of the types depicted in Figure 6 it 
lay somewhere between Type I and Type III. Electoral competition was becoming ori-
ented around two loose groupings with identifiable ideological orientations and distinc-
tive bases of social support (Anderson 1973:422), but parties in the modern sense only 
really emerged in the early 20th Century with mass enfranchisement. Formally, the ad-
ministrative state was responsible to the King rather than the parliament, but in prac-
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tice parliament was supreme. The Tryckfrihetsförordning was one of a suite of measures 
introduced by an incoming government which were designed to strengthen public ac-
countability in the aftermath of a serious financial and military crisis in which wide-
spread secrecy the politicisation of state policy were prominent sources of grievance 
(Roberts 1986:106,166). These are no more than passing similarities, however: the sheer 
number of other differences which would have to be taken into account to conduct a 
plausible comparison is simply too great. Although this law arose out struggles between 
political élites, its genesis lies in an attempt to establish a normatively-desirable kind of 
state rather than as part of an attempt to mobilise mass opinion. Mass democracy was 
only established in Sweden in the 1920s, and developed in the presence of an existing 
and well-entrenched regime. As next chapter shows, access is relevant to Swedish polit-
ical accountability. Its relevance lies, however, in its supporting a particular configura-
tion of authority relations between the political executive, the administrative bureau-
cracy and interest groups, a configuration which specifically minimises the importance 
of electoral competition.  
Two–Party Presidential Regimes: The United States 
The USA conforms exemplifies countries with two–party systems in which the legisla-
ture is not responsible to the electorate for bureaucratic behaviour. Communicative 
rights have long been a prominent issue of public debate. Freedom of information was 
identified and introduced relatively early as a solution to problems of electoral control 
over government. There is also good evidence that the separation of powers, and to a 
lesser extent the two-party system, contributed directly to these outcomes. 
The USA is particularly significant because it provides one of the clearest examples of a 
political crisis leading to a precipitous decline in trust, thereby opening the way for a 
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major consolidation of access rights. The crisis in question was Watergate, referring not 
just to the break–in at the Watergate Hotel itself but to the whole series of scandals 
which eventually brought down President Nixon: the legal battle over the publication 
of the Pentagon Papers, increasingly widespread dissatisfaction with the moral, finan-
cial and social costs of the Vietnam War, and irregularities in campaign financing. The-
se provoked considerable disillusionment among many Americans with their govern-
ment (Clark 1975:750-1; Rourke 1975:2). Nixon’s attempts to obscure his own involve-
ment in these unpopular and illegal decisions invited reconsideration of the terms on 
which those in power might legitimately keep information secret from the citizens to 
whom they were responsible (Lewis 1974:2-3). 
Watergate is widely understood to have been a decisive contributor to the development 
of the 1974 amendments to the Freedom of Information Act 1966 (Nader 1981b; 1981a), and 
their passage was facilitated by a combination of electoral competition and the separa-
tion of powers. The amendments were initially vetoed by President Ford, citing con-
cerns over national security (United States 1974b). This was a risky decision, electoral-
ly-speaking, since it could easily be construed as an implicit endorsement of the corrup-
tion and abuse of power which Nixon’s secrecy had facilitated. With an off–year elec-
tion looming, few members of Congress were willing to run a similar risk, and the bill 
was rapidly passed a second time with a veto–proof majority. That electoral concerns 
were a direct contributor is strongly suggested by the fact that the override was passed 
overwhelmingly by the House, all of which was up for re–election, but by a much nar-
rower margin in the Senate, only one–third of which was due to face the electorate 
(Archibald 1993:731). 
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The manner in which Watergate led to these amendments is significant, because it 
lends support to the claim made earlier that public opinion is not an independent 
“cause” of transparency, but rather a latent predisposition which proponents may find 
it easier and more attractive to politicise in some circumstances than others. Even in  a 
country which had experienced one of the most serious political crises of a generation, 
in which the issue of secrecy was at the forefront of popular consciousness, in which a 
law purporting to strengthen popular control over government by providing access to 
information already existed, and in which the idea that communicative rights consti-
tute a fundamental mechanism of popular control is embedded in the Constitution it-
self, neither public nor élite opinion spontaneously crystallised around the idea of 
strengthening the Freedom of Information Act. This crystallisation was the result of con-
certed efforts to mobilise Congressional and public opinion by a loosely–coordinated 
group of members of Congress such as Edward Kennedy, together with journalists and 
political activists like Ralph Nader (see the list of witnesses to hearings in United States 
1974a:4, some of whom were interested in consolidating access rights for reasons only 
tangentially related to electoral accountability, as Chapter Five shows). 
It is also significant that this exemplar of the “crisis explanation” involved amendments 
to an existing law rather than the introduction of the original law. A comparison with 
the circumstances under which the original 1966 Act was introduced suggests that the 
Watergate crisis was useful for transparency advocates, but that amendments may well 
have been put in place even if it had not occurred. The original bill was drafted by a 
House Subcommittee founded in 1955 at the initiative of freshman Representative John 
Moss. This was not the result of a crisis, or even a dramatic decline in public trust, but 
rather of shifts in the balance of power within Congress, and between it and the Presi-
dency. To the extent that shifts in public opinion facilitated the passage of its bill, they 
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were very largely brought about by the Subcommittee itself, which spent almost ten 
years documenting and publicising irregularities in government information handling 
and disclosure, in an explicit effort to mobilise support for reform. 
An historical perspective suggests, moreover, that Watergate itself may not have been 
an exogenous factor, but rather an outcome of a long-running structural conflict be-
tween Congress and Presidency over executive secrecy. This conflict emerged in its 
contemporary form in the immediate aftermath of World War Two, although it is possi-
ble to find historical antecedents stretching as far back as the foundation of the Repub-
lic (Hodder-Williams 1987:41-2; Foerstel 1999). The “modern” era of conflict over offi-
cial secrecy in the USA began with attempts by President Truman and his successors to 
assert control over official information on two grounds. The first was national security. 
During World War Two the executive branch developed comprehensive systems for 
classifying and controlling access to defence-related information. These were retained 
into the post-war era as a result of the Cold War, and were applied to an increasingly 
wide range of material of domestic political significance. The second was executive 
privilege, a claim advanced by Presidents from Eisenhower onwards that they enjoyed 
implicit authority to withhold information about domestic administrative matters un-
der their Constitutionally-mandated role as independently-elected chief executives 
(Schwartz 1977:129). Executive privilege was invoked with increasing frequency from 
the late 1950s onwards as a means of resisting what was viewed as unwelcome Congres-
sional interference in matters such as public works, schools, civil service examinations, 
gaols and public housing (cf. United States 1959:400). 
The invocation of national security has often proved a particularly effective way for 
Presidents to temporarily blunt Congressional or public demand for information 
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(Armstrong 1998:171), especially in the aftermath of terrorist attacks and military crises 
(Lee 2003:120 et sqq; Sides 2006). Over the long term, however, these assertions of Pres-
idential authority have often contributed to the consolidation of open access rather 
than undermining it, because they have provided the basis for counter-mobilisation 
among members of Congress and non-government organisations. Perhaps the prime 
example of this is the foundation of the Moss Subcommittee, mentioned earlier. This 
was a direct response to executive refusals to provide details on the purging of com-
munists in the employ of the federal administration. Officials had found there were 
fewer genuine communists available for purging than Eisenhower had promised in his 
election campaign, and that they had decided to make up the difference by targeting 
homosexuals and other “undesirables” (Archibald 1979:312; Lemov 2007). The Moss 
Subcommittee was among the more influential committees investigating government 
secrecy at this time, but it was by no means unique (e.g. United States 1958c; 1960b) 
Significantly, the pattern repeated itself around a decade later. Nixon’s attempts to 
transform executive privilege from a justification for withholding specific documents 
into a founding principle of the executive branch as a whole can be understood, in part 
at least, as a further reaction against this increasingly intense Congressional and public 
scrutiny of the executive branch. 
The importance of institutionalised conflict between Congress and the President has 
tended to divert attention from partisan competition. The Freedom of Information Act is 
usually described as enjoying wide bipartisan support in Congress, and this is true. The 
Act was introduced with the cooperation of a number of junior Republicans, and sup-
port has consistently been high across party lines ever since (see Rumsfeld, in 
United States 1966; Archibald 1979:317; Relyea 1979:328). It is important not to confuse 
causes and effects, however, or the involvement of individual Republicans during the 
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passage of the bill with an absence of partisan competition in ensuring the emergence 
of the bill in the first place. Freedom of information has been a point of difference be-
tween Democrats and Republicans throughout post–war era, with the former generally 
supporting it and the latter showing far less enthusiasm. The Democrats first commit-
ted to improving access to official files in 1952, and incorporated a freedom of infor-
mation act into their electoral platform in 1956 (Foerstel 1999:27; Piotrowski 2007:22). 
Commitments to expand it also appeared in the platforms of 1960, 1972, 1976, 1984 and 
2008 (Woolley and Peters 2010). The Republican Party, by contrast, has only used the 
phrase “freedom of information” twice in electoral commitments over that period, both 
times in a negative sense. The first was in 1980, as part of a promise to relax the prohi-
bitions in the Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts against background checks for pro-
spective employees of the federal security services; the second was in 1992, when 
strengthening the Act was seen as a means of combating perceived “liberal” bias in the 
system of public broadcasting funding. These quite different views of access rights may, 
in part, be due to an alignment between institutional and partisan interests (Kennedy 
1996): the Democrats enjoyed a majority in both the House and the Senate continuously 
from 1949 to 1981, with the exception of the period between 1953 and 1955. The party’s 
interests were, in a sense, those of Congress. The Congressional Subcommittee which 
drafted the original Freedom of Information Act was formed shortly after the Democrats 
regained control of the House in 1955, at a time when the Presidency was held by a Re-
publican and not long after Senator McCarthy’s fall from grace. Its foundation was thus 
facilitated not just by Congressional dissatisfaction with the executive branch, but by 
partisan Congressional dissatisfaction. The fact that the Subcommittee’s supporters still 
felt the need, years later, to emphasise its bipartisan nature might thus be taken as tacit 
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acknowledgement of this partisan aspect as much as a statement of fact (Archibald 
1993:727). 
Majoritarian Parliamentary Regimes: The United Kingdom 
A comparison between the UK and the USA suggests that the earlier adoption of free-
dom of information in the latter was indeed at least partly due to the separation of 
powers. As in the USA, official control over information has been a long-standing mat-
ter of public debate in the UK, due in no small measure to the highly competitive nature 
of its party system. But unlike the USA, the Freedom of Information Act 2000 only entered 
into force after some thirty years of piecemeal reform, a phenomenon which can very 
largely be traced to the position of Cabinet at the head of both the executive and the 
parliamentary majority. 
The late implementation of access rights in the UK cannot plausibly be explained by dif-
ferences in the level or nature of discontent with official control over information, 
which were similar to those in the USA. Calls for greater transparency grew out of 
widespread discontent with the UK’s notoriously-pervasive regime of official secrecy, 
and did so in two separate ways. The first was a largely élite debate which arose in the 
1960s over whether Britain’s administrative apparatus was appropriate for the domestic 
tasks it was being asked to undertake in the post-war era. The effects of the changing 
administrative relationship between the state and its citizens are considered in their 
own right in Chapter Four. They are relevant here because they became an electoral 
issue as a result of repeated, often heavy-handed attempts by successive governments 
to prevent the press from printing politically-embarrassing stories, usually about de-
fence and diplomatic matters. These foreign policy controversies spilled over into de-
bates about domestic administrative arrangements because the legal foundation of the 
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government’s actions were the same in both cases: the infamous Section 2 of the Official 
Secrets Act 1911. Prior to its amendment in 1989, this criminalised any unauthorised dis-
closure of government–held information by any public servant. It symbolised, and was 
widely understood to constitute the foundation of, a pervasive “culture of secrecy” (e.g. 
Newspaper Publishers Association, in United Kingdom 1972d:42). 
Nor can the late implementation of freedom of information in the UK be explained by 
greater reticence among the parties to compete with each other on the issue of secrecy; 
if anything, the partisan competition was greater. While in opposition, both the Con-
servatives and Labour proved perfectly willing to exploit scandals over the use of offi-
cial secrecy to discredit the government. Partisan competition began to focus on do-
mestic matters following the review of the civil service conducted by the Fulton Com-
mittee, which recommended rolling back official secrecy. This met with equivocal sup-
port within the Labour government. Some, including Prime Minister Wilson, were sup-
portive of the idea in principle, but the consensus position embodied in its White Paper 
Information and the Public Interest (United Kingdom 1969) was that wholesale reform was 
both undesirable and unnecessary (Wraith 1979:187-8; Marsh 1987:253). Despite claim-
ing that there was no “problem” of official secrecy stifling public access to important 
information, less than a year after the publication of this White Paper the Attorney 
General brought charges under the Official Secrets Act against four Sunday Telegraph jour-
nalists for leaking a confidential report into the Nigerian–Biafran civil war. This, to-
gether with Labour’s failure to seriously respond to the Fulton Committee’s recommen-
dation, encouraged the Conservative opposition to make a commitment to do so at the 
1970 general election(Theakston 2004:19-20). The Telegraph Case jury’s decision in 1971 
to acquit, combined with the trial judge’s harsh criticism of Section 2, provided the 
newly–elected Conservative government with the ideal opportunity to exploit its elec-
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tion commitment to maximum partisan gain. It did so by establishing the Franks Com-
mittee (Seymour-Ure 1977:161), whose report described the Official Secrets Act as “a 
mess” and recommended fundamental reform (United Kingdom 1972a; Winslow and 
Dwyer 1988). Although the Franks Committee stopped short of calling for a freedom of 
information act, it opened the door to this debate by explicitly drawing attention to the 
Swedish and American laws as possible models for reform (United Kingdom 
1972a:Appendix IV; Jaconelli 1973:70). The effect of this recommendation can be gauged 
by the fact that Labour’s October 1974 general election manifesto included an explicit 
commitment to replace the Official Secrets Act with a “a measure to put the burden on 
public authorities to justify withholding information” (Wilson 1974), a promise which 
was complemented by an announcement in the Queen’s Speech to the effect that, 
henceforth, it would be government policy to publish background information follow-
ing major policy announcements (Marsh 1987:253). 
Neither of these commitments were translated into law, a fact which can be at least 
partly attributed to electoral risk inherent in governments giving up control over offi-
cial information. One implication of the classic Westminster system in which ministers 
are theoretically responsible for the actions of the bureaucracy is that almost all official 
information is relevant to the electoral decisions of voters (Robertson 1999:1-8). The 
politicisation of access rights in the 1970s appears to have occurred despite the better 
judgment of party officials, if the reticence of Cabinets to follow through on election 
commitments is any guide. The Labour Party was so visibly reluctant to act on its 1975 
commitment that no fewer than three private members’ bills were presented between 
1977 and 1979 – two by Labour backbenchers and one by a Liberal – and proponents 
even managed to force the adoption of a more ambitious policy at the Party conference 
of 1978. This last proposal remains, in some ways, the most radical to be formally en-
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dorsed by a political party in the UK. None were implemented before the fall of the gov-
ernment in 1979, and primary and secondary sources suggest this was due, in part, to 
the lack of support among senior party officials (United Kingdom 1972d). The only con-
crete action the government took was to issue an internal memorandum (the “Croham 
Directive”) instructing authorities to release more background information after policy 
decisions had been announced. 
The Conservatives under Mrs Thatcher were overtly hostile towards the idea of general 
rights of access to central government files (CFOI 1993a), and displayed an unusual will-
ingness to use the criminal law to reinforce centralised control over the distribution of 
information (Johnson 1987). Despite a concerted effort conducted by the Campaign for 
Freedom of Information, which employed a similar repertoire of techniques to mobilise 
public opinion as those which had proved successful in the USA, the only general re-
form to occur during the 1980s was an amendment to the Official Secrets Act. This was 
presented as a liberalisation, but actually improved the ability of the government to se-
cure convictions for the unauthorised disclosure of information relating to the classic 
affairs of state. The reasons for this different attitude were not purely electoral, as later 
chapters show, but nor are they inconsistent with the electoral argument being devel-
oped here. 
This electoral explanation for the late introduction of access rights has one weakness 
which deserves consideration: if the centralisation of political and administrative au-
thority in the Cabinet provided those in power with such strong incentives to resist, it 
is not obvious why the Freedom of Information Act should have been introduced at all. 
Successive governments might theoretically have gone on making limited concessions 
more or less indefinitely, especially if party officials were right in believing that the 
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electoral risks of reneging on promises to do so were minimal – that there were “no 
votes in the issue” (Michael 1980:102; Worthy 2007b:83). Part of the explanation for the 
eventual adoption of the UK law lies in the fact that, by the mid-1990s a significant 
number of senior officials had genuinely come to believe in the value of transparency 
due to changes in the British state and its relations with society. These are examined in 
later chapters. But part of the explanation also lies in the fact that, for a crucial period 
surrounding the election of the first Blair government in 1997, electoral competition 
had positive effects which outweighed countervailing concerns. The release of the Scott 
Report into the Matrix Churchill affair in 1996 encouraged Labour to compete with the 
Conservatives on trustworthiness by promising to put in place mechanisms to combat 
secrecy and reinforce Ministerial accountability. Although Blair subsequently came to 
regret this tactic (Blair 2010:516-7), at the time he argued that the Scott Report “made 
the case for a freedom of information act unanswerable” (Blair 1996; Frankel 1999). 
Support for access was never universal within the Party, but a combination of euphoria 
and the prime minister’s personal support made possible the rapid release of an ambi-
tious White Paper (United Kingdom 1997d) and the start of work drafting a bill. It is 
open to question whether Blair was ever as profoundly committed to freedom of infor-
mation as he had made out prior to the election; he certainly appears to have either lost 
interest in it or been influenced by opponents within Cabinet at a relatively early stage 
(Frankel 2010). This resurgent resistance was reflected in a Cabinet reshuffle in July 
1998, which resulted in the transfer of responsibility for the Act to Home Secretary Jack 
Straw, and from the Cabinet Office (which had been responsible for open government 
initiatives since at least 1992) to the Home Office (which was responsible for the Police, 
the Security Services and Immigration) – which is to say from supporters to those much 
more inclined to believe that access “brings nothing but pain for governments” 
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(Worthy 2007b:147). It is likely that an increasing number of senior government figures 
would, by this point, have preferred to abandon legislation entirely, but that the elec-
tion commitments and the White Paper had produced so much momentum that this 
was considered too risky. Thus, although the kinds of electoral concerns outlined above 
were never truly absent, the existence of the Freedom of Information Act suggests that the 
cyclical effects of electoral competition can sometimes its long-term effects. 
Transparency without Crises 
The USA and the UK share an important characteristic: official control over information 
has been a long-standing matter of public debate and a relatively regular feature of par-
tisan competition between established parties. This section compares these countries to 
France and Germany, countries in which access rights were a much less prominent mat-
ter of debate. It reinforces the claims of the preceding section by showing that the ab-
sence of electoral competition can be explained, at least in part, on the basis of their 
differing structures of electoral competition and accountability. 
Sporadic Partisan Competition in France 
At first sight, the development of access rights in France conforms with expectations 
about multiparty presidential regimes. In contrast with both the USA and the UK, these 
rights did not develop in response to a specific crisis (Errera 1987:120), nor have there 
been serious attempts by either politicians or civil society organisations to encourage a 
widespread perception that abuses of executive power might be solved by access to of-
ficial files. This is consistent with the claim multiparty systems should be less likely to 
encouraging competition on this issue. Moreover, the inclusion of a right of access un-
der Title I of the excitingly–named Law of 17 July 1978 on Diverse Measures to Improve Rela-
tions between the State and the Public and Various Provisions of an Administrative, Social and 
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Fiscal Nature, represented an unusual degree of parliamentary initiative. When this om-
nibus bill was first presented by the government to the Assemblée Nationale it did not 
provide a right of access. This was added in committee a mere twenty minutes before 
the bill’s final consideration on the floor of the house (France 1978:1324). This is some-
times held out as a rare example of a law being passed under the Fifth Republic despite 
not having been introduced by the government (i.e. the Presidency; cf. Lasserre, et al. 
1987:72-4; Moderne 2003:40). 
France is also consistent with expectations in that this lack of partisan competition is 
clearly not for want of crises around which an Anglo-Saxon style debate might have de-
veloped. Revelations in the mid-1970s of the State’s use of the Compagnie Républicaine de 
Sécurite and wiretapping against its own citizens did not produce calls for greater access 
to government information, despite leading to the resignation of ministers and the 
termination of controversial surveillance programmes (Brasz 1977). Earlier, the near–
collapse of the Fifth Republic in 1968 produced only scattered calls for public access to 
official files (e.g. Moulin 1968), despite the prevalence of radical anti–authoritarian, an-
ti–bureaucratic critiques of French government and widespread demands for more 
meaningful public participation in politics. Such calls for access rights as were made 
had no direct impact on the development of the access law ten years later. 
This lack of politicisation is noteworthy for its persistence: unlike the USA, the French 
law has not formed the basis of subsequent attempts at framing problems of popular 
political control in terms of access to information. The term “transparency” has gained 
currency since 1998 with the introduction of laws to address corruption in party and 
electoral financing. These mandate the declaration of interests by elected office-
holders; they are not designed to provide access to official files, and nor have they giv-
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en rise to a general debate about the need for such laws. Those few laws which do pro-
vide access are narrow in scope, and have not been framed as relevant to retrospective 
electoral accountability but rather the defence of individual rights against the bureau-
cratic state – an indicative case being the strengthening of access to medical files fol-
lowing revelations in 1993 of the knowing use of infected blood by public health author-
ities (France 1995b:47). 
The French case is not entirely consistent with expectations, however: despite a general 
lack of politicisation, its access law was introduced after an uncharacteristic and brief 
period of inter-party competition in the mid-1970s (Errera 1987:89; Moderne 2003:40). 
The first proposal was tabled in the lower house by the (opposition) Communists in De-
cember 1975 (France 1978:1379), and essentially related to freedom of expression rather 
than access to government–held information (France 1976). This was followed in June 
1976 by a proposal from a broad left–wing coalition of Socialists and Radicals providing 
a right of access (France 1976). At the same time, the centre–right UDR tabled proposi-
tions of its own (France 1976; France 1978:1379). In November 1977 the Communists 
once again tabled a proposal, this time for a fully–fledged right of access (France 1977). 
This departure from the normal course of French politics is somewhat unexpected, and 
deserves explanation. One important contributor was the election of early 1978. This 
occurred during a serious economic downturn, and was widely-expected to deliver a 
victory to the parties of the left for the first time under the Fifth Republic. It was, more-
over, an extremely close election, and the outcome was expected at the time to turn on 
the support of socially-liberal members of the middle classes who were dissatisfied with 
the status quo but hesitant to embrace radical programmes such as those offered by the 
Communists (Wright 1978). That access laws were considered likely to appeal to these 
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voters can be gauged by the fact that the government responded to the opposition pro-
posals outlined above by running on a platform of administrative reform which includ-
ed an access bill (France 1978:1326; Errera 1987:91-2). 
 
 Although historical context undoubtedly played a role, it is also essential to take ac-
count of the unique interaction between legislative coalitions and the separation of 
powers in France. The Fifth Republic uses a unique electoral system with both propor-
tional and majoritarian features and complex effects. Some have argued that it favours 
the persistence of multiple smaller parties (Duverger 1968), a claim which appears to be 
borne out in practice: twelve won seats in the 2007 elections, and this was by no means 
unusual. More recent scholarship has suggested the system actually has non-linear dis-
proportional effects, disadvantaging weak parties while encouraging alliances between 
a small number of larger parties but not their fusion into a two catch-all parties (Blais 
and Loewen 2009:357). The result has usually been an Assemblée Nationale dominated by 
four main parties forming stable and often competitive two-party blocs on either side 
of the left-right material-distributional cleavage. 
Most of the time, the imperatives of the presidential system have meant that ruling 
coalitions in France have been highly-cohesive (Sauger 2009); There are, in particular, 
few incentives for coalition partners to either propose or support alternative mecha-
nisms of executive oversight (Lazardeux 2009). It is significant, then, that the politicisa-
tion of the mid-1970s was arose not just in response to unusual economic circumstanc-
es, but also in the context of a breakdown in discipline within the ruling right-wing coa-
lition. These relations were somewhat uneasy: President Giscard’s party was not the 
dominant member of the majority coalition, and the more influential right-wing parties 
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were uncomfortable with his social liberalism. The relationship is perhaps best summed 
up by the fact that the leader of the largest party, Jacques Chirac, was simultaneously 
Giscard’s political rival and, until he resigned in 1976, his prime minister. After Chirac’s 
resignation, Giscard appointed Raymond Barre, an academic economist rather than a 
member of parliament, and a figure who therefore lacked a political base from which to 
impose himself on the Assemblée. Consequently, the months leading up to the 1978 elec-
tion were characterised by an unusual degree of disharmony and even rivalry within 
the government, at least by the standards of the preceding decades. They resembled 
what would subsequently come to be known as cohabitation (where the President and 
the majority in the Assemblée are from opposing parties). The widespread politicisation 
of access rights in the mid–1970s must partly be understood as a partisan tactic to dis-
credit the President prior to the March 1978 elections in a manner which exploited a 
temporary and unusual lack of presidential control over the majority coalition (Errera 
1987:92; Lazardeux 2009). 
The presidency was an important contributor to the politicisation of access rights in 
other ways as well. Legislators undoubtedly drew inspiration for their access law from 
sources such as the recently–amended American law (Riley 1983a:85), the Council of 
Europe’s Directive 77–31 on the protection of individuals against administrative acts 
and the recently–enacted German administrative procedure law (Holleaux 1980:192). 
But the most direct influences lay within the French state itself. At the political level, 
Giscard and Barre were both at the socially-liberal end of the conservative political 
spectrum in France, and as mentioned earlier had committed themselves to lightening 
the “bureaucratic burden” at the 1978 election (France 1978:1324-5; Thyreau and Bon 
1981). The bill into which the French access regime was inserted was introduced in ful-
filment of this, and although the intent was not to introduce a right of access, opposi-
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tion to the Assemblée’s initiative was dampened by the fact that several government 
committees had identified the need for something like an access law at different times 
over the preceding decade. Indeed, the Prime Minister himself was known to be favour-
able towards the idea of access rights(Aurillac 2003:56): in 1977 he had established a 
committee to facilitate the pro–active publication of pre–approved official documents, 
and this had concluded the opposite approach of indicating which should be kept secret 
was the only feasible possibility (France 1981:60). This recommendation was made on 
the eve of the election itself, and may well have influenced the specific form taken by 
the political opportunism discussed earlier. This suggests that the origins of freedom of 
information in France lie substantially within the state itself, and that parliament was 
only a catalytic factor in their development, a possibility explored in more depth in the 
next chapter. 
Multiparty Parliamentary Regimes: Germany 
Germany, a multiparty system in which the political executive controls the legislature, 
is consistent with expectations in that freedom of information only became a promi-
nent matter of political debate relatively late, and was enshrined in law even later still. 
As recently as the 1970s, contemporary observers noted the lack of domestic pressure 
for reform (e.g. United Kingdom 1979a:44). Neither of the two main parties – the Social 
Democrats (SPD) or the Christian Democrats (CDU) – ever showed conspicuous enthusi-
asm for competing with each other on the issue. Indeed, the Informationsfreiheitsgesetz 
was only put in place in 2005 over their resistance (albeit passive resistance in the case 
of the SPD, which was then governing in coalition with the Greens, who were the main 
advocates of the law). It cannot be conclusively shown that this was solely the result of 
the electoral factors hypothesised above, in part because it is difficult to establish the 
causes of a non-occurrence. But some indirect sources of evidence which support this 
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claim, and others allow competing explanations for the lack of politicisation to be elim-
inated. In conjunction, these suggest that electoral considerations were an important 
contributor. 
The lack of political competition around access laws cannot be attributed to the absence 
of propitious crises. The Federal Republic has experienced several which, elsewhere, 
might have been expected to lead to calls for greater transparency. It was apparently 
widely-accepted by the late 1970s that Adenauer had “allowed” political opponents to 
be trailed by the secret service (Reese 1977:228), yet debate over political control over 
this sensitive aspect of coercive state authority was not framed in terms of widespread 
calls for greater popular accountability as occurred in the aftermath of Watergate. In 
the so–called Pitsch case, a member of the Verfassungsschutz (Office for the Protection of 
the Constitution) leaked details of wiretapping operations to the press, for which he 
was suspended and prosecuted. His conviction was eventually overturned by the Feder-
al Court on the grounds that the original wiretaps were illegal (Reese 1977:220-1), but 
this had no appreciable effect on the reluctance of the parties to compete over access 
rights. Earlier still, the publication in 1961 of defence plans by Der Spiegel led to the 
temporary detention of half its editorial staff on suspicion of breaching official secrecy 
laws. No convictions were recorded, the actions were eventually overturned as ultra vir-
es by the courts, and Adenauer was forced to ask for his minister’s resignation, but this 
did not lead to calls for transparency as occurred in the UK following prosecutions of 
the press under the Official Secrets Act in the 1970s and 1980s. 
The closest thing to a genuine “crisis” contributing to the development of freedom of 
information in Germany was the emergence of a debate around perceptions of corrup-
tion in the early 2000s (Redelfs 2005:1). This followed the publication of surveys by 
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Transparency International, which suggested that Germany had “fallen behind” other 
nations like Finland, Sweden and New Zealand – all countries with access laws. The is-
sue was taken up by the press (Financial Times Deutschland 2000a; 2000b; Bolzen 2002; 
Meyer 2002; Rademaker 2002; Associated Press 2003; Kulick 2003; Associated Press 
2004), and appears to have had particular resonance because it arose at a time when the 
CDU was embroiled in a major scandal involving undisclosed irregularities in its financ-
es. Advocates of freedom of information used this debate to overcome parliamentary 
resistance when the access bill stalled in the Bundestag (Berliner Zeitung 2004). It is 
significant, however, that this only occurred once a bill was already well on its way 
through the Bundestag – this crisis arose, in other words, partly due to the campaign for 
an access law rather than the reverse. 
The historic absence of competition cannot, secondly, be attributed to a lack of aware-
ness at élite level of the existence of access rights elsewhere, or to its potential as a ba-
sis of inter-party competition. For a brief period during the early 1980s, there were at-
tempts by public interest lawyers and academics to encourage the parties to take up the 
issue. This campaign met with some success: the Free Democrats (FDP) included a 
promise to introduce an access law in their election platform for 1980 (Schaar and 
Diederichs 1996, quoting Der Tagesspiegel, 12 January 1980), while a few factions of the 
SDP and CDU also called for reform (per officials quoted in Riley 1983b:11). 
This early period of élite agitation proved to be a false dawn. Neither the SDP nor the 
CDU formally adopted proposals for an access law, although they were not averse to oc-
casionally engaging in opportunistic politicisation. In 1983, for example, the opposition 
CDU asked the FDP Parliamentary Secretary for the Ministry of the Interior how the 
government was responding to the Council of Europe’s 1979 recommendation that all 
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member–states establish a right of access to official documents (cf. Council of Europe 
1979; 1981). This question appears to have been designed to force the FDP to choose be-
tween commitment to its earlier electoral promise and its interests as a member of the 
governing coalition. In the course of his reply, the Secretary revealed that freedom of 
information had been discussed by a group within the Federal Ministry for the Interior 
working on amendments to the Bundesdatenschutzgesetz (the Data Protection Act; see 
Schöler, in Germany 1981:2633). He would later go on to commission a report from the 
Max Planck Institute concluding that access rights in Germany lagged behind in France, 
the Nordic countries and the USA. These efforts did not produce substantive reforms. 
It does, however, seem possible to attribute the late development of debate over free-
dom of information at least partly to self-interested resistance by the parties them-
selves (Riley 1983b:11). This is suggested by the fact that the main proponents of the 
Informationsfreiheitsgesetz were the Greens, who advocated it as part of a broader strate-
gy of using transparency to disrupt established inter-party relations. One prominent 
feature of the German multiparty system is relatively stable relations between the main 
parties and their bases of support. These ties are particularly strong in the case of the 
two main parties, which are allied to highly-organised economic groups, and they mat-
ter for two reasons. Firstly, as Chapter Six shows, they encouraged these supporters to 
oppose access rights out of strategic self-interest. Secondly, and more importantly for 
present purposes, it encouraged the development of a sectionally-based cooperative 
style of opposition within parliament, in which influential opposition parties sought 
concessions for their supporters through negotiation, rather than by attempting to take 
government themselves. The Greens represented interests which were systematically 
disadvantaged by this “cartel” arrangement, and sought to overturn it by adopting an 
adversarial approach which relied heavily on the opportunities for publicity provided 
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by things such as parliamentary questions on notice, press conferences and member-
ship of parliamentary committees (Frankland 1988:110-16). 
That the prevailing tendency towards secrecy which the Greens sought to overturn 
arose from the structural imperatives of negotiation in a multiparty parliament rather 
than solely from ideological commitment is clear from the way the Greens’ approach to 
transparency changed over time. When they first won seats at Federal level, their 
commitment to radical transparency also led them not to hold all their caucus meetings 
in public. They were forced to abandon this practice when it became clear that it was 
weakening their bargaining position because the other parties knew in advance what 
their position would be (Frankland 1988:108). 
Conclusion 
One of the theoretical benefits of freedom of information is that it strengthens the ac-
countability of democratic rulers to the citizens over whom they rule. Since the com-
petitive election for public office is one of the most important mechanisms by which 
this is achieved in these countries, and since those who make the law in representative 
democracies are all elected, it would be very surprising if the development of these laws 
was not influenced by the costs and benefits disclosure might bring to elected politi-
cians. 
This chapter has argued, on the basis of a series of comparisons between the USA, the 
UK, France and Germany, that electoral politics is indeed relevant to the development 
of freedom of information, but not for the most commonly-assumed reason. In none of 
these countries was an access law the result of an independent crystallisation of public 
opinion around the need to exercise more effective electoral control. All experienced 
circumstances which might objectively have been expected to produce this, but debate 
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over the need for access laws only arose in some, and legislative action followed swiftly 
in but a few. Indeed, shifts in public opinion were most decisive where they were least 
independent of the political system. On several occasions in the USA and the UK, the 
identification of access rights as a desirable response to particular circumstances was 
the result of deliberate attempts at framing by politicians and politically-connected 
groups. 
This chapter has argued that the variable propensity to politicise access rights can 
plausibly be connected with the institutional incentives provided by competitive two-
party systems. These systems encourage those seeking office to mobilise electoral sup-
port by attacking the trustworthiness of their opponents, and by signalling their sup-
port for strong retrospective sanction voting through support for access rights. Multi-
party systems do not necessarily prevent the emergence of partisan competition on this 
issue, but the manner in which coalition building and parliamentary negotiations have 
developed in the countries examined here tends to discourage it. As a result, the advo-
cacy of access rights was associated with disruption to established patterns of interparty 
relations in the cases considered here, rather than their normal operation. 
Evidence has also been presented that the structure of political accountability contrib-
utes to the likelihood that access rights are introduced once they emerge as a topic of 
debate. Germany and the UK were both slower to introduce access laws than France or 
the USA, and this can be traced, at least in part, to electorally self-interested resistance 
by executives who control legislatures. Presidential systems, by contrast, provide an 
institutionalised space within which executive assertions of the right to control the dis-
tribution of information can be disputed – albeit only under certain conditions. These 
differences cannot be easily explained in terms of the ideological predisposition of 
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those in power. Freedom of information is, admittedly, broadly aligned with the politi-
cal left in the USA, but this is at least partly because the Democrats controlled the Con-
gress for a long period in the middle of the 20th Century, while the Republicans tended 
to be more successful in winning the White House. Moreover, freedom of information 
always had important supporters on the right, while parties on both left and right were 
willing to politicise the idea in the UK and, sporadically, France. In at least one country 
– Germany – the introduction of a Freedom of Information Act occurred despite the ob-
vious unwillingness of both major parties to compete with each other on the issue. 
This chapter has, finally, touched on several issues which will be examined more fully 
later. The comparison between France and the USA suggested that party discipline 
might have affected the influence of presidential systems. This is examined in Chapter 
Five. Secondly, while the attitudes of public officials are influenced by electoral consid-
erations, the comparison between France and the UK suggested that attitudes and be-
haviour were also influenced by the terms on which elected officials control the admin-
istrative bureaucracy. This is examined in Chapter Seven. Thirdly, although this chap-
ter has focussed primarily on the actions of elected officials, these are not the only ac-
tors with an interest in mobilising public opinion around transparency. Organised in-
terest groups might also do so, either as an end in itself or as a means to other ends en-
tirely. Chapter Five argues that these groups might even be more important in influenc-
ing the development of access rights than elected politicians. Finally, the whole discus-
sion in this chapter raises the question of why widespread calls for formal access rights 
should only have arisen in most consolidated democracies in the post-war era. After all, 
electoral competition has existed in many countries for much longer than this. This 
chapter has provided evidence that, in some countries at least, the causes lie in changes 
to the kinds of information which states were attempting to control during this period. 
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In countries already susceptible to the politicisation of access rights – the USA and the 
UK – disputes frequently arose in the context of official attempts to withhold infor-
mation on the grounds of national security. But instances of this can be found at least as 
far back as the mid-19th Century (Vincent 1998:Chapter 1), so this cannot be a sufficient 
explanation on its own. The underlying change, one which also contributed to reform 
in France, was the expansion of the administrative state and its increasing influence 
over domestic family, social and economic life. This is the subject of the next chapter. 
  129 
Chapter 4: Addressing Citizens’ 
Grievances with the Welfare 
State 
This chapter examines the impact on the development of access rights of changes in the 
relationship between administrative bureaucracies and the individuals subject to their 
authority. Although most works on freedom of information are primarily framed in 
terms of the electoral concerns discussed in the previous chapter, this relationship is 
worthy of attention for several reasons. Firstly, it features disproportionately among 
the small number of serious, historically-informed academic works on the subject: legal 
scholars and social scientists alike have argued that freedom of information is part of a 
response to discontent arising from increasing bureaucratic intervention in the lives of 
ordinary citizens (Lasserre, et al. 1987; Bennett 1997; France 1998b; Gillis 1998:143; 
Terrill 1998; Robertson 1999:67-78; Terrill 2000; Kirby 2003; Pollitt and Bouckaert 
2004:242; Shroff 2005). This response, which will be referred to here as “new adminis-
trative law”,22 is composed of reforms which seek to encourage bureaucratic respon-
siveness to citizens’ concerns through the disclosure of official information: the om-
budsman, privacy protections, requirements that the administration consult with af-
fected parties before making decisions and that it provide written statements of the 
reasons behind those decisions afterwards, more liberal rules on discovery in court 
proceedings, and the review of administrative decisions on their merits rather than 
merely for strict compliance with the law. The claim that freedom of information is part 
of the new administrative law is also worthy of attention because it is supported by 
                                                                           
 
22 This term has been chosen because it is in common use in Australia, the author’s home country; the terms used in 
other countries vary, and have sometimes changed over time. 
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some historical evidence. Freedom of information was introduced in countries like Can-
ada, Australia, Norway and Denmark at the same time as these other reforms, and was 
often understood by those involved to constitute part of the same attempt at address-
ing friction between states and their citizens. This evidence is not conclusive, however: 
in some countries – notably Germany - similar reforms are understood to have delayed 
full access rights. 
This chapter assesses whether freedom of information is an outcome of the growth of 
the bureaucratic state in three stages. It begins by arguing that the relationship be-
tween popular discontent with large, public bureaucracies and the adoption of freedom 
of information is far more contingent than most of the existing literature allows. The 
former should only be expected to produce the latter where the overall structure of 
administrative accountability and control favours the framing of individual discontent 
as an instance of broader failings in collective, political mechanisms of control over the 
state as a whole. This claim is tested and given initial confirmation in the second part of 
the chapter. It compares two countries which introduced freedom of information in the 
early 2000s, but which did so on the basis of quite different historical experiences of 
state-society relations: Germany and the UK. The third part of the chapter then com-
pares these cases with two others. The first is France, a country which introduced ac-
cess rights relatively early despite institutional arrangements which ought theoretical-
ly to have delayed it. The second is Sweden, where the original 19th-Century access law 
was transformed into a fully-fledged modern act in the early 20th Century, prior to the 
development of the welfare state but in anticipation of the problems it might cause.  
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Benevolent Surveillance and Administrative Control 
Given the prominence among academics of state growth as an explanation for the 
emergence of freedom of information, it is somewhat surprising that the only attempt 
to seriously examine its impact using cross-national data rejects it. Colin Bennett’s 
study, discussed in Chapter Two, argues that there is no single point above which gov-
ernments become so “big” that information rights are inevitable. He does this by meas-
uring size in terms of public expenditure as a proportion of GDP in 1975 (1997:220-2), 
when some countries with very large states had not adopted laws (Germany) but others 
with comparatively smaller states had already done so (the USA). Thus, he argues, the 
existence of a large public bureaucracy may be necessary, but it is insufficient as an ex-
planation. The sources of cross-national variation must lie elsewhere (specifically, he 
claims, in the diffusion of ideas among policy élites). 
Bennett’s rejection of the state as an explanation for variation is overly hasty, and part-
ly an artefact of the way he operationalises the concept. He is right to claim (1997:220) 
that the “size” of the state is difficult to measure, but it would be more correct to say 
that this is not particularly relevant. The proportion of economic activity taken up by 
the public sector is appealing because it is easy to measure, but at best only tangentially 
relevant to the issues at stake. The new administrative law is not a response to large 
state budgets; The relevant historically-oriented country case-studies employ the term 
“size” metaphorically to refer to a series of changes to the structure and operations of 
the administrative bureaucracy which made the contents of official files a matter of 
greater sensitivity to individuals, and consequently of greater political significance for 
officials. 
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The changes to the state on which these claims about new administrative law are based 
occurred in most of the consolidated democracies in roughly the first third to half of 
the 20th Century. The nature of these changes can usefully be conceptualised in terms of 
a shift from the sporadic exercise of despotic power to the regular, ongoing use of infra-
structural authority (Mann 1984). Prior to the 1930s, few states attempted to implement 
a comprehensive, integrated social and economic policy, although the first foundations 
were already in place in some of the richer countries by the 1910s. By far the most de-
veloped state agencies with domestic responsibilities prior to that were those charged 
with maintaining social order, such as the police. Their interactions with citizens were 
episodic, and often relied either directly or indirectly on the state’s monopoly of legiti-
mate physical violence. Where domestic administrative regulation occurred, it general-
ly constituted a response to local conditions which impacted directly on the state’s ca-
pacity to compete with other states (i.e. in military matters, diplomatic affairs and – to a 
lesser degree – trade). By the late 1940s, however, most of these states were engaging a 
broadly similar range of activities based on comprehensive administrative regulation of 
domestic society, including the provision of social insurance, education, healthcare, 
housing and other forms of welfare, and systematic domestic economic development 
and planning. 
None of the specific policies which made up this general trend was entirely unique to 
the post-war era; the differences were largely matters of comprehensiveness and inten-
sity. As Hugh Heclo has put it (1995), this was an era of consolidation rather than inno-
vation. Hitherto, social services had usually been residual, intended as a temporary 
safety net for those who could were temporarily unable to provide for themselves, and 
were provided on a piecemeal, private or voluntary basis. Henceforth, transfer pay-
ments and welfare services were usually provided on a compulsory and comprehensive 
  133 
basis, often funded through central taxation, and were integrated with other initiatives 
as part of an overall effort to ensure social and material progress. 
State Growth and Public Perceptions of Official Information 
These changes are argued to have contributed to the development of access rights by 
affecting public attitudes toward official information in at least three ways. The exten-
sion of bureaucratic management into domestic affairs necessarily meant the collection 
of collect a far wider range of more detailed information on subject populations than 
ever before. Once again, this was not entirely new: some authoritarian states had en-
gaged in large–scale “surveillance” (Lyon 1994) in the 19th and early 20th Centuries. The 
difference was that it now occurred in a far more comprehensive and intensive manner. 
The informational impact of these changes can be appreciated by considering their ef-
fect on taxation. This has been a central driver of bureaucratic development in Europe 
since at least the Middle Ages, if only because kings needed to pay their armies (Mann 
1988; 1993). Traditionally, the organisation and effectiveness of tax regimes, like that of 
the armies they supported, varied considerably from country to country and over time. 
In the contemporary era, however, the financial burden of providing comprehensive 
welfare services stimulated the development of similarly large bureaucracies in each 
country (Davidson and Lowe 1981:264), all capable of identifying individual economic 
actors, assessing their wealth and extracting the state’s share more effectively than ev-
er before. This increase in surveillance was not limited to taxation: social and economic 
policy also required the more comprehensive collection of data on individual and col-
lective characteristics such as educational qualifications, employment status, spending 
habits, overall health, nutrition, reproductive behaviour, housing, levels of consumer 
debt, spending patterns, industrial productivity and a whole host of others. 
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Secondly, the growth of surveillance provided favourable conditions for citizens to see 
problems in their relations with administrative authorities in terms of information. 
Comprehensive, publicly-funded transfer payments and networks of schools, hospitals, 
housing, roads and other infrastructure meant more regular contact between the two 
as officials made more decisions with a direct impact on people’s lives (Higgs 2004:168). 
It also meant that, by the late 1960s, every citizen of a rich country was likely to be the 
subject of at least one official file. Citizens cannot have helped but be aware of the ex-
istence of these files and the fact they contained personal information, if only because 
even the simplest and most banal processes required a form to be filled in: from birth, 
death and taxes to obtaining a driver’s licence (Lenoir and Prot 1979:35; Higgs 2004:168). 
These developments made it more likely that the contents of official files would become 
matters of explicit concern, as citizens became aware of the fact that they could be used 
to enable decisions and actions which were either incompatible with their own aims, or 
at least not undertaken primarily with those aims in mind. 
Thirdly, the increasing use of information technology by the state, starting in some 
places as early as the late 1960s, is claimed to have accentuated concerns about the rela-
tionship between surveillance and the erosion of individual liberty (e.g. Lowi 1977; 
Flaherty 1989; Lyon 2007:172). Rapid and accelerating advances in digital computing 
and communications vastly increased the volume of data which could be affordably col-
lected and stored, and the speed with which it could be processed (Arrow 1979; Evans 
1979; Noyce 1979). This made it possible to take an increasing number of routine deci-
sions affecting matters of direct personal interest to individual citizens without signifi-
cant human intervention. It also made it easier for officials to engage in “data match-
ing” –combining information collected from different sources into more comprehen-
sive datasets, thereby improving the capacity to draw inferences about individuals and 
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making it far more difficult for those individuals to rely on a lack of coordination be-
tween agencies to escape unwelcome regulation. In short, increased surveillance and 
information technology laid the groundwork for the identification of information per se 
as critical to relations between citizens and the state. 
Problems of Surveillance, Cooperation and Control for Officials 
These shifts in public attitudes towards the state and official information are usually 
argued to have caused at least three problems for officials. Firstly, they put in place 
conditions favourable to a dramatic increase in the number of citizens who were active-
ly dissatisfied with administrative decisions. This was partly because state regulation 
now affected matters of far more direct, personal relevance to the individuals con-
cerned than the traditional “affairs of state” (Vincent 1998:214-7). The spread of sec-
ondary and tertiary education almost certainly contributed by making the public less 
tolerant of government secrecy and more willing to dispute official decisions. Education 
improves the capacity to understand use the kinds of detailed information on which 
bureaucracies rely, and to identify relationships between different facts, implications 
and domains of experience (Popkin 1991:36). To employ the rationalistic language of 
the previous chapter, it lowers the cost of using complex political information. Educa-
tion also served to encourage disputes by eroding the social bases on which the authori-
ty of the bureaucracy traditionally rested: the technical expertise and the elevated so-
cial status of members of the bureaucracy, both of which were at least partly grounded 
in the superior education of bureaucrats as a group. 
Secondly, officials themselves increasingly became aware that information constituted 
a resource on which they depended but could not fully control (cf. Lenoir and Prot 
1979). In many of the new fields into which public administration expanded during the 
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middle of the 20th Century, the timely availability of accurate data depended on cooper-
ation from the subjects themselves. This cooperation could be secured with relative 
ease when citizens interacted with the state in order to obtain valuable goods and ser-
vices. Here, the provision of information could be made a condition of service. Where 
“mutually beneficial” exchange could not be relied upon, an obvious alternative was to 
compel citizens to divulge information. Under conditions of increasing public unease 
with surveillance and social control, however, this might easily prove counter-
productive by encouraging disputes. The imperative of ensuring timely access to accu-
rate information became more pressing as states made increasing use of technology. 
Both data processing and data matching depend on information being correct and cor-
rectly recorded in a standardised format. For any but the smallest of datasets, verifica-
tion can easily prove prohibitively expensive in the absence of cooperation from the 
data subjects themselves. The informatisation of public administration thus made the 
state particularly vulnerable to new forms of resistance through the provision of in-
complete, incorrect or incorrectly coded information. 
Thirdly, the expansion of domestic administration was associated with several changes 
within the state that provided new bases on which to challenge official decisions, and 
made it more difficult for those responsible to address public dissatisfaction when it did 
arise. Prior to the 20th Century, the piecemeal nature of domestic regulation was re-
flected in the organisational structure of most states, which were composed of a heter-
ogeneous collection of boards, agencies, departments and cooperative arrangements 
with external organisations like churches. In most of the consolidated democracies, the 
need to ensure the coordinated and consistent operation of the expanding welfare state 
led to the functional integration of many of these into centrally-organised bureaucratic 
departments (Schick 2002:36-8). One consequence was that those at the apex of the bu-
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reaucratic hierarchy were responsible for an increasingly wide variety of interactions 
with the public. In addition to undertaking an increasingly wide range of activities, the 
state was also employing large numbers of professionals with the technical expertise 
required to carry out the centralised management of society. This affected both inter-
nal and external authority relations. An ideal-typical Weberian bureaucracy is staffed 
by clerks with expertise in law and the internal processes of the organisation itself. 
Here, formal authority and expertise are aligned, and senior officials enjoy straightfor-
ward authority over their subordinates. The employment of those with professional ex-
pertise drove a wedge between these two founding principles of Weberian organisation. 
Practically, supervision and control now required command of increasingly detailed 
and technical knowledge, often coupled with professional standards of judgment which 
were grounded in normative and ethical standards controlled by epistemic communi-
ties outside the state rather than senior officials (Wieland 2000:98-99). The employment 
of experts simultaneously complicated the process of administrative control, and pro-
vided a new normative basis for outsiders to challenge the decisions of the state. 
Explaining Cross-National Variation 
The development of new administrative law is sometimes – as in Bennett’s article – por-
trayed as a dispassionate, technocratic process by which the obvious solutions to these 
problems were put in place. The underlying assumption is that officials readily recog-
nised new administrative law as effective in mitigating the unintended negative conse-
quences of state growth. Specialist tribunals, discovery rules, merits review of adminis-
trative decisions and the ombudsman address problems of internal control by relieving 
senior officials of the need to become directly involved in investigating operational 
failures or resolving disputes concerning complex technical matters (Robertson 
1982:196; Robertson 1999:Chapter 4). Privacy laws, for their part, concede a degree of 
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control over how information is used in return for encouraging cooperation with its 
collection and use. They may even assist in maintaining the accuracy of (increasingly 
large) government databases: most data protection laws include provisions allowing 
data subjects to amend or annotate information they consider incorrect (Robertson 
1999:77). 
Freedom of information is assumed to form part of this overall trend on the grounds 
that each of the other reforms rely on disclosing particular sorts of information, that 
collectively they serve to expand the proportion of official information to which citi-
zens have access. Full rights of access to official files represent the logical conclusion of 
a linear process (cf. Robertson 1999:67-78): they become more likely as limited forms of 
access become more numerous, either because the need for harmonisation between dif-
ferent limited regimes grows, or because they encourage citizens to become gradually 
more aware of the importance of information in general. 
Although this argument has a certain conceptual appeal, the historical record suggests 
that the identification of problems and the selection of aspects of the new administra-
tive law as solutions was the outcome of (often quite fierce) political disputes. Even the 
more limited reforms were almost always opposed by sections of the bureaucracy, usu-
ally because of reluctance to give up the power which control over information provid-
ed (cf. United Kingdom 1978:52-88). Unsurprisingly, freedom of information was op-
posed more strenuously still. This differential resistance can be seen most clearly in 
those countries where freedom of information was formally proposed as part of wider 
reform which included other aspects of new administrative law. In countries such as 
Australia, Denmark and Norway, things like the ombudsman and detailed administra-
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tive procedure laws were adopted fairly quickly; freedom of information, however, was 
resisted more strongly and often delayed by decades. 
In practice, the relationship between state growth and the development of freedom of 
information is likely to vary with the pre-existing structure of administrative dispute 
resolution and control. This is because the new administrative law is a response to the 
failure of existing systems of administrative supervision and dispute resolution to ad-
dress individual grievances. It is also because this need must be balanced against offi-
cials’ desire to retain their control over information, a control which is itself a product 
of institutional structure. Existing structures thus define, to a very great degree, the 
nature of the problem itself. Moreover, to the extent that some systems prove less sus-
ceptible to these problems in the first place, or better able to adapt, they will also have 
a significant effect on the solutions which are devised. 
The main argument of this chapter is that freedom of information is more likely to de-
velop out of discontent with the administrative state where elected politicians play an 
important role in supervising the bureaucracy.  In ideal-typical terms, one might dis-
tinguish between four approaches to administrative dispute resolution: appeals to 
higher officials, appeals to politicians, adversarial dispute resolution (i.e. courts and tri-
bunals), and mediation (e.g. the ombudsman). In practice, most countries provide a 
mixture of all four, but all differ in their emphases and effectiveness. There are at least 
two reasons why countries which rely heavily on elected politicians are likely to be par-
ticularly favourable to the development of access rights. Firstly, their systems of dis-
pute resolution are more likely to break down when faced with an increase in the vol-
ume and complexity of individual complaints. Politicians have many demands on their 
time beyond those of looking after the concerns of individual constituents, and it is 
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usually more difficult to increase the number of politicians in the legislature than, say, 
to increase the number of courts or expand the ombudsman’s staff. Secondly, the prom-
inence of politicians in these systems means their breakdown is also more likely to be 
framed as failures of political control, and so the solutions are more likely to be framed 
in terms of access to information relevant to collective, political decision-making, ra-
ther than just to the defence of individual rights and entitlements. 
Political and Legalistic Administrative Justice 
This second section of the chapter shows that these claims about different mechanisms 
of administrative control are consistent with the experience of two countries which had 
quite different experiences of state growth and freedom of information: the UK and 
Germany. At first sight, the contrast-oriented approach may not seem appropriate, 
since these countries’ laws entered into force within months of each other in 2005 and 
2006. In this case, a simplistic reliance on the date of legislation is misleading, because 
Germany has a much longer history of bureaucratic surveillance and social control than 
the UK. If we begin with the establishment of a comprehensive social insurance under 
Bismarck and Attlee, the introduction of the German access law occurred perhaps as 
much as seventy years after the UK; even if Asquith’s reforms of the early 1910s are 
used as a reference point, Germany was still at least two decades later. By either meas-
ure public rights of access became a political issue much earlier in the UK, and grew di-
rectly out of concerns over domestic social and economic regulation, while there was 
no comparable process of politicisation in Germany. 
The third section considers France and Sweden, for reasons which are discussed below. 
The USA is not examined in this chapter. This is not because the kinds of concerns 
about state intervention outlined above were absent. Quite the contrary, the two earli-
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est phases of access legislation – the Administrative Procedure Act 1946 (APA) and the Free-
dom of Information Act 1966 – were either drafted or passed under the presidents respon-
sible for the most significant growth of domestic bureaucracy and socioeconomic regu-
lation in 20th Century America: Roosevelt and Johnson. The USA is not discussed here 
because these concerns found political expression through relations between members 
of Congress, public interest campaigners, economic groups and the state, rather than 
through direct state-citizen relations. Some of the issues have already been discussed in 
Chapter Three; the rest are examined in Chapters Five and Six. 
The Difficult Birth of Transparency in the United Kingdom 
The UK constitutes a clear example of state growth contributing directly to the devel-
opment of access rights. The previous chapter indicated that the most prominent in-
stances of overt political competition over access arose in response to government at-
tempts to withhold information relating to high matters of state. It also suggested that 
these scandals enjoyed the impact they did because they touched on deeper concerns 
about privacy and the spread of administrative regulation in the fields of social policy 
and planning (United Kingdom 1979b:8-9). The following discussion shows that the 
prominence of parliament within the political system played a vital role in facilitating 
the framing of freedom of information as a solution to these problems, and in ensuring 
it remained prominent despite resistance from senior political figures. 
The establishment of comprehensive social and economic policy occurred over a rough-
ly thirty-year period beginning in the 1910s. The earliest initiatives concerned social 
insurance, and were the outcome of pressure from trade unions, increasing awareness 
of the inadequacy of voluntary private insurance schemes, and concern within the Lib-
eral government of the potentially serious consequences for imperial policy of working 
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class poverty and malnutrition (Heclo 1974:158-78). Even so, there was considerable re-
sistance to the ideas embodied in the National Insurance Act 1911: politicians, civil serv-
ants and even prominent reformers opposed on the basis of the unacceptable degree of 
bureaucratic surveillance and control over workers and employers it entailed (Hennock 
1981:84-9). Another contributor was the general consensus among policy élites in fa-
vour of “free trade, the gold standard and minimal public spending” (Skidelsky 
1981:167), which limited the resources available to fund large bureaucracies. The shift 
from this traditional liberal approach is conventionally traced to the Second World 
War, which provided a positive experience of centralised administration to both civil 
servants and the general population, encouraged a sense of social solidarity, and low-
ered resistance to the actual establishment of an administrative apparatus which could 
readily be adapted to Keynesian management once peace returned (United Kingdom 
1942:6-7; Harris 1981:247-9,259-60). 
Discontent with the administrative state began to emerge as early as the mid-1950s 
(United Kingdom 1968:96), and by the late 1960s it had crystallised into a series of criti-
cisms which were expressed most comprehensively in the report of the Fulton Commit-
tee on the Civil Service. This report was a major contributor to the emergence of official 
secrecy as a topic of debate, thanks largely to its finding that “the administrative pro-
cess [was] surrounded by too much secrecy, [and that] the public interest would be bet-
ter served if there were a greater amount of openness”. (United Kingdom 1968:91). It 
recommended that the Official Secrets Act be reviewed, and it was in fulfilment of this 
that the Conservatives established the Franks Committee discussed in the previous 
chapter. 
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The Fulton Report was also significant for the clarity of its diagnosis. It identified offi-
cial secrecy was problematic because it contributed to poor policy-making and wide-
spread public dissatisfaction with government. The Official Secrets Act was originally in-
troduced as a means of reinforcing discipline within the civil service (United Kingdom 
1972a:120-2), but the Report noted that it had come to constitute an important mecha-
nism by which the civil service insulated itself from those it was supposed to serve. 
Other symptoms of this lack of openness included a failure to consult on proposed poli-
cies, or to employ those with substantive policy-relevant expertise in numbers suffi-
cient to ensure the successful implementation of the government’s chosen policies 
(United Kingdom 1968:95-6). 
Consistent with the claims made earlier, pervasive secrecy became more difficult to 
maintain once the state eventually did start employing experts, many of whom sup-
ported more liberal disclosure practices. According to Vincent (1998:228-30) support 
was strongest among members of nascent epistemic communities in areas which de-
pended on cooperation with subject populations, such as child protection and social 
work. Their advocacy served two purposes: it formed part of a process by which they 
established professional legitimacy, the better to compete for influence within the state 
against older professional groups like medical doctors; the development of clear profes-
sional standards also served as a means of encouraging cooperation among the clients 
of their services . The employment of experts also contributed to the weakening of offi-
cial secrecy because professional expertise was not monopolised by government: there 
were now outsiders with the expertise and authority to question official decisions on 
their merits. This provided an impetus for demands for access to the basis on which de-
cisions were being made, demands which were accommodated only slowly and with ap-
parent reluctance through a series of half-hearted commitments by governments to 
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release more comprehensive background information on policy decisions (e.g. 
United Kingdom 1969:5; United Kingdom 1979b:9). 
The combination of parliamentary supremacy and a parliamentary executive in the UK 
meant that the consequences of state growth were almost immediately experienced as 
problems of political control. This is because these changes challenged one of the legit-
imating myths of the Westminster system, ministerial accountability. As the Fulton 
Committee noted, the idea that ministers could actually accept personal responsibility 
for administrative error on the grounds that they had personally failed to exercise suf-
ficient control had ceased to serve as anything more than a convenient fiction within 
two short decades of the war ending (United Kingdom 1968:93-5). The perceived failure 
of traditional mechanisms of political accountability was, from the outset, one of the 
major drivers of freedom of information in the UK; it remained prominent during de-
bates on the eventual law in the late 1990s (United Kingdom 1997c), and continues to 
dominate popular and academic literature on the subject today (cf. Flinders 2000; 
Hogwood, et al. 2001) 
The centralisation of authority in Cabinet also meant that problems at the depart-
mental level tended to be interpreted in terms of political interference. Indeed, this 
concerns often combined with the one discussed above: several scholars have argued 
that the adoption of new administrative law in the UK was driven by the view that poli-
ticians were not just increasingly unable to supervise the bureaucracy, but that their 
partisan interests meant they could not be trusted to do so and required supervision 
themselves (e.g. Flinders 2001). This suspicion, although partly structural in origin, was 
not unreasonable. The Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries’ inquiry, conducted in the 
1950s, into the compulsory acquisition and subsequent disposal of farmland at Crichel 
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Down in Dorset, is a seminal example. This revealed pervasive administrative incompe-
tence and failures of communication in the absence of corruption or personal dishones-
ty (e.g. United Kingdom 1954:32), and is conventionally seen as the first significant 
post–war instance of the activities of a minister in carrying out the executive functions 
of government coming under close public scrutiny. Its immediate consequences includ-
ed a ministerial resignation and reforms including the establishment of the Parliamen-
tary Commissioner for Administration (Wong 1973; United Kingdom 2010c). 
The fusion of administrative authority and electoral accountability in Cabinet also 
meant that the way politicians responded to this dissatisfaction reinforced the view 
that limited measures were put in place in an attempt to head off the introduction of 
more comprehensive reform; they encouraged demand for more general rights of ac-
cess rather than satisfying it. Ministers from Attlee onwards resisted the introduction 
of almost all the elements of new administrative law on the grounds they would un-
dermine the authority of parliament, and in so doing reinforced the view that the root 
causes of these problems were failings at the political rather than administrative level. 
In the early 1960s, judicial review emerged as a response to emerging problems in the 
review of immigration applications, housing, environment, education and social ser-
vices (Sunkin 1992:145-52). It was favoured, in part, on the grounds that it was prefera-
ble to more radical attacks on ministerial control such as the ombudsman, dedicated 
administrative tribunals or freedom of information (Wong 1973:141 et sqq). The even-
tual establishment of the Parliamentary Commissioner is conventionally portrayed as a 
straightforward response to the problems revealed by Crichel Down, but this is an over-
simplification: it was initially resisted by the MacMillan government, which justified its 
position on the grounds that the office would interfere with ministerial accountability 
to Parliament (United Kingdom 1962). This was much the same argument as would later 
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be used against freedom of information (United Kingdom 1979b:¶56); it is ironic that 
the Parliamentary Commissioner was itself later offered as evidence against the need 
for an access law, on the grounds that it provided access to information on terms more 
compatible with the principle of ministerial responsibility to parliament 
(United Kingdom 1979b:6). 
Perhaps the strongest evidence that the access provided by other new administrative 
law reforms were not considered alternatives to freedom of information but, in a sense, 
lesser forms of it concerns access to personal data. Like the Freedom of Information Act, 
the Data Protection Act 1984 was only introduced after a series of white papers, several 
private members’ bills (Michael 1981:267-8), at least one official inquiry explicitly call-
ing for the establishment of a Data Protection Authority (United Kingdom 1978), a Eu-
ropean Union directive and significant pressure from firms worried at losing business 
in European countries where laws were already in place (Warren and Dearnley 2005).  
Unlike Germany, data protection was not routinely invoked as a reason to oppose ac-
cess; it was itself resisted. The Data Protection Act  was not conceived by officials as an 
alternative means of satisfying demands for freedom of information, and nor did it have 
this effect in practice. Quite the reverse: data protection contributed to the emergence of 
freedom of information in the UK in a number of ways (Hazell 1998; Robertson 1999:67-
78; McDonald 2006:130-1). The Campaign for Freedom of Information successfully pur-
sued a strategy of campaigning for access to specific sorts of personal data as a means of 
maintaining momentum in the face of Cabinet opposition to full access rights in the 
1980s (Tant 1990; CFOI 1993a). This strategy was successful, insofar as these laws appear 
to have made citizens and officials alike more used to the idea of access; today requests 
for personal data are almost always the least controversial from a bureaucratic point of 
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view, which is to say they are dealt with quickest and most likely to be granted in full 
(United Kingdom 2008). 
Rechtsstaat, Privacy and Resistance to Transparency in Germany 
Several crucial differences between Germany and the UK support the claims that large 
administrative states only contribute to freedom of information where systems of dis-
pute resolution and administrative control are favourable, and not simply as a matter of 
course. By any reasonable measure, comprehensive social and economic policy were 
established far earlier in Germany than in Britain. Moreover, Germany did not simply 
introduce freedom of information much longer than the UK after the onset of objective-
ly-conducive circumstances; it also differed in that concerns over the surveillance and 
social control which welfare implied were absent from debate over freedom of infor-
mation once it did arise. 
In one sense, it is no surprise that Bismarck’s original reforms did not immediately lead 
to widespread calls for access: his was an authoritarian regime which introduced them 
in order to control workers and weaken support for radical and socialist movements; 
there was, at best, only a pretence of democratic accountability at the time. It is some-
what surprising, however, that debate was also absent after the re-establishment of a 
strong administrative bureaucracy and comprehensive social and economic regulation 
in the late 1940s, since Germany was then a democracy. Although it is difficult to offer a 
truly conclusive explanation for this non-occurrence, it is possible to make a plausible 
case, through a combination of positive circumstantial evidence and elimination of al-
ternatives, that the relationship between politics and administrative control was an 
important contributor. 
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The different course taken by Germany cannot be plausibly attributed to any lack of 
concern at the implications of state intervention and control over information for indi-
vidual liberty. Privacy concerns are, if anything, even more prominent there than in the 
UK. The protection of the individual from “bureaucratic domination” was a central con-
cern of those who drafted the Basic Law in the 1940s, working as they were in the imme-
diate aftermath of the Nazi regime. Awareness of the role which control over infor-
mation had played in facilitating totalitarian government led to the establishment of a 
number of constitutional rights, among which were the right to privacy (Article 10) and 
the right to consult, without interference from the authorities, sources of information 
intended to be available to the public (Article 5). A concern with regulating the use of 
personal information in order to protect individual self-determination is pervasive in 
German administrative law, and as in the UK the increasing use of information technol-
ogy within government from the 1970s onwards heightened sensitivity to these issues 
still further. Unlike the UK, however, Germany was an early and comprehensive 
adopter of privacy legislation, and its administrative law privileges privacy over both 
administrative convenience and collective control (Wieland 2000:90-1). 
The late adoption of freedom of information in Germany cannot be attributed to the 
absence of suitable limited forms of access around which support for full access might 
have been mobilised, or of attempts to actually mobilise public concern on this basis. 
There was clearly awareness at élite level of the conceptual similarities between the 
various elements of new administrative law from the 1970s, which is to say at more or 
less the same time that freedom of information was emerging as a distinct policy pro-
posal in the UK. The FDP co-sponsored a conference on privacy in 1979, the same year 
in which it proposed one of the first general rights of access to official files. This was 
followed by attempts within the CDU and SPD to have commitments to access rights 
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included in their election platforms, discussed in the previous chapter, which appear to 
have been motivated in part by concerns over privacy and the use of automated data 
processing (Riley 1983b:10-11). Not long afterwards, opposition to the 1983 census crys-
tallised into a movement which brought a successful suit in the Constitutional Court. 
The Court held that “informational self–determination” was an important contributor 
to personal freedom and human rights (Schraut 1996). This, in turn, encouraged the 
Greens to propose an amendment to Article 5 of the Basic Law introducing a right of ac-
cess overseen by an information commissioner (Germany 1993:3). This was a largely 
opportunistic move by the party, which had been campaigning for access rights for 
other reasons – discussed in following chapters – for close to a decade. But it was not 
the Party’s only attempt to leverage limited disclosure in this way: a bill submitted to 
the Bundestag in late 1997 (Germany 1997) sought to introduce general public rights of 
access by way of amendments to the data protection and administrative procedure laws 
(Germany 1998:19579-85). The significant thing about all these efforts is that none was 
successful: privacy did not help German proponents of freedom of information, as it did 
the Campaign for Freedom of Information in the UK. 
The differences between these countries are consistent, however, with claims about the 
importance of different ways of structuring relations between the political and admin-
istrative spheres. These are perhaps most concisely revealed in the differences between 
the founding principle of the German system – rechtsstaat – and the phrase usually used 
to translate it into English – “the rule of law”. The English term means, broadly, that the 
sovereign power is no more above the law than its own subjects, or to put it another 
way that the government must obey the law even though it also has the power the 
make it. Within the sphere of actions which are not expressly forbidden or required, 
“the rule of law” accepts both the possibility and normative legitimacy of administra-
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tive and ministerial discretion. Rechtsstaat, on the other hand, implies that the actions 
of the administration should be prescribed by a detailed body of positive law, and em-
bodies a normative presumption against the exercise of discretion or political calculus 
in operational matters. 
The late development of freedom of information is, arguably, at least partly due to the 
decision made at the founding of the Federal Republic to re-establish the principle of 
rechtsstaat. The emphasis on detailed legal codes as a means of excluding political influ-
ence has deep roots in German administrative practice, having emerged in the late 18th 
Century as a means of protecting the middle classes from the arbitrary power of the po-
lice under absolutist regimes. It was consciously reinstated in the 1940s as a means of 
satisfying several competing imperatives. These included the need for a state which was 
strong enough to undertake the reconstruction of Germany’s shattered social and eco-
nomic infrastructure, but sufficiently limited to prevent it from engaging in the ex-
traordinary and systematic abuses perpetrated under the Nazis. They also included the 
need for a democratic system which was sufficiently responsive to popular will to be 
perceived as legitimate, but sufficiently insulated from it to avoid the chronic instabil-
ity of the Weimar Republic or the persecution of political minorities under a tyranny of 
the majority. These priorities were balanced by establishing a system in which political 
power was divided among multiple actors, each circumscribed by a complex set of insti-
tutional checks and balances comprehensively defined in law. The direct, ongoing in-
fluence of the legislature and the political executive over the bureaucracy was limited 
by the systematic exclusion of discretion implied by the explicit reference to rechtsstaat 
in Article 20 of the Basic Law, and also by the existence of a Constitutional Court with 
jurisdiction over the constitutionality of primary legislation. The establishment of pow-
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erful administrative courts to control the bureaucracy offered individuals protection 
from abuse by the state. 
The re-establishment of rechtsstaat delayed the development of freedom of information 
in at least two ways. It legitimised the re-establishment of a long–standing tradition of 
official secrecy in the form of a comprehensive duty of discretion on public officials, 
legitimised with reference to the need to protect individual privacy and the democratic 
system from the state’s capacity to misuse information (Reese 1977:225; Bullinger 
1979:217-9; Perritt and Rustad 2000:408). In other words, the same norms which facili-
tated the emergence of freedom of information in the UK had the opposite effect in 
Germany because of the means chosen to realise it. 
Secondly, where this discretion proved problematic, the highly-legalistic German ap-
proach proved far better able to adapt than the UK. A specialist system of administra-
tive courts under the Federal Administrative Tribunal was established in 1952, and a 
uniform code of procedure for hearings promulgated in 1960. These courts enjoyed far 
more extensive powers to review and amend administrative decisions than their British 
equivalents. Although disclosure rules in both countries became increasingly favoura-
ble to plaintiffs over the 1970s, they were consistently more favourable in Germany. Re-
visions to the Federal Administrative Code in 1976-7 were noted at the time for their effec-
tiveness (Bullinger 1979:219-20; Holleaux 1980:192); by contrast, the liberalisation of 
discovery in the UK under landmark decisions such as Conway v. Rimmer (1968) occurred 
over the opposition of the government (Spencer and Spencer 2010). In comparative 
context, the German solution to administrative control and dispute resolution lowered 
the barriers to the introduction of effective mechanisms of addressing individual griev-
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ances, and in so doing removed the impetus for framing them as problems of collective, 
democratic control. 
Disputed Control and Early Transparency 
The preceding comparison between Germany and the UK is consistent with claims that 
the way systems of administrative dispute resolution coped with the growth of domes-
tic administrative bureaucracy influenced the development of freedom of information. 
But a number of questions arise when attempting to apply this to other countries. This 
last section of the chapter considers two cases of relatively early transparency which 
exhibit features that might be expected to have delayed its introduction. The first of 
these is France, where the bureaucratic state dominates the political sphere and where 
administrative dispute resolution procedures fuse judicial and executive power. The 
second is Sweden, which consolidated its access regime in the early 20th Century, even 
earlier in the development of the welfare state than France or the UK, despite the exist-
ence of an administrative system which also seeks to limit political influence in im-
portant ways. 
Stillborn Freedom of Information in France 
It may not be immediately obvious why France presents a problem for the explanation 
being offered here, since the emergence of its access law is consistent with many claims 
made earlier about how state growth affects public and official attitudes towards in-
formation. Although France has a long tradition of state-led economic development, the 
adoption of comprehensive, modern social and economic policy occurred slightly later 
than in the UK. Social insurance was first introduced in the 1930s, while the Fourth Re-
public instituted some welfare and economic development programmes. These were 
consolidated into a comprehensive modernisation programme under the Fifth (Jobert 
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1991), along with what became one of the more generous welfare regimes in the OECD 
by the 1960s (Ambler 1991:2-4). 
If concern at the growth of the state were a sufficient explanation, it would not be sur-
prising that France was a relatively early adopter of a general right of access to official 
files: the first signs of dissatisfaction can be seen in the 1960s, focussing on the imbal-
ance of power which had developed between the bureaucracy and its citizens (France 
1978:1329-31). These concerns crystallised in the early 1970s into a debate in the press 
and among prominent political figures over the lack of bureaucratic responsiveness to 
the needs and concerns of individuals (Cornu 1978; Degez 1978; Drouin 1978b; 1978a; 
Frances 1978; Le Monde 1978b; 1978a; Plantey 1978). This contributed, in turn, to Prime 
Minister Barre’s 1975 “Blois Declaration”, which proposed a programme of reforms de-
signed to streamline the bureaucracy and make it more responsive (France 1978:1324-5; 
Thyreau and Bon 1981). The law into which the Assemblée Nationale inserted the right of 
access, under the circumstances discussed in the previous chapter, was presented in 
partial fulfilment of this programme. 
France deserves closer consideration because it challenges the arguments made earlier 
about why countries should differ in their willingness to adopt such laws. Neither its 
system of administrative dispute resolution, nor the relationship between the state and 
the political sphere, were nearly so conducive to development of freedom of infor-
mation as they were in the UK; in fact, the constitution of the Fifth Republic specifically 
sought to weaken political control over the Presidency and the bureaucracy. The late 
adoption of transparency in the UK can arguably be explained in terms of self-
interested resistance by a parliamentary executive motivated by political concerns, but 
this still leaves the problem of explaining early adoption in France. 
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Under the Fifth Republic, administrative supervision and dispute resolution is complex, 
but is undertaken almost entirely by the executive branch itself. The regular courts 
have no jurisdiction to rule on matters involving purely public law, and the legislature 
has relatively weak powers of supervision over the President, ministers and the de-
partments of state (Peyrefitte 1976:169). Dispute resolution is also insulated from politi-
cal influence within the executive branch: it is undertaken by a hierarchy of administra-
tive tribunals culminating in the Conseil d’État, a body which is formally subordinate to 
the President but which enjoys a significant degree of de facto independence by virtue of 
its age and prestige (Auby and Fromont 1971). The institutional structure of the Fifth 
Republic reflects a deliberate attempt by de Gaulle to insulate the state from party poli-
tics, and should consequently not be particularly favourable to the articulation of indi-
vidual grievances as problems of broader political control. It is, perhaps, slightly more 
favourable than Germany, in that a directly elected chief executive is formally respon-
sible for the behaviour of state officials, but certainly far less favourable than the UK. 
The unexpectedly early implementation of access rights in France is best explained in 
terms of the government temporarily losing control over the political agenda due to the 
peculiar contradictions and complexities of the political system. It is fairly clear from 
the available sources that the government had no intention of introducing American-
style freedom of information in 1978. Liberalisation of access was only ever envisaged 
as being limited in scope, and was identified merely as one possible solution to a range 
of problems of internal administrative coordination rather than as a means of strength-
ening external democratic accountability. 
The loss of control was, in part, the result of the temporary conjuncture of favourable 
party-political circumstances described in the previous chapter, but it was also made 
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possible by the fact that the state itself had already identified secrecy as a problem and 
freedom of information as a possible solution. By the 1970s, there was growing realisa-
tion among senior French civil servants of the managerial challenges posed by instinc-
tive bureaucratic secrecy in an increasingly large, diverse administrative apparatus 
(Moderne 2003:32-3). Freedom of information was identified independently as a possi-
ble solution at multiple points within the state. Starting in the early 1970s, a number of 
official committees composed principally of members of the Conseil d’État reviewed the 
French government’s information management practices. The original impetus for this 
work was a desire to ensure systematic archival procedures, and rationalise the publica-
tion of official documents – while if possible establishing them on a profit-making basis 
(de Baecque 1991:9; France 1995a:195). This naturally led to the questions of what con-
stituted a “publication”, and hence what should be made available to the public as a 
matter of course. The cost and difficulty of compiling and maintaining a list of docu-
ments authorised for release, especially given the size and complexity of the state and 
the sheer number of documents it published, quickly led the officials involved to advo-
cate the opposite approach – elaborating the kinds of documents which should be kept 
secret – on the grounds of efficiency and effectiveness. They recommended, in effect, 
something very like a freedom of Information act (France 1981:60). 
Similar conclusions were reached separately within the Commissariat du Plan, which had 
been considering the administrative and political uses of information and expertise in 
economic planning since the late 1960s (Lenoir and Prot 1979:16-17). The Commissariat 
concluded that sharing information – albeit in highly structured ways – might improve 
the development of coordinated economic policy with outside parties (Auby and 
Fromont 1971:253-4). This, it appears, then crystallised discontent among the regional 
field offices of central departments and the economic development agencies in the ré-
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gions and the départements, who had come to feel that the central government’s “cult of 
secrecy” was hampering their efforts by preventing local planners and businesses from 
planning effectively for local circumstances (Auby and Fromont 1971:244-5; See also the 
synthesis of debate between members of local administrative units in France 1981:25 et 
sqq). The Commission’s Seventh Report, issued in 1976, called for the introduction of a 
right of access to government documents (Errera 1987:89). 
The fact that members of the Conseil d’État led this process meant that proposals for ad-
ministrative transparency could not be lightly set aside by the government once they 
had been taken up in parliament. The Council is not just the ultimate court of appeal in 
the hierarchy of administrative tribunals, it is also an independent source of policy ad-
vice and plays a prominent role in advocating administrative reform and renewal 
(Crozier 1965:197-8). It enjoys a considerable degree of de facto authority and independ-
ence from the rest of the administrative hierarchy, and it has been a consistent – albeit 
cautious – advocate of greater access to information in both its judicial and administra-
tive guises (Boulard 1979:171; France 1996; Banisar 2006:72). 
The claim that the early implementation of access rights in France was the result of ex-
ceptional circumstances is consistent with the manner in which relations between 
states and citizens have been handled since. The French state has historically been 
quite willing to grant limited access rights to specific information in order to ensure 
equality of treatment by the state and protections from abuse of power by officials. This 
was already clear prior to the 1970s, when citizens enjoyed comparatively extensive 
rights of access to information which had legal implications (Boulard 1979:155). These 
covered matters such as public budgets, the terms and conditions of public tenders, the 
procedures of public examinations, the right of access to files in certain kinds of dispute 
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(e.g. deportation, expropriation and taxation), and the requirement that administrative 
decisions or actions likely to affect fundamental rights be published before they were 
legally binding. A number of other reforms were introduced in the 1970s with full gov-
ernment support to address the concerns discussed earlier, including a right to written 
reasons for decisions and an ombudsman (the Médiateur de la République). Since then, the 
increasing collection and use of personal data, and especially the tendency to digitise 
and match data from various social services for the purposes of law enforcement, have 
been more prominent concerns than general access (Flaherty 1989:166; Moderne 2003). 
Most of the (rare) debates on public access to general files in France have arisen out of 
concerns with personal data, and the state has proved far more willing to grant limited 
rights and protections in this area: a general data protection act was passed in January 
1978 with full support from the executive. This was preceded by special-purpose legisla-
tion in 1970 (covering a database of driver’s licences), and followed by laws in 1983 and 
1996, both of which applied to the use of police and judicial files. 
The early introduction of France’s access law meant the introduction of more limited 
rights could not contribute to the introduction of full transparency as it did in the UK. 
But it is telling that neither the subsequent introduction of limited rights of access nor 
the ongoing prominence of privacy concerns contributed to more widespread use of the 
existing freedom of information law. The French equivalent of the UK’s Data Protection 
Act remains far more prominent in popular discourse than its equivalent of the Freedom 
of Information Act, and appears to be implemented far more willingly by the administra-
tion. Moreover, even thirty years after its passage it has developed no significant con-
stituency in civil society. This is despite persistent institutionalised support from both 
the Médiateur de la République, which first called for access rights in a report published in 
1975 (Errera 1987:88), and the Commission d’Accès aux Documents Administratifs. France, in 
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short, represents a case in which problems of administrative dispute resolution have 
been successfully framed in individual terms, and in which interest in access more gen-
erally remains weak, despite the fact that freedom of information was introduced in the 
context of efforts to address precisely these grievances. 
“Apolitical” Transparency in Sweden 
The final case considered here is Sweden, which transformed its 19th-Century access law 
into a modern freedom of information act through major amendments in 1937 and less 
extensive but no less significant changes in 1949. The circumstances surrounding these 
amendments are consistent with the claim that the growth of the administrative state 
and the threat it poses to individual liberty are important contributors to access rights. 
They challenge at least two important aspects of the explanation for cross-national var-
iation being advanced here, however. In Sweden transparency, far from being facilitat-
ed by a system of administrative dispute resolution in which political and administra-
tive forms of control overlap, underpins a system which aims to exclude political influ-
ence and hierarchical authority as mechanisms of administrative control. The second is 
that the consolidation of freedom of information apparently occurred in anticipation 
of, rather than a response to, the growth of the modern welfare state. Sweden, like its 
Nordic neighbours, thus constitutes a partial exception to the claim that large states are 
strictly necessary preconditions for the development of the instruments of administra-
tive accountability mentioned above (Bennett 1997:221). Although primary sources for 
this period are not readily accessible, it seems likely that both these unexpected fea-
tures of transparency in Sweden can be explained in terms of the prior existence of a 
functioning access regime, and the particular configuration of political interests which 
prevailed in the early decades of the 20th Century. 
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In very broad terms, the establishment of the welfare state occurred in Sweden at a 
similar pace to the UK. Although Sweden had a much longer tradition of administrative 
intervention in domestic economy and society than Britain, prior to the late 19th Centu-
ry its welfare system essentially focussed on providing poor relief. The first compulso-
ry, modern programmes to be implemented were social insurance schemes, put in place 
under Liberal governments in 1913 and 1918 (Flora, et al. 1987:454). Over the following 
decades, these were gradually expanded, and culminated in the establishment of a 
comprehensive social and economic policy under the Social Democrats in the 1930s and 
1940s which was comparable to, if not more comprehensive than, the Beveridge re-
forms in the UK. 
The expansion of domestic regulation also had similar effects on broad public opinion 
as elsewhere, giving rise to concerns over data protection and privacy at more or less 
the same time as Germany and France. By the late 1960s, there is evidence of wide-
spread discontent with the increasing use of information technology to collect, process 
and above all link datasets within government. If anything, these concerns arose slight-
ly earlier than elsewhere, a fact which can largely be explained by the early and com-
prehensive adoption of computers as a cost-saving measure in a country with a rela-
tively large and, hence, expensive bureaucracy (Flaherty 1989:98). As in Germany, con-
troversy over the census was a particular flashpoint, in this case in 1970 (Flaherty 
1989:94-7), and led to the establishment of an official committee whose 1972 report on 
computers and privacy formed the basis of the world’s first national data protection law 
a year later. 
Measured against the development of the welfare state and the emergence of these 
concerns, the introduction of a modern regime of access rights occurred far earlier in 
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Sweden than elsewhere. This can partly be attributed to the fact that it already had a 
relatively well-entrenched access law in place, and that the consequences of state 
growth were thus experienced as threats to existing entitlements rather than as incho-
ate discontent waiting to be given shape. The potential threat posed by administrative 
growth to Sweden’s traditional right of access to official documents had been clear from 
as early as the 1890s, when a series of amendments excluded aspects of the emerging 
state administration from its scope, including defence secrets, tax information and 
some social and economic programmes (Anderson 1973:422). As early as 1912, the Chief 
Justice of the Administrative Court had been asked by the government to report on 
whether there were problems with the law of sufficient severity to require amendment 
(Anderson 1973:422 note 12; Hirschfeldt 2008). A series of official commissions starting 
in 1924 were tasked with preparing proposals for updating the right, and these eventu-
ally led to the 1937 amendments mentioned above. 
Concerns over the expansion of the administrative state were clearly contributors to 
these amendments, and were reflected in the text of the law itself (Östberg and Eriksson 
2009:114). Coverage was explicitly extended to local government authorities, which 
were the main providers of expanding welfare services. Provision was also made for ap-
peals over denials of access, suggesting that dissatisfaction with refusals was sufficient-
ly widespread to require formal mechanisms of resolution. The 1949 amendments were 
ostensibly a response to widespread dissatisfaction with restrictions on press reporting 
which the 1937 act had also imposed in order to placate the Nazis, and thereby protect 
Swedish neutrality. They must also be understood in the context of a broader re-
examination of the protection of civil liberties in the face of state growth, a process 
which began in 1941 when the Social Democrats established a royal commission on the 
need to update the bill of rights included in the 1809 Constitution (Stjernquist 
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1992:135). 1949 is conventionally understood to mark the end of debate over the princi-
ple of freedom of information in modern Sweden (Sweden 2001:587). 
The second distinctive feature of the Swedish system of administrative transparency is 
that it did not develop in response to a failure of political control over the bureaucracy, 
but rather appears to have been part of a pre-emptive effort to keep direct political in-
fluence over the bureaucracy to a minimum. It seems likely that this was, at least in 
part, a result of growing concern among conservatives at the turn of the Century over 
the need to protect traditional property rights in the face of the growing power of the 
labour movement and its demands for parliamentary sovereignty and mass enfran-
chisement. This concern led to the establishment of a number of other institutional 
protections, such as judicial review of legislative acts (Stjernquist 1992:134), the adop-
tion of proportional representation, and the establishment of a supreme administrative 
court. 
Whatever its origins, the principle of transparency remains essential to the functioning 
of a system of administrative accountability and dispute resolution which not only op-
erates independently of the political system, but continues to actively exclude it 
(Anderson 1973:427 note 40). In certain respects, it resembles the German system, a fact 
which makes the contrasts between the two instructive. In both countries, the vast ma-
jority of civil servants are individually responsible to the law as well as to their superior 
officers and, eventually, ministers. Responsibility to the law is even more important in 
Sweden than in Germany, because ministers are formally barred from directing public 
servants on how to apply the law to particular cases. 
Despite this, Sweden differs in several crucial respects from Germany. Swedish bureau-
cracy is less centralised and less hierarchical than the German, and its internal mecha-
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nisms of appeal and control less well–developed. Public law tends to be less detailed and 
prescriptive, and although administrative decisions and actions can be appealed to the 
courts, administrative control tends to be accomplished in ways which rely less on ad-
versarial processes. Perhaps the most crucial point on which the Swedish and German 
systems of administrative justice differ, apart from the existence of freedom of infor-
mation itself, is the ombudsman. These two institutions have enjoyed a mutually-
reinforcing relationship in Sweden since the late 18th Century, having been introduced 
together in the 1770s and reintroduced in 1809 with the re–establishment of a constitu-
tional monarchy. The ombudsman has also proved remarkably well-suited to coping 
with the increase in volume and the increasingly technical kinds of disputes which 
arose due to the expansion of the welfare state: the number of staff in the ombudsman’s 
offices in these countries grew significantly between the 1950s and the 1970s in direct 
response to the pressures identified in the first part of this chapter, and the offices 
themselves were reorganised internally to allow for greater specialisation in dealing 
with particular parts of the administration. The ombudsman has also proved crucial to 
ensuring that access to information is a real right, rather than a merely formal one 
(Einhorn 1977:263). Its role in mediating disputes between citizens and the state is vital 
in enforcing rights in specific cases, while its role as an investigator and advisor on the 
improvement of public administration means it has frequently constituted a significant 
institutionalised source of support for the principle of access. Although the late devel-
opment of freedom of information in Germany cannot simply be attributed to the ab-
sence of an ombudsman there, the comparison with Sweden suggests it may be a con-
tributor; it is, at any rate, a small but significant difference solving the problems of ad-
ministrative control between two countries which share many similarities. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter sought to show two things. Firstly, that the establishment of comprehen-
sive social and economic policy which occurred in the middle of the 20th Century in 
most consolidated democracies was a major contributor to the development of freedom 
of information, because it gave rise to broad public discontent with bureaucratic inter-
vention. Secondly, that this contribution was contingent on the role played by the po-
litical system in the pre-existing systems of administrative dispute resolution. 
Considerable historical evidence has been provided in support of the empirical claim 
which underpins the first of these arguments. In all four of the countries examined 
here, the growth of comprehensive welfare and economic regulation gave rise to con-
cerns over individual liberty, and to an increase in grievances held by citizens against 
their states. The same is arguably also true in the USA, although evidence for this has 
not yet been presented. State growth thus offers a plausible explanation for an aspect of 
freedom of information which the previous chapter identified but was unable to ex-
plain: that freedom of information has only become a matter of widespread political 
debate since the middle of the 20th Century. Access rights  are - at least in part - an at-
tempt to shackle the leviathan that is the welfare state.  
The second claim has also received some support, although the mechanisms at work 
have proved to be more complex than originally claimed. The comparisons undertaken 
here suggest that the institutional structures governing the relationship between citi-
zens and their states affect the likelihood that general public rights of access to gov-
ernment files will be identified as the appropriate response. But they also suggest that 
these structures are not sufficient on their own to explain the development of access 
rights, and that they matter for the way the grievances they produce  are mediated by 
  164 
politics. In France, popular discontent and official recognition of the problems of coor-
dination posed by administrative expansion became relevant only under a particular 
conjuncture of interparty relations and state policy development; once this conjuncture 
subsided, the traditional approach to addressing these concerns re-emerged. Germany 
is sometimes described as a late adopter due to its emphasis on privacy, but the im-
portance of privacy in the UK suggests this is simplistic. It was a late adopter because its 
post-war settlement emphasised legalistic rather than political settlement of disputes 
with the administration, and provided forms of access which, although limited in scope, 
were so effective they undercut the demand for more general access discussed in this 
chapter. 
In countries where politicians play a prominent role in administrative supervision and 
control, such as the UK, the situation is more complex. These systems facilitate the po-
liticisation of access rights, but may also delay their implementation if political consid-
erations encourage resistance among lawmakers for other reasons. This suggests that 
countries in which the two systems are separate may be less likely to develop access 
rights early, whereas those in which they are fused might be more diverse in their tim-
ings. The importance of understanding the broader context in which discontent with 
the welfare state is embedded was underlined by the Swedish case. There, the attitudes 
of important, organised interest groups towards the emergence of a welfare state were 
an important factor in establishing a system of dispute resolution which is both apoliti-
cal and transparent. Taken together, this chapter and the last have shown that func-
tioning electoral systems and large, bureaucratic welfare states were important con-
tributors to the adoption of freedom of information. Although these may be necessary 
conditions, as Bennett claimed (Bennett 1997:123), they are not sufficient. Politics mat-
ters, and it is to this that we now turn. 
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Chapter 5: Centre-Periphery 
Relations in Policy Networks 
The two preceding chapters examined the ways in which different institutional struc-
tures governing the relationship between governments and the general public influ-
enced the introduction of freedom of information. Both concluded that institutions 
matter because they aggregate the preferences and actions of individuals, and in doing 
so transform inchoate discontent into identifiable problems for politicians and bureau-
crats. Both were, however, unable to provide an entirely satisfactory explanation for 
why these conditions only produced laws in some countries, and especially why coun-
tries where these pressures were weak also eventually legislated. One reason for the 
unsatisfactory quality of these explanations is that these chapters have emphasised the 
agency of government officials. These are the very actors to whom these laws consti-
tute the greatest threat, and almost all the sources not written by officials themselves 
agree that they are the primary source of resistance to access rights. Even under the 
most propitious of circumstances, officials identify freedom of information as the solu-
tion to problems of secrecy only when others go to considerable lengths to persuade 
them. 
This chapter and the next build towards a more satisfactory account by focussing on 
these “others”. This chapter considers those organised non-state groups which have 
tried to convince politicians and bureaucrats to introduce access laws. It identifies their 
bases of support, reasons for advocating access to information and the structural fac-
tors which explain why they were more successful in some countries than others. The 
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next examines the impact on general attitudes towards transparency of patterns of in-
teraction among interest groups which already enjoy influence over the state. 
This chapter argues that freedom of information, insofar as it is the outcome of interest 
group pressure, constitutes an attempt to open the policymaking process which is more 
likely to succeed in countries where openness already prevails. It is divided into three 
parts. The first uses the literature on policy networks to show why support for freedom 
of information is likely to vary inversely with influence over the policy process. It ar-
gues that the single most important determinant of “openness” is whether any party or 
coalition effectively controls a majority of seats in the legislature. The second part 
compares the USA with Denmark and Norway (standing, for reasons made clear below, 
as proxies for Sweden). It shows that there are at least two distinct patterns of open 
policymaking which favour the early introduction of access rights. In the first, weak 
party discipline means senior officials cannot prevent peripheral groups from gaining 
influencing the legislative agenda. In the second, single-party minority governments 
routinely identify and incorporate social interests and movements, but thereby find 
themselves unable to reject unwelcome demands made by these incorporated interests. 
The third part of the chapter contrasts Germany and the UK with both the USA and the 
Nordic Countries. It suggests that Germany’s late adoption of access may well be due to 
its tendency towards the passive exclusion of peripheral interest groups, while the in-
troduction of access rights in the UK was delayed by the government’s autonomy set-
ting the legislative agenda and structuring relations with external interest groups. 
Freedom of Information and the Policy Process 
Those interested in freedom of information have been somewhat unsystematic in their 
examination of organised groups and the relations between them. Many scholars in the 
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field are, as Chapter One showed, primarily concerned with evaluating legal texts 
against liberal democratic norms which emphasise individual autonomy and state ac-
countability to the public as a whole. Within this tradition, organisations per se are often 
either ignored as unimportant, or explicitly criticised as crystallisations of sectional in-
terests which distort the democratic process (e.g. Rousseau 1968). Scholars of freedom 
of information usually only take organisation seriously as a source of secrecy even then 
only within states and firms. States are regularly portrayed as monolithic and reflexive-
ly secret, eternally engaged in a Manichean struggle against an undifferentiated public 
and its desire to hold those in power to account. The fact that politicians and bureau-
crats alike routinely share considerable amounts of information with outsiders, albeit 
on a highly selective basis, is generally only acknowledged in order to support claims 
that legally-enshrined access is desirable because otherwise officials favour special in-
terests at the expense of the common good. Businesses, for their part, are frequently 
portrayed as opponents of freedom of information for reasons of convenience and prof-
it: secrecy protects the close relations which many producers are able to develop with 
regulators, and prevents the commercially-sensitive information they provide to regu-
lators from being disclosed to competitors or hostile interest groups. 
The possibility that organised interests might make a positive contribution to the de-
velopment of freedom of information, or that they might not all be equally harmful, is 
nowhere explicitly denied but has not received systematic attention. It is widely 
acknowledged that civil society organisations play an increasingly important role in 
raising awareness of access laws, lobbying for their introduction, and ensuring their 
effective implementation. Examples at the international level include Article 19 and 
Privacy International; two prominent national-level organisations discussed in more 
detail below are the UK’s Campaign for Freedom of Information, which was especially 
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active in the 1980s and 1990s, and the campaign conducted in the USA by the American 
Society of Newspaper Editors in the 1950s and 1960s. But organisation per se is usually 
treated as an incidental strategy in these accounts, appropriate where the state pursues 
its institutional interest in secrecy with particular vigour but not important in and of 
itself. The possibility that secrecy might persist for reasons other than a lack of com-
mitment to democratic ideals, that some groups might legitimately consider freedom of 
information harmful without necessarily being antidemocratic, or that access might 
stand a better chance of being introduced under some configurations of interest group 
interaction than others has been largely ignored. 
There are two exceptions to this lack of attention to organisation. Much of the second-
ary literature assumes that the press is a significant contributor to the development of 
freedom of information. This claim is, however, based less on recognition of its self-
interest or organisational capacity than on its normative role in supporting mass de-
mocracy by ensuring an informed voting public. The actual contribution of the press to 
the development of access laws is far more variable than is often supposed, especially 
when viewed in organisational terms. Individual journalists have often been dedicated 
campaigners, and individual media institutions have periodically given vocal support. 
But the press as a whole has only very rarely mobilised, and even then usually only to 
support campaigns which are already underway. The historical sources testify more of-
ten to the frustration of rights campaigners at the weakness of this support than to sat-
isfaction with its strength. 
The other exception to prevailing inattention to organisation is a small body of scholar-
ship from the late 1970s concerned with explaining government secrecy. Of particular 
interest is Itzhak Galnoor’s invocation of the market to explain patterns of voluntary 
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disclosure of politically–salient information (Galnoor 1975:34; Galnoor 1977). Selective 
disclosure was, he argued, an attempt by officials to “purchase” cooperation from influ-
ential outside interests. Secrecy is therefore not pathological, but inherent to the policy 
process in pluralist societies. The metaphor of the market is not without problems, not 
least its tendency to downplay the existence of unequal power relations and the extent 
to which these inequalities both influence and are reproduced by the communicative 
process itself. But Galnoor’s basic insight about the structured nature of communication 
and cooperation is also latent in more recent literature on policy networks which does 
take these factors into account. 
Policy Networks, Power Resources and Information 
The policy networks literature provide a basis for identifying the kinds of organisation 
which might campaign for freedom of information and the structural features which 
are likely to contribute to their success, without making any particular assumptions 
about the merits of their substantive or normative goals. Its relevance rests on a num-
ber of inter–related insights about the distribution of politically–salient power re-
sources and resource dependencies. The first is that it is extremely rare for any gov-
ernment – or, a fortiori, any part of government – to control everything required to suc-
cessfully develop or implement policy in any given area. Important resources such as 
formal authority, expertise, money, the perceived legitimacy of policy intervention, 
knowledge, and infrastructural capacity are usually controlled by many actors includ-
ing politicians, departments of state, semi–independent public bodies, organised inter-
est groups, social movements, firms and even – under the right circumstances – the 
public at large (cf. Rhodes 1988:90-1 in Saward 1992:78). Although governments could, 
theoretically, require most of these groups to comply with their wishes, in practice ex-
plicit reliance on despotic power is rare, especially in democracies. Opinion is often di-
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vided within the state itself, and it is often easier and more effective to negotiate with 
those external parties who control important resources (Peters 2001:189 et sqq). Doing 
so forms a   (Rhodes and Marsh 1992:23). 
The second insight is that, within any given policy network, resources are almost al-
ways distributed unevenly, which means that the influence different groups can exert 
also varies (Leone 1972:49-50; McFarland 1987; Rhodes and Marsh 1992). Some non-state 
groups routinely enjoy disproportionate influence across a range of networks, by virtue 
of their control over strategically-important resources. Examples include professional 
bodies (which act as guardians of expert knowledge, and can often crucially influence 
the perceived legitimacy and practical effectiveness of policy interventions), and pro-
ducer associations (which wield disproportionate economic influence). Influence is like-
ly to be unevenly distributed within the state as well: those who can block decisions 
(e.g. members of cabinet or minor parties who hold the balance of power) are in a far 
better position to extract concessions in return for their cooperation than those who do 
not (e.g. individual rank-and-file members or opposition parties). Within the bureau-
cracy, the relative influence of departments, ministries and agencies also varies– the 
Treasury is usually among the most influential for obvious reasons, but line agencies 
may also hold considerable sway under the right circumstances. This uneven distribu-
tion of influence means that networks are often characterised by a “core”, composed of 
members who are highly involved in negotiations with each other because they control 
resources deemed essential to policy success. This is surrounded by a “periphery”, 
composed of those who wield less influence because their cooperation is less important 
(Marsh and Rhodes 1992:255-7). 
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Policy networks are relevant to freedom of information because, as Galnoor claims, pat-
terns of resource dependency are likely to produce structured patterns of disclosure. 
Negotiation and coordination are fundamentally communicative processes; indeed, pol-
icy networks are sometimes defined in terms of the degree of mutual communication 
among their members (e.g. McFarland 1987:146). Practices of disclosure are likely to re-
flect the unequal power relations because those who control access to the most im-
portant resources will probably be courted by those seeking to negotiate favourable 
terms. Negotiations are, in other words, likely to be most frequent and detailed among 
core members of a network, and less so between core and peripheral members. 
The distribution of information is not just likely to reflect power relations. Information 
is a resource in and of itself, and deliberate decisions about who to communicate with 
can influence those same relations. Information about the network itself – the identi-
ties, intentions and bargaining positions of other participants– is likely to be particular-
ly valuable. Knowledge of whether interests combine in a zero– or positive–sum fashion 
is important for choosing the most appropriate negotiating strategy, for example. All 
else being equal, under zero–sum conditions information about the positions and goals 
of others becomes more valuable as it is less widely–known, because those who do know 
are in a better negotiating position to than those who do not. Under positive–sum con-
ditions, on the other hand, this information becomes more valuable as it is shared, be-
cause it allows parties to identify opportunities for mutually profitable cooperation. 
Overall, selective disclosure is likely to reinforce pre-existing asymmetries of power ra-
ther than undermine them, because the value of network-relevant information is likely 
to vary with the importance of the actor concerned. Actors who control policy-relevant 
resources are in a better position to affect the bargaining position of others through 
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selective disclosure than those who do not. Members of the political executive and sen-
ior bureaucrats are usually in a particularly strong position, because information about 
the intentions of the state is especially valuable. As Martin Smith has shown in his study 
of Britain (1992), although states may often be quite profoundly dependent on external 
resources in any given policy domain, these patterns of dependency only exist by virtue 
of official decisions to regulate in the first place. This decision provides a measure of 
control over the terms on which regulation will occur: it affects relative standing of dif-
ferent interest groups by making some resources more important to policy success than 
others. Once a network develops, the role of the state in formalising and implementing 
most policies means that information on the attitudes and intentions of officials con-
tinues to be valuable, allowing them to selectively disclose their intentions and offer 
opportunities for direct consultation in exchange for things like cooperation and public 
expressions of support. Official responsibility for these decisions constitutes, in Smith’s 
account, a form of power akin to Lukes’ second and third “dimensions” (cf. Lukes 2005), 
and implies that the state potentially enjoys a significant degree of autonomy from ex-
ternal demands even while it is apparently dependent on them. 
Patterns of Policymaking and Variations in Freedom of Information 
The close relationship between patterns of resource dependency and communicative 
practices suggests that the attitudes of different actors towards freedom of information 
should vary systematically with their position in a policy network. 
Core actors are unlikely to be strongly in favour: their control over valuable resources 
and their strong negotiating position means they are likely to receive information rele-
vant to their interests in the normal course of events, and that they will have relatively 
little need for legally-protected access. In fact, hostility to formal access rights should 
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increase with proximity to the core, because the absence of these rights limits the in-
fluence of more peripheral groups competing for the attention of policymakers. Free-
dom of information is likely to be least popular of all among bureaucrats and members 
of the political executive, not just for the reasons identified by Weber and discussed in 
Chapter Two, but because it threatens both their relations with core members of par-
ticular networks, and also their capacity to use selective disclosure to structure power 
relations across the policymaking process as a whole. 
For much the same reason, freedom of information is likely to find greatest favour 
among organised groups whose interests are affected by policy decisions but who find 
themselves on the periphery of the relevant networks. These groups are likely to enjoy 
relatively little privileged access to information because they do not control relevant 
resources, and cannot easily jeopardise outcomes by threatening to withdraw. The in-
troduction of formal rights of access is likely to appeal to these groups precisely be-
cause network cores almost always include bureaucratic departments or agencies, and 
official files constitute a relatively rich source of information to which access can be 
assured through legislation. 
A policy networks approach suggests that, although freedom of information is often 
justified as strengthening ex post democratic accountability, its development is likely to 
be influenced by the opportunities available to peripheral groups seeking to exert ex 
ante influence over the policy process. Given the fundamental importance of the law to 
this strategy, and the likelihood that officials will be less than supportive, it seems rea-
sonable to assume that freedom of information should be least likely to develop in 
countries where the government’s ability to block unwelcome legislation is strongest. 
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This claim has clear affinities with the sociological literature on political opportunity 
structures, which conventionally distinguishes between “open” and “closed” (Kitschelt 
1986), or “inclusive” and “exclusive” (Dryzek, et al. 2003), patterns of policymaking 
(Tarrow 1998:82). Expressed in these terms, the central argument of this chapter is that 
“open” and “inclusive” political input structures should favour the development of 
freedom of information. The language of political opportunity structures can only be 
adopted with caution here, however. There is no consensus on what makes up an 
“open” opportunity structure, and scholars have employed the term with varying de-
grees of precision (Rootes 1999). Furthermore, when the concept is defined precisely, 
freedom of information is usually considered a contributor to openness. In order to 
employ opportunity structures to explain how these laws come into being in the first 
place, it is therefore necessary to first specify exactly which other institutional ar-
rangements are likely to be relevant and why. 
This chapter argues that the nature and extent of control which parties exercise over 
the legislature is a crucial determinant of how responsive a country is to interest-group 
pressure for a freedom of information act. This is by no means the only set of arrange-
ments which might affect the executive’s control over the legislative agenda. Chapter 
Three identified the separation of powers, while Chapter Four suggested accountability 
institutions like the Ombudsman and the Conseil d’État might also be relevant; another is 
a strong upper house employing a different electoral formula (cf. Lijphart 1999). Fortu-
nately, there is no need to catalogue or investigate the effect of each of these so-called 
“institutional veto players” (Tsebelis 1995), because the comparison between France 
and the USA conducted in Chapter Three suggested that their they were of secondary 
importance compared with the role played by parties. Both these countries have presi-
dential systems, but the separation of powers was a significant, ongoing contributor to 
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the politicisation of access rights only in the USA; it became relevant in France when 
discipline within the right-wing coalition was particularly weak. As Duverger put it 
(1968:394): “executive and legislature, government and parliament are constitutional 
façades; in reality the party alone exercises power”. 
Party control over the legislature has two separate but related dimensions: the degree 
of discipline which parties exercise over their parliamentary members, and whether a 
majority of seats in the legislature is routinely controlled by a single party. Where both 
apply, the climate for access rights is particularly unfavourable (unless senior party of-
ficials have some other reason to support it). Single-party cabinets concentrate the po-
litical costs and risks of freedom of information, discussed in Chapter Three, on those 
with the ability to resist their introduction. Senior party officials in these systems are in 
an extremely strong position to prevent unwelcome proposals from being made by al-
tering the determine the composition and terms of reference for parliamentary com-
mittees, and through their control over the agenda in the house as a whole. In the last 
resort, party discipline can be relied upon to ensure any proposal which cannot be 
blocked in this way is voted down. The situation is similar where majority coalitions are 
the rule, although the extent to which they approximate the behaviour of a disciplined 
single-party cabinet will depend on the stability of the coalition itself. Under minority 
government, by contrast, the prospects for freedom of information are somewhat 
brighter. Opposition parties are in a better position to demand access rights in ex-
change for support for the rest of the government’s programme, and more likely to ac-
tually do so inasmuch as access laws are a kind of insurance against secrecy-based ex-
clusion from future policy debates. 
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Fragmented and Cohesive Paths to Early Transparency 
One of the striking things about advocacy of freedom of information is that, in all coun-
tries where the impetus came primarily from domestic groups, mobilisation occurred in 
two phases with similar constituencies and tactics. Freedom of information has typical-
ly drawn its earliest and most consistent support from professional groups whose re-
sponsibilities made them sensitive to problems official secrecy, and whose professional 
position provided easy opportunities to agitate for transparency. Primarily, these were 
journalists, relatively junior members of parliament and academics. From the 1970s 
onwards, an additional source of pressure came from groups advocating participatory 
politics as a means of solving the spill–over effects from large–scale industrial manufac-
turing. This second wave shared a concern with their predecessors at the implications 
of bureaucratisation, but their targets were broader: not only public officials working in 
planning departments, or public health and welfare agencies, but also private corpora-
tions which distorted popular sovereignty through their influence over policymakers, 
regulators and the media. The distinction between these two phases of mobilisation 
provides a means of distinguishing between early adopters of freedom of information – 
where governments responded to pressure from the first phase – from late adopters – 
where governments only responded to the second phase, if at all. This second section of 
the chapter shows that there are at least two distinct paths to the early adoption of ac-
cess rights by examining the USA on the one hand, and Denmark and Norway on the 
other. The justification for examining Denmark and Norway rather than Sweden as in 
the rest of the thesis is that Sweden already had a well-entrenched access law before 
the development of modern of interest-group politics, making it difficult to separate 
cause from effect in this case. As the discussion below shows, however, Norway and 
Denmark were early adopters, for reasons which can be traced in very large part to in-
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stitutional structures they share with Sweden. They show, in short, what the influence 
of interest group politics might have been had Sweden not introduced its access law 
long beforehand. 
The third section of the chapter further supports the relevance of party control over 
the legislature by contrasting these countries with two late adopters: Germany and the 
UK. France is not examined here because civil society interest in access is so weak as to 
be non-existent. An explanation for the absence of mobilisation lies beyond the scope of 
this thesis, but the conclusion of the chapter offers a few speculative comments based 
on the insights gained in the intervening discussion. 
The Congressional System in the United States 
The development of freedom of information in the USA demonstrates the favourable 
conditions presented by a fragmented policymaking process. Consistent with expecta-
tions, the social bases of support for reform lay among groups which were either pe-
ripheral to established policy networks or represented interests that were excluded 
from them, and their support was an instrumentally-motivated attempt to overcome 
their lack of influence. That pressure from these groups led fairly quickly to legislation 
can largely be explained by the fact that the parties exert only weak control over the 
legislature. Over the long term, this absence of control has produced a self-reinforcing 
pattern: legislative gains in one period have facilitated further reform by opening the 
political system to influence from a wider range of groups, making information an in-
creasingly valuable resource in the policy process channelling dissatisfaction among 
peripheral groups into calls for stronger legal rights. 
The first explicit advocacy of formal access rights in the USA began in 1946 when the 
American Society of Newspaper Editors (ASNE) founded a committee on freedom of in-
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formation. Through a combination of reporting and commissioned research, it sought 
to portray two emergent trends as dangerous to popular democratic control of gov-
ernment: official secrecy and the increasing complexity of the state administrative ap-
paratus. These issues have already been addressed in earlier chapters, but their particu-
lar significance for the press is worth underlining here. The difficulty of providing ac-
curate, informative reporting posed by the complexity of the state was compounded by 
the increasing tendency of officials to withhold information which had hitherto usually 
been available (Cross 1954:214 et sqq). One contributor to this shift was the political 
context of the early Cold War, and particularly the widely–feared threats of communist 
infiltration of the USA itself. These fears provided a ready justification for the mainte-
nance, and indeed the extension, of official secrecy to new areas, even under circum-
stances where it seemed to serve little purpose other than administrative convenience. 
The ASNE campaign was grew out of discontent with this situation, and was precipitat-
ed attempts to convert the state’s internal security classification system into a compre-
hensive censorship regime (Cross 1954:preface). 
ASNE gained an important ally with the foundation of the Congress Special Subcommit-
tee on Government Information in 1955. In addition to the proximate causes discussed 
in Chapter Three, this was also a response to broader concerns about the consequences 
of state growth and de facto expansion of official secrecy for popular sovereignty, Con-
gressional control of the executive, and the preservation of personal liberty in the face 
of extensive bureaucratisation in both public and private spheres. 
It might seem naïve to argue that the head of a Congressional subcommittee and the 
editors of some of the most important newspapers in the country were “peripheral” to 
the American policymaking process, especially since their efforts resulted in the pas-
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sage of the Freedom of Information Act itself. It is important, however, to distinguish the 
advantages they enjoyed due to the openness of the American political system from at 
least two structural weaknesses which these advantages offset. 
Firstly, policy domains are not all equivalent, and influence in one may not translate 
into influence in another. The literature on policy networks usually takes as its frame of 
reference the development and implementation of substantive policy in areas such as 
agriculture, national security, environmental management and healthcare. It is as-
sumed that the various members of these policy communities participate because their 
interests are directly affected by the outcomes. Freedom of information is not a sub-
stantive issue in this sense; it a procedural matter which cuts across substantive do-
mains. In a sense, the freedom of information policy domain is itself peripheral; the 
press was certainly a peripheral player in the substantive policy domains where con-
cerns over official secrecy first arose, where it had nothing to offer in exchange for ac-
cess but the promise of sympathetic reportage. Policymakers were far more interested 
in cooperating with groups controlling more important resources: military officers, in-
dustrial producers and administrative departments. 
Secondly, it is certainly true that Moss was the head of a Congressional subcommittee, 
and was therefore not fully excluded from the policy process, but committees are not 
all equal Moss was only recently elected when the Subcommittee was formed, and was a 
peripheral player within Congress insofar as he had not yet developed a reputation, 
connections or sufficient seniority to constitute an influential figure in his own right. 
The foundation of the Subcommittee occurred not because of his personal influence, 
but because the political circumstances discussed in Chapter Three encouraged the 
House Majority Leader and the Chair of the Government Operations Committee to allow 
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it. Once founded, the Subcommittee occupied a peripheral position within the commit-
tee system, and had to struggle against a mixture of indifference and outright hostility 
from the rest of Congress: one of its own staffers later recalled that its only real sup-
porters during the early years were its own immediate members (Archibald 1993:727). 
The Subcommittee provided advocates of openness with considerable opportunities to 
pursue their goals within Congress. Committee chairs enjoy wide scope to undertake 
own-motion research, and their ability to subject the executive to scrutiny is arguably 
without peer among parliaments worldwide (Gleditsch and Hogetveit 1984:29). The 
Moss Subcommittee used these opportunities to good effect. It compiled comprehen-
sive data on the arbitrary nature of official information practices through a combina-
tion of hearings and questionnaires sent to all departments and agencies (Archibald 
1993:727). It then produced voluminous reports (e.g. United States 1956; 1957; 1958b; 
1958a; 1959; 1960a; 1961b; 1961a) detailing the inefficiencies, abuses and irrationalities 
this secrecy made possible, and the self–serving ways in which bureaucrats interpreted 
existing provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act. This fed directly into the electoral 
politics discussed in Chapter Three. 
This strategy met with success, in part, because weak party discipline meant that the 
executive’s institutional interests were not a significant influence on other members of 
Congress, even when the President was a member of their own party. It is fairly clear 
from the way the executive branch reacted to the proposed Freedom of Information Act 
that, had it been able to block the Subcommittee’s work earlier it would have done so. 
The bill was opposed by all executive departments, and although President Johnson 
made much of democratic principles in his signing statement (Johnson 1966), his pri-
vate view was very different and he had to be “dragged to the signing table” (Moyers 
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2002). The bill appears to have rapidly gained the support noted in Chapter Three be-
cause it resonated with the normative justification for Congress as a check on the exec-
utive, and even a President such as Johnson, whose influence over Congress was leg-
endary, was unable to prevent it from passing the legislature as UK governments did in 
the 1970s and 1980s.. Intriguingly, there is some evidence that party discipline, alt-
hough weak, was not entirely absent or irrelevant: Johnson’s decision not to veto the 
bill was, in part, motivated by the fact that it had been put forward by his own party 
(Archibald 1979:312). The party system was, it seems, strong enough to influence stra-
tegic calculations of senior party officials, but not strong enough to prevent Members of 
Congress from supporting projects which diverged from the interests of their nominal 
superiors in the party. The second phase of mobilisation began in the USA in the late 
1960s, and contributed to the 1974 amendments to the Freedom of Information Act. Chap-
ter Three showed that this was a propitious time for attacking official secrecy for rea-
sons unrelated to the policy process. But it also showed that the relationship between 
Watergate and legislation was contingent; events were exploited opportunistically by 
groups interested in consolidating access rights for reasons unrelated to Nixon’s behav-
iour. These groups were principally composed of public interest campaigners interested 
in issues like product safety, human health and industrial pollution. They emerged as a 
political force in the mid-1960s, as part of a wave of social movement mobilisation 
which emphasised individual self–determination, participatory democracy and greater 
attention to quality–of–life in the face of increasing bureaucratisation in public and pri-
vate spheres (Kitschelt 1990:179-80). 
The public interest movement was peripheral to the policy–making process in the USA 
in two senses. It sought, firstly, to further interests which were peripheral – albeit often 
due to passive exclusion. Prior to the 1970s, many of the most important policy net-
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works in the USA were primarily concerned with material-distributional issues such as 
labour market regulation and the management of industrial and agricultural produc-
tion. The core of these networks was composed of representatives of a relatively nar-
row range of players working in almost exclusive cooperation with each other; stereo-
typically, these were Congressional committees, government departments and produc-
er groups, whence the name “iron triangles”. The exclusion of consumer and other pub-
lic interests was partly due to consensus among core members that issues like partici-
pation and pollution were of secondary concern where they were not actually a threat 
to profitability. It was also an outcome of the underlying organisational weakness 
among the beneficiaries of these goods (Leone 1972:51). 
The public interest movement itself was peripheral to most American policy networks 
for two reasons. It was, from the start, suspicious of bureaucratic organisation per se, 
resisted the formation of internal hierarchies and preferred to remain outside estab-
lished networks for fear of cooptation (Kitschelt 1990:179-80,191). It also controlled few 
policy-relevant resources in its own right. Unlike unions, the public interest movement 
does not seek to directly organise its constituents, and is thus rarely able to credibly 
threaten a strike. It is also in a far weaker financial position than professional or pro-
ducer associations, who represent the interests of profit-generating enterprises and 
who can therefore rely on the self-interest of their members to secure funding. 
The public interest movement’s interest in official information was integral to its at-
tempts at overcoming these structural weaknesses. Consistent with its fundamentally 
anti-bureaucratic stance, it sought to mobilise by encouraging the development of 
group consciousness and political sophistication among their constituents rather than 
through direct organisation (Reich 1970:1096-7). One early and widely–adopted ap-
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proach was to provide accessible, authoritative research and advice (Evan Hendricks, 
one-time editor of Privacy Times, in Bollier 2004). The intent was to empower individu-
als to exert pressure directly on corporations and government through the free market 
and the electoral system (Mueller 1969). This technique was widely employed by the 
consumer movements in many countries at least as far back as the early 20th Century 
(Marcus-Steiff 1977:88), not least because it was less resource–intensive than wide-
spread mobilisation through direct organisation, and could be offered as a selective in-
centive in the form of publications sold to members. 
The shift from a focus on distributing information as a mobilising strategy to freedom 
of information as a policy goal occurred through a process exemplified – and, indeed, 
led – by Ralph Nader. Nader had a profoundly ambiguous relationship with government 
authorities. His researchers were significant requesters under the 1966 Act, using it to 
obtain information in support of particular technical claims they made in their con-
sumer reports (Mueller 1969:980). This was, in other words, an attempt to harness the 
power of the state to compensate for the structural weaknesses of his own movement. 
On the other, Nader was an outspoken critic of regulatory agencies such as the Federal 
Trade Commission, which he alleged had become unaccountable to any constituency 
apart from those they were nominally supposed to be regulating (Leone 1972:55). They 
had been captured by, and ended up protecting, the very interests from whom they 
were supposed to be protecting the public (Mueller 1969:979). 
Nader’s goal of breaking industry capture of regulatory authorities led him to eschew 
the impartiality preferred by earlier consumer advocates in favour of the unabashedly 
polemic use of prominent negative publicity campaigns. This approach unsurprisingly 
provoked resistance to his routine information requests: officials attempted to protect 
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themselves and favoured insider groups by exploiting loopholes in the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act to withhold information (Mueller 1969:982). His response was to conduct an 
investigation into the administration of the act itself, and to issue a report which 
opened with the claim that its democratic promise was being “undercut by a riptide of 
bureaucratic ingenuity” (Mueller 1969:982; Nader 1970). This report, and the Freedom 
of Information Clearing House he founded in 1973, were of decisive importance in the 
passage of the 1974 amendments to the Freedom of Information Act: they provided the 
impetus and organisational core of a campaign to convince Congress that amendments 
were both an appealing way of responding to the Watergate crisis and acting on a 
broader agenda of popular empowerment (Bollier 2004). 
The enduring importance of the structural factors identified above is strongly suggest-
ed by the fact that, despite addressing different substantive concerns and involving dif-
ferent actors, the process leading up to the 1974 amendments resembled that leading 
up to the original 1966 enactment in several important respects. Congress had become 
more open to influence by small groups between 1966 and 1974, due among other 
things to the introduction of elected primaries for selecting candidates from the two 
major parties. These had existed in some states since the early the 20th Century, but be-
came the norm nationwide in the period after the 1968 Democratic convention when 
they were introduced for presidential races. Elected primaries weakened the power of 
the party hierarchy in two ways. By placing candidate selection in the hands of regis-
tered voters, they reduced the capacity of whips to discipline elected members with the 
threat of losing party endorsement at the next election. They also encouraged candi-
dates to be even more receptive than they had been to lobbying efforts from outside 
groups, especially where the issues might prove popular with their constituents. 
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A further similarity was the importance of alliances between external interest groups 
and individual members of Congress willing to exploit the opportunities offered by the 
committee system. On this occasion, Senator Ted Kennedy played a leading role 
through the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. These alliances were not just important 
at particular moments in the development of freedom of information – they were cru-
cial to increasing sympathy within Congress to the use of transparency more generally 
as a tool of public empowerment and regulation . Supporters of the original access law 
remained active; Moss himself played an instrumental role in the passage of key con-
sumer protection measures, including the Consumer Product Safety Act, the Motor Vehicle 
Information and Cost Savings Act, the Toy Safety Act, the Poison Packaging Prevention Act and 
the Toxic Substances Control Act. These all relied on disclosure to achieve particular policy 
goals (Kennedy 1996; John Moss Foundation 1999).Finally, both campaigns exploited the 
widely-perceived failure of an existing law as a means of mobilisation: the Freedom of 
Information Act in 1974, and the Administrative Procedure Act in 1966. Both laws constitut-
ed a clear set of standards against which official behaviour could be compared as part of 
a negative publicity campaign (Leone 1972:55) and also, if necessary, disputed in court. 
The Freedom of Information Act also provided access – however imperfectly – to official 
files containing evidence that official behaviour frequently fell short of those standards, 
evidence which Nader used systematically as part of his broader public interest cam-
paigns. Access rights thus contributed to their own consolidation. They formed a point 
around which otherwise-disorganised groups could mobilise, provided a means for pe-
ripheral groups to gain access to the policy process, and in lowering the barriers to dis-
organised participation in politics contributed to the very processes of fragmentation 
which made access rights desirable in the first place.23 
                                                                           
 
23 It is interesting to note that pre-existing access laws at state level do not appear to have provided a similar basis for 
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Diffusion from Sweden to the Nordic World 
The Nordic countries took a very different route to freedom of information than the 
Americans, but also arrived early. Their bureaucracies are large and coherently organ-
ised, their political parties are capable of successfully disciplining their own members, 
and their constitutional structure is not nearly so fragmented as the USA. The opportu-
nities for external groups to impose access on reluctant officials ought, in principle, to 
have been far fewer, and these countries might therefore have been expected to be late 
adopters. Sweden’s historic law is so old, and it was transformed into a fully modern law 
with codified exemptions and effective enforcement mechanisms so early, that the con-
tribution of interest group politics is difficult to assess (although the suggestion in the 
previous chapter that the Social Democrats strengthened the law in the 1930s as part of 
a bid to placate conservatives worried at the expansion of the state is, at least, con-
sistent with the arguments about resource dependency advanced at the start of this 
chapter). In order to examine these processes by comparing sufficiently similar cases, 
this section focusses instead on Denmark and Norway, which legislated only a few years 
after the USA, and which resembled Sweden in many important ways but differed cru-
cially in that they did not have pre-existing access regimes. 
One major problem for any claim that Denmark and Norway represent what Sweden 
might have been in the absence of the 1766 and 1809 laws regards diffusion. The Swe-
dish model of administrative dispute resolution and ex post control, discussed in the 
previous chapter, was known in its Western neighbours no later than 1929. In that year, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
 
mobilisation at federal level, despite being extensively surveyed in Cross’s seminal study (1954:337 et sqq.). Louisi-
ana passed its Public Records Act in 1912, providing greater rights of access and enforcement than the Swedish law 
(Anderson 1973:445-6). California’s Brown Act followed in 1952, and is called by some the first “modern” freedom of 
information law (Singer 1979:310). In the mid-1960s others adopted similar laws, including Arkansas and Colorado. 
Although state-level laws have developed local constituencies and constitute a long-standing field of fruitful aca-
demic research (Piotrowski and Van Ryzin 2007), the main drivers of federal reform were, at least in the 1950s-
1970s, specific to the federal level.  
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Swedish delegates to a meeting of the Nordic Association for Public Administration 
proposed it as a solution to the anticipated problems of state growth (Nilberg 1929; 
Holm 1975:160-1; Holm 1979:77). The idea was, reportedly, received relatively favoura-
bly (Anderson 1973:436-7 note 92). 
Although officials in Denmark and Norway were aware of the concept of freedom of in-
formation before the War, this appears to have had little direct effect on later events. 
Familiarity among cabinet ministers and senior civil servants did not translate into pos-
itive support; they were less enthusiastic about the idea than legal academics and junior 
civil servants (Holm 1975:160-1), and made no serious effort to implement it prior to the 
emergence of civil society pressure after the War. Once demands did arise, there were 
clear signs of official resistance motivated by much the same concerns as in the USA, 
UK, Germany and France (Einhorn 1977:260-3; Holm 1979:77-8,104 note 3). 
Similarly, the character of domestic mobilisation in favour of access rights does not ap-
pear to have been much affected by the prior existence of access rights in Sweden. In all 
three countries – as in the USA – the first groups to mobilise in the 20th Century were 
journalists, lawyers and academics concerned about the threat to individual autonomy 
and democratic control of a growing state, followed in the 1970s by environmental and 
consumer rights campaigners. In all three cases, this mobilisation also led relatively 
rapidly to legislation: in Sweden, to the 1937 and 1949 amendments; in Denmark and 
Norway, to limited rights of access to files relevant to formal dispute proceedings in the 
mid-1960s, followed by full freedom of information acts in 1970. 
The distinctive feature of the Nordic countries, in comparison with the USA, is that ear-
ly adoption did not occur despite the existence of a strong, well-organised executive 
with the capacity to influence over the policymaking process, but because of it. Nordic 
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governments were active participants in the broader processes which gave birth to 
freedom of information, even as they sought to resist this specific outcome. Many of the 
underlying institutional structures which produced this strange and apparently con-
tradictory situation also existed, or had functional equivalents, in all three. 
Swedish politics has been described as “deliberative, rationalistic, open, and consensu-
al” (Anton 1969:94) – a trait that appears to be common to the rest of Scandinavia, 
where phases such as “problem–solving, bargaining and self–governance” are used 
(Olsen, Roness and Sætren 1984:47, in Einhorn and Logue 1989). This does not imply an 
absence of forthright or even bitter public debates about policy; these authors are all at 
pains to distance themselves from stylised portraits of the Nordic countries as entirely 
lacking political conflict. It only implies that these conflicts are resolved in a particular 
way, relying on two potentially contradictory elements. First is an emphasis on scien-
tific evidence, embodying a presumption that “sensible people with a sufficiently long–
term perspective will support policies that are both in the general interest and in their 
particular interest” (Einhorn and Logue 1989:139). Second is widespread direct partici-
pation by interested parties, consistent with the view that the principles of universal-
ism, legal security and due process require all those whose interests are affected to 
have a chance to express their views (Pierre 2001:137). 
This style of policymaking is described in the political opportunity structures literature 
as “actively inclusive” (Dryzek, et al. 2003:Chapter 2), and “open and strong” (Kitschelt 
1986). Both draw attention to the crucial importance of the state in identifying emer-
gent conflicts, facilitating negotiation between interested parties and integrating the 
various positions into coherent policy (Einhorn and Logue 1989:137-8). The manner in 
which this occurs varies slightly from country to country, but there are sufficient simi-
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larities to make it possible to speak of a single approach. In Sweden there is frequent 
recourse to a formal mechanism of consultation known as remiss (Einhorn and Logue 
1989:120-1). In the narrow sense, this refers to the requirement under Article 10 of the 
Instrument of Government that all matters submitted to the King in Council for approval 
be prepared by seeking advice from relevant administrative offices. This need not imply 
any more than a purely formal request for advice issued by a ministry to another ad-
ministrative body, although it often involves comprehensive and pro–active consulta-
tion with affected interests. Even where consultation is limited, remiss often serves as a 
mechanism for alerting outside interests to policy proposals, because requests for ad-
vice are generally available to the public under the Tryckfrihetsförordning (Anderson 
1973:428). Another common mechanism is the committee of inquiry, especially in plac-
es like Norway where remiss is less used. The role of these inquiries is to identify and 
integrate the various competing interests into coherent policy proposals, and to that 
end they often include formal participation from non–government experts and affected 
groups. Their role is very different to the Anglo–Saxon world, where inquiries often 
serve as means of bestowing political independence on examinations of past policy fail-
ure (United Kingdom 1979a:9-10). 
The early adoption of access rights in the Western Nordic countries is largely a result of 
state reliance on these mechanisms and the pro-active incorporation of  the first wave 
of mobilisation. In Sweden, this occurred through the establishment of a Committee of 
Press Experts under a process of constitutional review which was already underway. 
This Committee delivered a report in 1944 containing a draft bill that eventually be-
came the Tryckfrihetsförordning (Sweden 2001:583-4). This law, as already noted, com-
pleted the consolidation of Sweden’s historic regime which had begun in 1937. The in-
tegration of experts in this way was not an isolated incident: concerns over the implica-
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tions of new technology and privacy were also accommodated through active inclusion 
in 1960 and 1966, and subsequently as part of the major constitutional review in the 
early 1970s (Anderson 1973:423-4 and notes; Wennergren 1983:17). 
In Denmark, several committees established immediately after the war considered the 
need for access rights. The first was the Commission on Public Administration, founded 
in 1946, which failed by the narrowest of margins to recommend in favour of access as a 
means of protecting individuals from administrative action (Anderson 1973:437; Holm 
1975:161-2; Holm 1979:77). This report revealed a stark divergence of opinion between 
officials and expert outsiders, and encouraged the Prime Minister to establish a Publici-
ty Commission in 1956 to “report on the question of whether, and in the affirmative 
case to what extent and in what manner, publicity can be carried out in state and local 
administration” (Anderson 1973:437-8). Composed of 20 members including judges, 
lawyers, journalists, civil servants and politicians, its 1963 report once again narrowly 
recommended against transparency (Holm 1979:78), but proposed extending access to 
files for parties to administrative disputes as a compromise. Once again, the minority 
was composed entirely of members of the press and outside experts. They saw this 
compromise recommendation as a tactical victory, in that it provided a basis on which 
to build public support for a right of general access (Anderson 1973:438); included in the 
minority report was a draft of what eventually became the Law on Publicity in Administra-
tion 1970 (Holm 1975:163-4). 
The process in Norway was similar. The first official recommendation in favour of ac-
cess was made by the Wold Royal Commission, established in 1951 to “investigate the 
question of more adequate procedures for public administration” (Anderson 1973:432). 
Its 1958 report called for the introduction of transparency in public administration by a 
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margin of ten to three, but this was rejected by the government, provoking a decade–
long debate on the issue – a point to which we will return in a moment (Anderson 
1973:432-3). By 1964, inaction on this issue had provoked sufficient dissatisfaction that 
the Labour government felt compelled to establish a second commission, which again 
narrowly recommended against access rights. It did, however, propose greater access to 
files related to administrative disputes as a compromise which formed the basis for the 
eventual introduction of the Law on Transparency in Administration 1970 (Einhorn 
1977:261). 
Pro-active cooptation and consultation did not entirely eliminate resistance among sen-
ior officials in any of these countries, but it did reduce the incentives to resist and re-
strict the opportunities to do so successfully. Consultation relied on pro-active dissemi-
nation of information, and also served as a functional equivalent of the Congressional 
committee system in that it provided opportunities for otherwise peripheral groups to 
make claims in ways which could not easily be dismissed or rejected by the executive. 
Here, the “inability” to exclude was more a matter of reluctance than the absence of 
capacity or institutional barriers, and was grounded in the presuppositions and strate-
gic aims of the whole system of compromise and cooptation itself. This system, it has 
been argued, evolved as a response to the prevalence of minority governments in these 
countries. In all three, post-war parliaments have been dominated by Social Democratic 
or Labour parties which, although larger than any of their rivals, have only rarely 
commanded an absolute majority of seats in the legislature in their own right. The po-
litical right, by contrast, has been composed of several right-wing parties which have 
only rarely been able to form stable coalitions. Pro-active consultation developed as a 
strategy by which the left could govern in its own right while only constituting a mi-
nority in parliament: it helped them to obtain the support they required to pass their 
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legislation on a case-by-case basis by ensuring their proposals had support from at least 
one of the right-wing parties before they were introduced into the house (Einhorn and 
Logue 1989:86-9). It also formed part of a broader strategy of incorporating potential 
opponents as a means of insuring against repeal should they ever lose power to a right–
wing coalition (Grønnegaard Christensen 2001:119). 
Despite its strategic merits, active inclusion had the signal disadvantage of making it far 
more difficult for governments, once they have begun a consultative process, to openly 
reject whatever proposals for inconvenient policies which this consultation might pro-
duce. To do so might compromise the willingness of the other parties to enter into ne-
gotiations in future; in the case of freedom of information it also ran counter to the 
whole spirit of consultation, based as it was on open communication of policy plans. 
Norwegian and Danish governments alike attempted to resist the implementation of 
full access throughout the 1960s by granting limited rights, referring bills to commit-
tees and delaying the tabling of legislation. They did not, however, block the bills which 
the right-wing parties eventually tabled out of frustration with government refusal to 
follow the recommendations of their own official commissions discussed above 
(Einhorn 1977:260; Holm 1979:104 note 3). The exception to this is Norway in he 1950s, 
where the Labour party was the majority party and thus felt itself able to reject the 
Wold Commission’s recommendation in 1958. It is no accident that the shift in its atti-
tude towards access corresponds with the onset of minority government in the early 
1960s. 
The early success of the first phase of mobilisation in the Nordic countries meant that 
access rights were already firmly entrenched by the time the environmental and con-
sumer rights movements arose. As in the USA, the prior existence of these laws benefit-
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ed these groups, although less as a basis of mobilisation than as a practical aid. In a 
comparative study of the environmental movement in four capitalist democracies, 
Dryzek et al. argue that dissatisfaction with official sensitivity to environmental con-
cerns was directly responsible for increasing interest in access to information in the 
USA and Germany in the late 1970s and 1980s. In Norway, however, this dissatisfaction 
was absent, due to an early positive official response to environmentalism which was 
itself partly a result campaigners’ effective use of access and their rights formal incor-
poration into the formal policymaking process (cf. Dryzek, et al. 2003:172, inter alia). As 
in the USA, although for different reasons, the interaction between entrenched access 
rights and the rise of new social movements thus served to reinforce the prevailing pat-
tern of open policymaking. 
Autonomous Executives and Late Transparency 
This final section of the chapter examines two countries in which the influence of pe-
ripheral interest groups over the legislative process has been limited. It shows that, in 
both Germany and the UK, this was a direct contributor to the late development of 
freedom of information. 
Passive Resistance in Germany 
A comparison between Germany and the American and Nordic cases, suggests that the 
institutional structure of the policy process can significantly influence the development 
of access rights simply by virtue of their effect on the attitudes of campaigners and per-
ceptions of appealing strategies for political reform. These conclusions are further sup-
ported by the significant points on which Germany resembles these other cases, which 
tend to eliminate possible alternative explanations. 
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Perhaps the most significant point of similarity between all these countries is that mo-
bilisation in Germany occurred in two phases of comparable composition, organisation 
and strategic goals as in the USA and Scandinavia. The first phase involved a small 
group of academics and human rights lawyers concerned at the conduct of surveillance 
and covert operations against domestic social and political movements by defence and 
national security forces. These concerns led to the foundation of the Institute for Civil 
Liberties and Public Safety by academics at the Free University of Berlin in 1978, and a 
joint campaign with the Humanist Union to advocate freedom of information as a check 
on the use of coercive state power. This activism was a significant contributor to a false 
dawn of party-political debate which occurred in the early 1980s discussed in Chapter 
Three.  
The first phase of mobilisation in Germany differed from those elsewhere in two signifi-
cant respects: it occurred later, and did not involve the press in any significant way. 
Given the importance of journalists to campaigns elsewhere, it seems possible that this 
early lack of success might be at least partly due to differences in their bases of support 
rather than opportunity structures.  
It is worth considering, however, why the German press should have been so conspicu-
ously absent, particularly given the active involvement of the German Journalists’ Asso-
ciation and the Journalists’ Union in the second phase two decades later (both were 
thanked by Green deputies following the vote; cf. Germany 2005:13948). One explana-
tion is that the constitutional and legal protections the German press enjoyed substan-
tially mitigated the development of grievances similar to those felt by journalists in the 
USA, without providing a lightning–rod for mobilisation as in Sweden. From as early as 
1948, the Policy Committee of the committee responsible for drafting the Basic Law de-
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bated the merits of a provision which would have provided the media with a right to 
official information (Wegener 2006:18 and note 57). This particular proposal was reject-
ed on grounds later used by other governments to oppose freedom of information; the 
fact it was raised at all demonstrates the sensitivity among officials of the need to make 
a break with Nazi information policy, and their recognition of the contribution a free 
press makes to a healthy democracy (Kaiser 1979:134). These concerns were eventually 
accommodated in other ways. Article 5(1) of the Basic Law enshrines the freedom of the 
press and protects the right of citizens to read publicly-available material. In addition, 
since the 1960s the State press codes have all included provisions quite similar to those 
left out of the Basic Law, requiring public authorities to respond to questions from the 
press (Bullinger 1979:226; United Kingdom 1979a:44). Even as recently as the late 1970s, 
these codes were routinely praised for their protection of access by the media to offi-
cials and their absolute prohibition on censorship (Kaiser 1979:134). They certainly 
compared quite favourably with Britain’s nominal openness circumscribed by informal 
censorship under the Official Secrets Act and the D-Notice system. In short, although the 
weakness of mobilisation in Germany may well account for the late adoption of its ac-
cess law, the weakness itself arguably has an institutional explanation. 
The second wave of mobilisation began in Germany in the mid–1980s, but really only 
became a significant consideration for parties at federal level in the mid-late 1990s. This 
phase was rooted in the environmental movement, which had identified access to offi-
cial files as a means of facilitating public deliberation and participation in planning de-
cisions and pollution control, especially concerning the construction of nuclear power 
plants. The Greens began to submit bills on the issue from the moment they entered the 
Bundestag, more as symbolic gestures than in the hope of meeting with substantive suc-
cess. One was submitted in 1985, followed by another in 1990. Real success at federal 
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level only came once the Greens entered government in coalition with the SPD, as dis-
cussed in the next chapter. 
The Greens did not find it easy to have the Informationsfreiheitsgesetz passed, but in con-
trast with the first phase these difficulties cannot plausibly be explained in terms of any 
weakness in their support. Like the USA, Germany experienced a general wave of pro-
gressive social mobilisation which started in the late 1960s among students. It flour-
ished in the 1970s, and saw the establishment of myriad new movements representing a 
wide range of post–materialist concerns including, but by no means limited to, the en-
vironmental movement. At national level, 1969 saw the election of a Social Democratic 
government under Willy Brandt, the first of the post–war era after two decades of CDU 
rule. This indicated a major shift in political opinion, and provoked serious reflection at 
élite level on the nature of political accountability and control – not least because the 
new government was anxious to assure itself of the loyalty of a bureaucracy which had 
become accustomed to serving its political opponents (Reese 1977:221-3). At a local lev-
el, there was an increased emphasis on participatory politics and so–called citizen–
orientation. This led to a range of reforms, some of which were designed to facilitate 
participation in existing political processes through the provision of information and 
rights of access to many official meetings (Holleaux 1980:192-3). 
Nor can the lack of progress in the 1980s and early 1990s be attributed to either organi-
sational weakness or the absence of laws around which to mobilise. The German green 
movement was far larger and better organised than Nader’s public interest campaigns. 
The false dawn of rights activism in the early 1980s was precipitated, in part, by the 
Council of Europe’s recommendations (1979; 1981) that all member–states establish 
rights of access to official documents. The American Freedom of Information Act also pro-
  197 
vided inspiration, but in the absence of any legal or normative requirement to harmo-
nise German law with the American its influence was minor. State-level access laws, 
which already existed in Brandenburg, Berlin, Schleswig-Holstein and North Rhine-
Westphalia, were not so much inspirations for the Federal bill as different outcomes of 
the same set of pressures: they were usually the result Green proposals, and their early 
introduction in some places was largely due to the fact that Greens entered government 
earlier there than at Federal level. The instrument which did prove important both as a 
focal point for mobilisation and as a political resource for overcoming executive re-
sistance was the Access to Environmental Information Act (Umweltsinformationsgesetz), 
which came into force in 1994 in response to a European Directive. This Directive came 
into existence despite German resistance, due to international politics within the EU 
which cannot be adequately examined here (Knill and Liefferink 2007:132-3). The intro-
duction of the Umweltsinformationsgesetz was introduced under similar circumstances to 
the Informationsfreiheitsgesetz: it was supported by the Greens, and opposed by the main 
parties and the state (Redelfs 2005:4-5). In this case, however, resistance was muted by 
the fact that a commitment to European integration is fundamental to the German 
post–war political consensus, and the Directive could not simply be ignored without 
serious political risk. Once in existence, the Umweltsinformationsgesetz provided a point 
around which advocates of freedom of information could rally (Germany 1991:4581-2), 
since it constituted a partial recognition of access to information in domestic law, and 
made it far more difficult to ignore calls for the harmonisation of German law with the 
emerging international consensus on general access rights. 
The imperatives of harmonisation with EU norms are important, but they should not be 
overstated: the introduction of access to environmental information did not fundamen-
tally transform the politics of access, and Germany has been found by the European 
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Court of Justice to be in breach of its obligations under the Directive on several occa-
sions  (Banisar 2006:78). It still took a further decade before a full general access law was 
passed; this delay must still be explained, and to do so it is essential to take account of 
the structure of the relations between parties in the parliament. 
German parties are more centralised than their American counterparts, which means 
that senior party figures exert greater control over their members and individual MPs 
have less to gain by publicly campaigning for special causes over the opposition of their 
colleagues. The Bundestag committee system, too, offers far fewer opportunities than for 
the representation of special interests – their composition generally reflects the bal-
ance of power among the parties in the house as a whole – or for the use of publicity as 
a tool of intra–Congressional politicking – around 90% of committee meetings have his-
torically taken place behind closed doors, compared with only 10% in the USA (Dalton 
1989:305). German parliamentary committees are better understood as mechanisms by 
which the main parties resolve conflicts of detail with minor parties and bureaucrats on 
policies whose main lines are already determined. These are examples of the arrange-
ments which the Greens’ use of disruptive publicity, discussed in Chapter Three, was 
designed to overturn. 
In contrast with the Nordic countries, cabinets in Germany have routinely been com-
posed of minimal winning coalitions centred around the CDU/CSU on the one hand, and 
the SPD on the other (with the FDP, and more recently the Greens, holding the balance 
of power). Incentives to pro-actively engage with emergent interest groups in order to 
ensure the passage of legislation are thus largely absent. The control of the majority  
over the legislative agenda is clearly evident in the origins and fate of bills during the 
post–war era. Most are proposed by the government, with a small and shrinking pro-
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portion of private members bills. Moreover, around 80% of executive proposals become 
law, while around 40% of private members’ bills do so (cf. Dalton 1989:307-13). It is no 
accident that the Informationsfreiheitsgesetz was passed only when its active supporters 
became part of the government; this was, arguably, the only way it could have done so. 
Cooptation and Active Exclusion in The United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom presents several informative contrasts with the countries dis-
cussed above. Like Germany, it was a late adopter of freedom of information, passing a 
law only in 2000. Unlike Germany and the Nordic countries, this delay was largely due 
to the active efforts of senior officials and members of the political executive, who suc-
cessfully isolated and undercut its proponents. A comparison with the USA confirms 
that centralised authority  in formal institutions and the parties was a vital contributor 
to this autonomous control of the policy agenda. 
In the UK, as elsewhere, the first to explicitly advocate freedom of information were 
journalists and members of parliament (especially Liberal Democrats and backbench 
members of the Labour Party), progressive lawyers and academics. Although the inten-
sity of support varied everywhere inversely with the degree of organisation among the-
se constituencies, and with seniority in those organisations, in the UK these tendencies 
were much more pronounced. Many individual lawyers were extremely supportive of 
thoroughgoing reform, but the British branch of the International Commission of Ju-
rists’ 1978 report in favour of access embodied the “minimalist” approach (Marsh 
1987:279). Similarly, the press was criticised by campaigners for not pursuing the cause 
of access as forthrightly as they might have done (CFOI 1989b; 1989a), but this criticism 
appears only partly justified in retrospect. It is certainly true that the press as a whole 
did not pro-actively organise to campaign for a right of access, but on the other hand 
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there is a long tradition of individual political reporters giving prominent support, and 
the editorial lines taken by the Times in the late 1970s and the Guardian in the late 1990s 
were also distinctly positive. 
The grievances which lay behind this early mobilisation were essentially the same as 
elsewhere. As in America, the British government retained and extended wartime 
mechanisms for controlling official information. The two cornerstones of this system 
were the Official Secrets Act and the Defence Notice system. Officially, D–Notices were a 
voluntary arrangement by which the government made the media aware of national 
security concerns which should not be the subject of reporting (Defence, Press and 
Broadcasting Committee, in United Kingdom 1972b:241-2). This was reflected in joint 
administration by representatives of the media and government through the Services, 
Press and Broadcasting Committee (Winslow and Dwyer 1988). Outside officialdom, it 
was nevertheless considered a means of covert censorship from at least the late 1960s 
onwards (Wraith 1979:204-5). Dissatisfaction ran particularly high among journalists, 
for reasons which ranged from high democratic principle to self-interested suspicion 
that claims of national security were being used to justify withholding information 
merely to avoid political embarrassment (e.g. Editorial Liaison Committee of the 
Newspaper Society, Guild of British Newspaper Editors and Newspaper Conference, in 
United Kingdom 1972b:246 et sqq; Press Council, in United Kingdom 1972d:194 et sqq). 
First phase campaigners successfully established freedom of information as a topic of 
debate in élite circles, but were far less successful in achieving concrete reform than 
their counterparts in the USA and Sweden due to the greater control which the party 
hierarchies have exercised over the institutional opportunities on which they relied. 
The high degree of discipline in both main parties throughout the post–war era means 
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that the parliamentary committee system in the UK has usually served as a mechanism 
for the formalised approval of policy decided in advance by the executive; parliament 
usually plays a very limited role in the development of policy or the integration of ex-
ternal demands in the normal course of events. Discipline ensures that the nature and 
composition of the committees and their subcommittees is under the control of the 
parties, rather than that of the Committee chairs or the House in its own right. The 
consequence was is that an access law was extraordinarily unlikely without the support 
of at least one of the two major parties. It is no surprise,  that the earliest activists be-
gan by campaigning within the Labour Party to have it adopted as formal policy, as not-
ed in earlier chapters, rather than by setting up an independent campaign organisation 
as in the USA. Nor is it particularly surprising that these efforts focussed on Labour ra-
ther than the Conservatives. Although both parliamentary parties are usually highly-
disciplined, within the broader party organisation the Labour central executive exerts 
less control over the formulation of the party programme than its Conservative coun-
terpart due to the greater emphasis on democracy in its constitution. Resolutions 
adopted at the Labour Party Conference, for example, become part of the party’s official 
programme (Kingdom 1991:229-38). 
Widespread use of private members’ bills, which stand far less chance of success as a 
matter or course, only really began in the late 1970s once it became clear that the La-
bour party hierarchy was unwilling to follow through on the commitments it had been 
obliged to adopt. Here, too, discipline in the (parliamentary) party was a significant 
contributor to  slow progress. Three freedom of information bills were brought forward 
between 1977 and 1979, and the closest any came to being passed was the last (which 
received a second reading but was still in committee when the government fell). Senior 
labour party figures such as Callaghan had made their lack of sympathy for access clear 
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over the years, and the executive’s control of the Commons agenda meant it could use 
procedural mechanisms to avoid being forced into explicitly voting against proposals 
with strong democratic credentials and considerable popular appeal (Times 1976; 
Hennessy 1978). 
Mobilisation broadened in the early 1980s, much as they had done in the USA in the 
mid–1970s. Peripheral members of political-professional groups were now joined by a 
range of public interest groups concerned with the impact of official secrecy on the ef-
fective regulation of pollution, consumer health, housing and food safety (Seymour-Ure 
1977:174-5). The Campaign for Freedom of Information, founded in 1984, was symbolic 
of this demographic shift: the initiative came from the public interest movement 
(United Kingdom 1998a:71), but it was very much an alliance rather than a takeover, 
and members of the earlier groups remained important. 
The public interest movement in the UK supported access rights for similar strategic 
and tactical reasons as in the USA: it was a means of reforming the policymaking pro-
cess in a more participatory direction, and of overcoming its exclusion from certain 
policy domains due to industry capture of regulators. This concern can be seen in the 
substantive focus of the Campaign: defence and high affairs of state were discussed 
(Goldberg 1987:45), but were essentially used as a means of raising the organisation’s 
public profile (Wilson 1984). The real focus was asymmetries of information and power 
in routine interactions between citizens and administration. The Campaign’s real tar-
gets were waste, maladministration and even outright corruption in areas such as local 
administration, housing and planning (Bailey 1984), threats to self–determination 
which flowed from secret files held by schools, universities and health providers 
(Frankel 1984a), and the role of secrecy in allowing industry to pollute by preventing 
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prevented the market from identifying polluters and factoring these costs into its valu-
ations (Frankel 1984b). 
The Campaign for Freedom of Information was an important contributor to the intro-
duction of the Freedom of Information Act 2000, but its impact was determined by the pre-
vailing attitude of Cabinet. Its relative lack of success in the 1980s, compared with the 
public interest movement in the USA certainly cannot be plausibly attributed to having 
adopted different tactics: the founding members of the Campaign were directly inspired 
by Nader and were, if anything, even more willing to use publicity ; founding Chair Des 
Wilson was disparagingly described as more of a media campaigner rather than a true 
environmentalist by colleagues in other organisations (Weston 1989:88). On the specific 
issue of freedom of information, the frosty reception the Campaign received from the 
Thatcher government has already been discussed. Its response was to pursue piecemeal 
reform via private members’ bills (CFOI 1993a), and although the Campaign benefited 
from a singularly good run of luck its success was also a result of the government’s will-
ingness to let these bills pass after extracting concessions to protect the its own power 
(Tant 1990). That the government was willing to resist proposals for relaxing the gov-
ernments’ control over information in general was abundantly clear: Richard Shep-
herd’s bill proposing to narrow the scope of Section 2 of the Official Secrets Act was de-
feated in 1988 on a three-line whip (Lewis 1989), while Mark Fisher’s Right to Know Bill 
was “talked out” (filibustered) in 1993. . In a similar manner to the German Greens, the 
Campaign only began to meet with substantial success when it became an insider, for 
reasons which have already been touched upon in Chapter Three and which are further 
discussed in the next two. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed mobilisation in favour of access rights by domestic non–
governmental actors in four consolidated democracies.  It has shown that the substan-
tive success of movements in four countries depended to a very large extent on the un-
derlying openness of the policy system rather than the strength of mobilisation or the 
tactics adopted by advocates. In all the four, supporters were drawn from similar pro-
fessional groups, had similar aims, adopted similar strategies of using media and public-
ity campaigns to compensate for their relative resource poverty, , and were often able 
to point to failings in existing laws as justifications for their positions. Despite these 
similarities, however, legislation followed at different rates in different countries. 
Where institutional conditions were particularly sympathetic, as in the USA and the 
Nordic countries, advocates met with early success without needing to establish formal 
campaign organisations. In these countries, success begat success: the importance of 
information as a means of coordinating an increasingly complex policy process led to 
the development of well–entrenched lobbies advocating amendments to keep pace with 
changing circumstances, and opposing repeal. Where politicians were able to ignore or 
resist outside pressure, even highly-organised campaigns with widespread support  met 
with little success until the attitudes of Cabinet ministers became more sympathetic. In 
the case of Germany, this was because the Greens themselves took office; in the UK, it 
was the result of changes within the Labour party.  
France has not been examined here because civil society pressure for reform was prac-
tically nonexistent, but the available evidence suggests it does not contradict these 
claims. As the previous chapter noted, the 1978 law was made possible by a temporary 
loss of presidential control over the legislative agenda due to a breakdown of discipline 
within the ruling right-wing coalition, combined with advocacy of access from within 
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the state. That this opportunity was not exploited by civil society cannot be attributed 
to the absence of potential advocates, or a lack of awareness of the uses of information 
in general as a tool of mobilisation. Academics had been writing on administrative se-
crecy since before the war (Moderne 2003:19-20), and an active consumer rights move-
ment had existed since the early 20th Century, which explicitly sought to empower 
consumers by distributing product information (Marcus-Steiff 1977). It seems possible, 
however that this lack of interest might be the result of adaptive expectations to the 
lack of opportunity which generally prevails in France. The Fifth Republic offers few 
avenues for civil society organisations to articulate policy demands which officials find 
unwelcome (Kitschelt 1986). The Constitution was designed both to protect the execu-
tive from parliamentary scrutiny and to give it an unprecedented degree of control 
over the legislature (Keeler 1993). This lies atop a long tradition of étatist or “heroic” 
policymaking in which officials impose policies then negotiate with affected interests 
during implementation (Schmidt 1999). Furthermore, studies of official secrecy often 
argue that French interest groups tend to accept official secrecy because they rely 
heavily on the state, not just to integrate various competing demands but to provide 
resources with which they overcome the challenges of internal collective organisation 
(Manor 1977:238). Consistent with this pattern of dependence, it’s the state’s relations 
with civil society only appear to have been relevant through scattered official concerns 
at the way state secrecy affected its ability to coordinate economic policy with unions 
and businesses (Boulard 1979:167; Rowat 1983:36). State-economy relations are the sub-
ject of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 6: Relations between 
the State and Core Interest 
Groups 
The previous chapter considered how the unequal distribution of policy-relevant re-
sources influences the development of freedom of information. The concept of the poli-
cy network was used to argue that support for access is likely to be strongest among 
peripheral groups, and that the ability of the executive to control the legislative process 
is an important determinant of whether laws are passed. It showed that there have 
been two main sources of civil society pressure for change: well-connected professional 
groups with a personal stake in official information, and new social movements inter-
ested in harnessing the power of the state to solve the environmental and political side-
effects of large–scale industrial production. 
This chapter24 builds on the previous one in two ways. Firstly, it continues to examine 
relations between the state and external interest groups. Here, however, the focus is on 
the effects of differing structures at the core of policy networks rather than relations 
between periphery and core. Secondly, it builds on the insight that conflict over rela-
tions between the state and producer interests were a major focus of the second wave 
of civil society mobilisation. It considers the implications for freedom of information of 
seeing that the consolidated democracies are not just democratic, they are also capital-
ist, and capitalist interests are at the core of many of the most important policy net-
works. 
                                                                           
 
24 An earlier version of this chapter was published in the October 2010 edition of Government Information Quarterly 
as Who Pays the Piper? The Political Economy of Freedom of Information (McClean 2010). 
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This chapter is divided into three parts. The first argues that, in principle, the neo–
corporatism (the formal integration of comprehensive, centralised economic interest 
groups into the policy–making process) should delay the introduction of access laws. 
The second shows that this prediction is consistent with two archetypically–contrasting 
real–world political economies: the USA and Germany. The third uses two apparently 
divergent cases – Sweden and the United Kingdom – to consider the limits of political 
economy as an explanation, and how these factors might interact with the more 
straightforwardly political factors which are usually invoked to explain the develop-
ment of information rights. 
The Economic Value of Transparency 
The idea of invoking political economy to explain why the capitalist democracies have 
adopted on freedom of information at different times might seem a little surprising to 
those familiar with the historical sources. These mostly describe its origins in the polit-
ical terms which have been the focus of the previous chapters: struggles by democrati-
cally–inspired civil society campaigners, journalists and the occasional politician 
against a bureaucracy clinging resolutely to its traditional habits and privileges. This 
account is not to be discarded lightly, for all the reasons which have already been ex-
plored, but nor should it be accepted uncritically. 
The invocation of political economy may be rare among protagonists, but it is not com-
pletely without precedent in the academic literature. The diffusion of freedom of in-
formation to Eastern Europe and to South–East Asia during the 1990s has been ex-
plained as a response to pressure from transnational financial interests and the func-
tional requirements of increasingly integrated international markets (Blanton 1995; 
Florini 1998:56; Blanton 2002a; Lord 2006:5-10; Florini 2007b:5-10 et sqq.). One promi-
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nent recent example is the introduction of various reforms in China as part of its acces-
sion to the WTO (Economist 2007; Horsley 2007). Economic factors have also been linked 
to the development of information rights in the consolidated democracies, but there is 
less consensus on the nature of the relationship or its effects. The diffusion of data pro-
tection is at least partly a result of pressure on laggard governments from businesses 
eager not to lose opportunities for the cross–border transfer of personal information 
(Bennett 2001; Warren and Dearnley 2005). This suggests that the influence of economic 
interests is at least possible in the case of freedom of information, perhaps through a 
“spill-over” effect (Aaronson and Abouharb 2011:381), but since this policy affects the 
core interests of the bureaucratic state in ways which data protection does not, the 
mechanisms involved must be specified and justified in their own right. There is con-
siderable evidence that economic norms and the defence of private commercial inter-
ests have regularly served as justifications for resistance among officials to the imple-
mentation disclosure laws once they are in place (e.g. Roberts 2006a), but the question 
of whether this illuminates their origins has not yet been explored.  
The Political Power of Capital 
The claim that political economy is relevant to the development of freedom of infor-
mation is predicated on two assumptions: that economic groups have an interest in 
public rights of access to official information, and that they enjoy sufficient influence 
over the policy process to act on that interest.  
The idea that capitalist interests influence democratic governments is widely–accepted, 
although the precise manner in which this power is exercised has been the subject of 
long–running and heated debates. The subordination of the state to the needs of capital 
in general, identifiable capitalists in particular, or both is central to the various strands 
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of Marxian political thought (see, for example, the famous debate between Miliband 
1969; and Poulantzas 1973; for a more general overview see Jessop 1977). This debate is 
voluminous enough in its own right, and it is only one part of a literature too vast to be 
addressed here. Happily, there is no need to do so; for present purposes, one need only 
accept that producers enjoy two distinct, mutually–reinforcing advantages in their re-
lations with democratic states. Firstly, individual producers or producer groups are in a 
strong position when they are forced to compete with others for the attention of poli-
cymakers due to the financial and human capital at their disposal. (Lindblom 1977:175-
7). Secondly, producer interests occupy a position of considerable structural power 
which means their needs may well be taken into account without the need to organise 
or resort to explicit campaigning at all (Lindblom 1977:170-188,189-200). This is partly 
because capitalist states depend on the private economy for revenue to fund their op-
erations. Although individual firms may not be particularly powerful in their own right, 
in aggregate their decisions on investment, employment and production determine the 
size of the government’s tax base (Jessop 1977:336). It is therefore difficult for govern-
ments to consistently act against the interests of major producer groups; in fact, the 
mere threat that firms will stop investing may well be enough to induce changes in pol-
icy. The likelihood of substantial, long-term divergences between government policy 
and the collective interests of firms is particularly remote in democratic countries, 
where the prospects of a government’s re-election often largely depend on recent eco-
nomic performance. 
Predictability and Control under Capitalist Democracy 
The idea that producers might have an interest in controlling the state is likewise hard-
ly controversial. Weber himself argued that the development of capitalism and bureau-
cratic public administration were mutually-reinforcing phenomena in Europe in the 
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early modern era, and that this was partly due to the specific requirements of large-
scale industrial production oriented towards a mass market: 
Industrial capitalism must be able to count on the continuity, trustworthiness and ob-
jectivity of the legal order, and on the rational, predictable functioning of legal and ad-
ministrative agencies. Otherwise those guarantees of predictability are absent that are 
indispensable for the large industrial enterprise. They are especially weak in patrimo-
nial states with a low degree of stereotyped operations; conversely, they exist at an op-
timum under modern bureaucratism (Weber 1968b:1095). 
This basic interest in predictable government is likely to have become more pressing 
over the course of the 20th Century, and to have expressed itself specifically in terms of 
access to official information, due to several changes to the state which occurred during 
this period. The first of these is the dramatic expansion of administrative regulation 
examined in Chapter Four. Firms have a similar interest to citizens in accessing official 
information: it helps to defend themselves against administrative capriciousness and 
error. Like other interest groups, firms also have an interest in obtaining favourable 
policies in areas such as the regulation of industrial production, labour relations and 
product markets, and the implementation of investment programmes and macroeco-
nomic financial management. Predictability is particularly important where production 
requires considerable up-front investment, since investors are likely to be sensitive to 
sudden reversals of government policy which affect the profitability of past invest-
ments. Advance notice of regulatory changes makes it easier to protect against this risk 
(Grønnegaard Christensen 2001:119). 
Although most of the broader literature on the power of capital focuses on its influence 
over politics, access to information specifically about administrative behaviour has ar-
guably become particularly important over this period, due to the manner in which 
state expansion was accomplished. Most governments have made widespread use of so-
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called “framework” legislation, which sets the broad parameters of policy and delegates 
power to flesh out the specifics to administrative authorities. Delegation has increased 
the importance of departments and agencies as first-order participants in the policy 
process, and hence the importance for producer groups of being able to understand and 
influence them. . In addition, large interventionist states are costly to run, and provide 
numerous opportunities for corruption and mismanagement. Officials who know their 
decisions and actions could be scrutinized at any time by outsiders are likely to antici-
pate criticism and act to avoid it by (Prat 2006). This so-called “law of anticipated reac-
tions” is often argued to make governments more efficient by discouraging waste, and 
more honest by increasing the risks of corrupt behaviour. Even if corruption sometimes 
benefits individual firms which are able to establish favoured relations with regulators, 
an honest, transparent state is usually understood to be in the interests of the capitalist 
class as a whole insofar as it reduces the uncertainty of what must be paid in return for 
reliable government service. 
The Institutional Sources of Variation 
The influence of capitalists and their interest in predictable government could easily 
combine to produce widespread, decisive support for freedom of information, but the 
extent to which this occurs in practice is likely to vary considerably. Individual firms 
may well benefit from being able to protect or further their interests by obtaining offi-
cial information. But the appeal of general, legal access rights is likely to be offset by 
the fact that increasing state regulation of the economy means that sensitive infor-
mation about firms which appears in official files may be exposed to competing or hos-
tile interests. The previous chapter identified environmentalists and public interest 
campaigners as competitors in the policymaking process, and showed that they advo-
cate access rights precisely because they assist in pursuing aims which are hostile to the 
  212 
basic interests of industrial manufacturers. Competition is not just political, however, it 
is also economic – firms may be harmed by the exposure of information collected by the 
state to competitors operating in the same market, to suppliers, or to those operating in 
different sectors with conflicting structural interests. 
The manner in which firms as a group are organised is likely to be of considerable im-
portance in determining whether they consider the benefits of freedom of information 
to outweigh the costs, whether they can reach consensus on the issue, and whether 
they are able to exert significant influence over public officials in pursuit of that con-
sensus. To demonstrate why, it is convenient to adopt the conventional distinction in 
the literature on comparative political economy between coordinated, organised or 
neo–corporatist economies on the one hand, and disorganised, liberal or pluralist econ-
omies on the other. 
Perhaps because the distinction between pluralism and neo–corporatism has been so 
widely-employed for so long, there exists a range of different views on how it should be 
drawn (Schmitter 1981; Lehmbruch 1984; Maier 1984; Regini 1984; Crouch 1993; Archer 
1995; Hall 1999; Soskice 1999). There is, however, broad agreement that the relevant cri-
teria are the manner in which economic actors are organise collectively, and the degree 
of formality in their relations with the state. Neo–corporatism is characterized by the 
existence of “a limited number of singular, compulsory, non–competitive interest 
groups which are granted a representational monopoly in their functional areas by the 
state in exchange for control of their members’ demands and support for the political 
system” (Pallesen 2006:133 paraphrasing Schmitter 1979). Under pluralism, interest 
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groups are multiple, voluntary and compete with one another for the attention of gov-
ernment, and official grants of monopoly over representation are absent.25 
The main claim of this chapter is that, all other things being equal, neo–corporatist 
countries should be slow to introduce freedom of information acts. This is partly be-
cause mechanisms of economic coordination provide alternative, institutional means of 
balancing the need for predictable, responsive government with the risks of exposure 
to hostile or competitive interests entailed by exposure to the state. In these countries, 
policy relevant to economic interest groups is developed through formal, ongoing ne-
gotiations between their representatives and officials. These negotiations provide op-
portunities for the participants to exchange information about intentions, preferences 
and attitudes; indeed, this exchange is sometimes cited as one of their principal benefits 
(Meijer 1969). Furthermore, government participation in these negotiations represents 
a commitment, even if only implicit, to honour, facilitate and (if necessary) enforce the 
agreements which are reached by all the parties. Indeed, bargains between employers 
and unions in highly coordinated economies frequently include commitments by the 
government to introduce laws, policies or programmes which facilitate cooperation be-
tween purely economic actors. In a sense, these negotiations serve not merely to make 
government action more predictable but more controllable, a significantly greater ben-
efit. 
                                                                           
 
25 The arguments developed in the previous chapter and this one are similar in many respects. It is worth noting that 
they are not, however, strictly of the same order. “Neo-corporatism” and “pluralism” are generally applied to mac-
ro-political structures, while the concept of the policy network developed out of a critique of the generalisations 
this entails, and is self-consciously a meso-level construct. Nevertheless, there are obvious similarities between the 
concepts: neo-corporatism shares much with the concept of the “policy community” – a network with a dominant 
core – and pluralism with the “issue network” – a network in which the core is either weak or entirely absent. One 
might define neo-corporatism in the language of policy networks as the situation which obtains when the most im-
portant economic networks are communities with rigid and exclusive cores composed of highly-organised actors 
with officially-recognised representative status (cf. Offe 1981).  
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Neo–corporatism should not merely obviate the perceived need for legal rights of ac-
cess, it should actually make the most powerful interest groups more hostile to its in-
troduction while simultaneously placing them in a better position to act on that hostili-
ty. One reason for this was touched on in the previous chapter: holding an officially–
designated representational monopoly places employers and unions firmly in the net-
work core, thus placing them at a significant advantage compared with peripheral in-
terest groups when it comes to influencing many policy decisions. The knowledge of 
and access to government which these negotiations provide is a scarce, and hence valu-
able, power resource, and its beneficiaries have an interest in resisting liberalisation of 
access where it would dilute their own influence compared with those who do not enjoy 
it. These beneficiaries include, most obviously, the firms and unions who are represent-
ed in negotiations and whose interests bargaining is ultimately intended to serve. But it 
applies more strongly still to the peak industry associations which do the actual repre-
senting, because direct access to government constitutes as a power resource in their 
relations with their own members as well. Since peak bodies are the conduits by which 
members obtain the privileges of neo–corporatism, access is contingent on member-
ship, and the associations can use it as a selective incentive to discipline members and 
discourage defections. 
In addition to their effects on economic interest groups, neo-corporatist arrangements 
are likely to be associated with particularly strong resistance to access rights among 
public officials. The relatively greater difficulty which non-producer groups face in ob-
taining information about important policy decisions may officials by reducing the 
range of different demands to which they are exposed, and to which they are obliged to 
respond – a benefit explicitly mentioned in Pallesen’s definition cited above. In addi-
tion, close ongoing cooperation between producer groups and the state will probably 
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encourage the development of a sense of shared perspective, and a blurring of percep-
tions of where the interests of officials stop and the producers begin; officials may mis-
take the interests of capital for their own, and capitalists come to share the bureaucra-
cy’s propensity for secrecy. 
The hypothesis that neo–corporatism should delay the introduction of freedom of in-
formation has at least two possible corollaries. The first is that most of the early 
adopters should be pluralist. 
It might be wondered why a pluralist economy should encourage freedom of infor-
mation rather than the establishment of coordination mechanisms which would pro-
vide firms with privileged access. One possible answer lies in a combination of institu-
tional inertia, complementarities and adaptive expectations on the part of the interest-
ed parties, which together lead to these two varieties of capitalism forming dynamically 
self–sustaining wholes. The clearest contemporary version of this argument is made by 
the Varieties of Capitalism school, which posits that firms in an idealised capitalist econ-
omy face problems of collective coordination in five domains: industrial relations, voca-
tional education and training, corporate governance, supply and product markets, and 
employee relations (Hall and Soskice 2001; Thelen 2001:6-7). In each of these domains, 
they can solve these problems in one of two ideal-typical ways: market competition or 
formal negotiation. It is logically possible for firms, either individually or collectively, 
to adopt different strategies in each of these domains, but they usually adopt similar 
strategies in any given domain, and complementary strategies across different domains 
– perhaps because doing so lowers transaction and coordination costs. This has two im-
plications, which are effectively specific instances of the more general predictions of 
historical institutionalism discussed in Chapter Two. The first is the existence of only a 
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few distinct varieties of capitalism rather than a plethora of different models displaying 
the full spectrum of possible combinations of coordination strategies. The second is the 
persistence of cross-national distinctions over time, even if their specific features 
evolve, since firms are likely to react to new stresses in ways which minimise disruption 
to their investments in existing arrangements in unaffected domains. This suggests that 
policy innovations are more likely to succeed where they make incremental modifica-
tions to – and are consistent with – existing arrangements. 
With this in mind, one reason a pluralist economy may encourage a positive preference 
for formal, general rights of access is the greater degree of uncertainty which prevails 
in relations between the state and economic interest groups. The absence of a formal 
representational monopoly means that neither individual firms nor industry associa-
tions are able to reliably influence the development and implementation of specific pol-
icies to the same degree as their counterparts in neo–corporatist countries. Public offi-
cials still have compelling structural reasons to pay attention to economic concerns, of 
course, and may still seek advice on specific proposals. But they do so because it repre-
sents sound politics rather than out of any formal obligation, and from the perspective 
of firms there is no guarantee this will occur. When favourable policies are put in place 
in these countries, their future is often also uncertain because the government may 
subsequently change its mind or fall under the influence of hostile interest groups. The 
greater unpredictability of public policy in pluralist economies means firms tend to be 
much more wary of entering into long–term commitments with the state, especially 
commitments which require them cede autonomy over economic decision-making. Le-
gal rights of access to information are more likely to find favour because they meet the 
need for making the state predictable without requiring this sacrifice. 
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A second reason why pluralism should favour the emergence of formal legal rights de-
rives from the greater degree of competition between firms themselves. Although firms 
under pluralism are generally wary of entering into binding commitments with the 
state, it is by no means uncommon for close informal ties to develop between regulators 
and the regulated. This is particularly common in sectors where the state is a major 
economic actor in its own right, such as defence where government departments are 
often by far the most significant purchasers. It is easy to imagine how tacit collusion of 
this kind could be seen by both the producers and regulators involved as mutually-
beneficial. The greater degree of economic fragmentation and political competition im-
plied by pluralism means, however, that these arrangements are also likely to exclude 
at least some producers in addition to the consumer and non–economic interest groups 
discussed in Chapter Five. From a systemic point of view, freedom of information 
should arise earlier in pluralist countries because it represents an acceptable compro-
mise between self–interest and risk in this situation. Transparency does not provide the 
same degree of influence over government as informal collusion, at least for those lucky 
enough to be on the inside of such arrangements. It does, however, serve to make gov-
ernment more predictable while mitigating some of the effects of  collusive arrange-
ments arising between the state and one’s competitors. 
The second corollary of late adoption among neo-corporatist countries is that pluralist 
countries, as a group, should exhibit greater variation in their adoption of freedom of 
information than neo–corporatist countries. This is partly because competition and the 
absence of strong peak associations, although they may be more favourable to the de-
velopment of a positive preference for freedom of information on the part of individual 
firms, are paradoxically less favourable to the development of coherent collective poli-
cy positions among firms as a whole. It is also because the absence of formal integration 
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into the policymaking process weakens their capacity to decisively influence policy 
outcomes, no matter what their preferences may be. In pluralist countries, the relation-
ship between economic interests and freedom of information is likely to be weaker, and 
more contingent on other factors such as constitutional structure, prevailing political 
circumstances and the strength of competing interests. 
Pluralist and Corporatist Exemplars 
In the literature on neo–corporatism, the USA is usually described as the archetypal 
pluralist economy, while Germany is an exemplar of neo–corporatism (Thelen and 
Kume 1999:479-83; Hall and Soskice 2001:19). The timing of legislation in these two 
countries is consistent with the predicted differences between these two types of econ-
omy. The USA was one of the first to adopt a comprehensive access law, while Germany 
was one of the last consolidated democracies to do so. More importantly, in each case 
the history of attempts to introduce access laws, and the processes by which this right 
was eventually established, support the claim that this difference is attributable to the 
preferences and actions of firms as mediated by the institutional structure of the politi-
cal economy. 
Neo–corporatism in Germany 
In Germany, highly–organized employer associations and unions negotiate with each 
other and with a federal state which, in its sphere of constitutionally–defined responsi-
bility, is coherent, centralised and enjoys a well–deserved reputation for expertise, pro-
fessionalism and effectiveness. 
Consistent with expectations, the German federal government has historically proved 
quite willing to share considerable amounts of information with designated representa-
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tive associations (Reese 1977:231). This structured approach to the distribution of polit-
ically–salient information at the national level is complemented at firm level by the 
presence of worker representatives on supervisory boards, a system which effectively 
addresses many local economic issues separately from the political system.26 Strictly 
speaking, both industry associations and worker representatives have a duty to pre-
serve the secrecy of confidential information they receive through these channels, but 
it appears to be widely–accepted that their role as representatives implies communica-
tion with their constituents (Bullinger 1979:224,29-30). The trend since the 1990s to-
wards a loosening of national coordination and greater variation between the bargains 
in each sector (sometimes called “lean corporatism” or “network governance”; cf. 
Traxler, et al. 2002:303) has not radically affected the role of these structures as privi-
leged mechanisms of communication. In fact, if anything, the importance of neo–
corporatist arrangements as privileged conduits for information, and hence as facilita-
tors of coordination and consensus between unions, employers and the state, is increas-
ing even as the degree of variation between arrangements reached in different sectors 
also increases (Culpepper 2002:776-9). 
Also consistent with expectations, the close relationship between firms and the federal 
state was associated with the late development of a range of access rights in Germany. 
Official resistance to a whole range of information rights was attributed concern that it 
would not only compromise personal privacy, but damage important economic princi-
ples like commercial confidentiality (Bullinger 1979:219-22; Wieland 2000:98-9; Capitant 
2003:169-70). This cannot simply be dismissed as bureaucrats defending their own in-
terests by invoking of whatever justifications were likely to be most convincing: there is 
                                                                           
 
26 Industrial democracy, in the form of works councils and employee representation on supervisory boards, has been 
present in some German industries – notably coal and steel - throughout the post-war era. The Co-Determination 
Law (Mitbestimmungsgesetz) of 1976 made this a requirement for all companies with more than 2,000 employees. 
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a good deal of evidence that economic interests, and pressure from industry associa-
tions, were important independent contributors. Press reports suggest, for example, 
that corporations and representative associations opposed several specific-purpose dis-
closure laws covering environmental and consumer information during the 1980s and 
1990s, on the grounds that these laws would have laid them open to more effective di-
rect pressure by social movements (e.g. Ten 1994). 
The importance of relations between producer interests and the state in underpinning 
resistance to access can also be seen in the discourse and strategy adopted during the 
second phase of mobilisation discussed in Chapter Five. The earliest formal proposal for 
an access law was made by the Greens soon after emerging as a significant force in the 
Bundestag (Germany 1986a). The ostensible purpose of this bill was to increase public 
participation in decisions about pollution management (Germany 1986b:19097). In the 
German context, this constituted a dual attack on economic interests, since it targeted 
both polluters and the neo-corporatist system as a whole. It was strongly resisted by 
important sections of the business community including the insurance industry 
(Germany 1986b:19097), and its effect on relations with employers was specifically cited 
by the CDU government as a reason for opposing it (Germany 1986b:19099). This first 
bill was referred to the Bundestag’s Home Affairs Committee and never re-emerged, but 
it set the pattern for debates over subsequent proposals. The bill which eventually be-
came the Informationsfreiheitsgesetz began as a ministry draft rather than a party pro-
posal; it was widely-criticised by activists for its extensive protection of business secrets 
(cf. Schwanitz 2005), and by the Department of Commerce and the Ministry of Econom-
ics and Technology on economic grounds (Redelfs and Leif 2004:22-3). The insurance 
industry appears to have been a particularly consistent opponent (Redelfs 2005:30), 
lobbying the government to have the bill removed from the Bundestag agenda at the 
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last minute (Grimberg 2005). In the final vote, the CDU opposed it on similar grounds to 
those it had invoked nearly twenty years earlier, although since it was in opposition at 
this time, it did so to no avail. 
The Informationsfreiheitsgesetz was eventually passed over the combined resistance of the 
bureaucracy and important sections of the business community, which clearly shows 
that neither are all–powerful even in Germany. The context within which this occurred 
are worthy of attention, because it too tends to support the claim that the close, coop-
erative relationship between economic interests and the state delayed the law. 
It is significant, firstly, that the law passed following a period when German neo–
corporatism was under considerable pressure. In the face of increasing international 
competition, a rift opened between small–to–medium enterprises and large manufac-
turers in the 1990s, with the latter strongly supporting the continuation of high–level 
collective bargaining but the former calling for mechanisms which were cheaper and 
provided greater flexibility at a local level. Outright defections from employer associa-
tions were rare and short–lived, and there was never any serious prospect of a shift to 
Anglo-Saxon style pluralism (Thelen and Kume 1999:487-492), but this dissensus was 
nevertheless indicative of a system under strain. 
At more or less the same time, the state itself came under increasing pressure from sev-
eral quarters. The cost to of reunification, increasing international capital mobility, and 
a reduction in the state’s margin of fiscal manoeuvre under the terms European mone-
tary union provided fertile soil for critiques of the German public sector and the Ger-
man model more generally (Blanton 2002a). To this was added pressure from interna-
tional government organizations such as the OECD and the EU for Germany to “mod-
ernize” its administration and “harmonize” with international norms. This included, 
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among other things, introducing an access law (Wieland 2000:92 et sqq). In response, 
the CDU adopted a largely rhetorical program of reform in the early-mid 1990s which 
was broadly inspired by New Public Management (discussed in the next chapter); this 
was adapted an adopted form by the SPD under Schroeder from 1998 onwards. 
The partial loosening of the ties that bound the German political economy together do 
not appear to have seriously affected the attitudes of the main producer groups towards 
the privileged channels of communication and influence they enjoyed with govern-
ment. They do, however, go some way towards explaining why Greens were successful 
in having the Informationsfreiheitsgesetz passed in the 2000s when they had not been in 
the 1980s or 1990s. To be sure, a major contributor was the fact that they entered gov-
ernment as a partner in the Red/Green Coalition. But the SPD was widely-understood to 
have been less than enthusiastic (Redelfs 2005:34), and it still needs to be explained why 
it eventually supported the 2004 law. The mere fact that the Greens insisted on com-
mitments to freedom of information in the coalition agreements does not appear to 
have been a factor (SPD-Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 1998; 2002). Despite the existence of 
several model laws in earlier Green bills, negotiations between the parties dragged on 
for six years, during which one bill was rejected by the Home Affairs Committee, and 
work on the second was almost abandoned due to the 2002 general election (Germany 
2005:16953). 
The SPD’s “enabling state” reform agenda, one which implied reforms that would move 
Germany in a pluralist direction - is a possible explanation for its eventual support for 
freedom of information. As the next chapter shows, similar reforms were contributors 
to the introduction of freedom of information in other late adopters, notably the United 
Kingdom. Within Germany, the other major constituency supporting freedom of infor-
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mation was composed of advocates of neoliberalism. Chief among these was the Ber-
telsmann Foundation, which is widely seen within Germany as the main proponent of 
neoliberalism (Lietz 2003). Access rights were thus, somewhat paradoxically, supported 
by two groups at opposite ends of the political spectrum while being opposed by the 
centre. This strange alignment of interests was not the result of chance political cir-
cumstances; it reveals the fundamental, long-standing importance of the kinds of eco-
nomic structures targeted by neoliberal reform in underpinning German resistance to 
access rights. The Greens themselves had once advocated freedom of information as 
part of a proposal for administrative reform which adopted language strongly reminis-
cent of New Public Management on at least one occasion prior to entering government 
(Germany 1994). That similar ideas may also have been at work within the SPD is sug-
gested by the fact that its representatives felt it necessary to defend themselves against 
charges of neoliberal zeal in the debate over the final bill (Germany 2005:13946), and to 
claim they represented a revival of a long-standing commitment of their own: access 
rights had appeared in a defunct project of constitutional from the early 1990s whose 
disappearance had hitherto not been widely mourned (Germany 1993; Redelfs 2005:5). 
Pluralism in the United States 
In contrast with Germany, the American economy is not centrally-coordinated, and 
businesses are not formally organised into strong hierarchical associations. Consistent 
with expectations, legally-protected public access to government files were introduced 
relatively early, and he issue has always enjoyed  greater support among businesses in 
the USA than in Germany. That said, the attitudes of capitalist interests have also tend-
ed to be more varied, and the correspondence between these attitudes and law has de-
pended far more on the existence of favourable political circumstances. The process by 
which access rights here developed occurred, as noted in earlier chapters, in at least 
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three distinct phases. In each of these, the attitudes of important players and the issues 
at stake differed substantially. Economic interests were not the only influence during 
any of these phases, but a good case can be made that they were important structural 
influences, and particularly that they were direct contributors to its early development. 
Economic interests were central to the establishment of the first law purporting to pro-
vide a right of access to official documents. This was not the Freedom of Information Act 
1966, but rather the so–called “public information” provisions in Section 3 of the APA. 
These required authorities to give advance notice of their intention to make regula-
tions, to accept submissions from affected parties, and take these submissions into ac-
count before making new rules. They were also required to provide access to official 
files, although the wording of this requirement was so ambiguous it was easily evaded 
by the bureaucracy. The Act was part of a compromise reached between New Deal dem-
ocrats and their political opponents after more than a decade of fierce political struggle 
over the legitimacy of the rapidly–expanding federal bureaucratic apparatus, how it 
was to be controlled, and how those subject to its power were to be protected from it 
(for detailed accounts, see Gellhorn 1986; Shapiro 1986; Shepherd 1996). 
Although the justification for the Administrative Procedure Act was formally couched in 
terms of the democratic rights of private individuals, it is fairly clear that the specifical-
ly economic concerns of private enterprise were fundamentally what was at stake (e.g. 
United States 1946:7-8). The rapid expansion of economic regulation which began in the 
1930s was not welcomed by many parts of the business community. Regulation of  the 
labour market, industrial relations, production processes and financial markets (among 
other things) meant that decisions made by bureaucrats had a far greater impact on the 
profitability of private enterprise than ever before. In addition, several important piec-
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es of New Deal legislation – notably the National Labor Relations Act 1935 – created an un-
precedentedly favourable environment for union mobilisation. Unions in the USA have 
never enjoyed the same coverage, centralised organisation or influence over policy-
makers as their equivalents in Germany. The period between the late 1930s and the ear-
ly 1950s was, however, the high water mark of their membership and arguably also 
their direct political influence, both of which were perceived as a threat by businesses. 
These factors alone would probably have been sufficient to produce considerable dissat-
isfaction; they were compounded by the manner in which increasingly intrusive admin-
istrative regulation was carried out. Many New Deal initiatives took the form of frame-
work legislation which delegated both rule-making and rule-enforcing authority to bu-
reaucratic authorities. A major source of discontent was the complexity and incoher-
ence of the regulations which this delegated authority produced (House Committee on 
the Judiciary 1939, in United States 1946:9-10; Cross 1954:223). This was partly a conse-
quence of Roosevelt’s tendency to establish multiple competing agencies within the 
federal administration, rather than adapting existing organisations to new tasks, and 
appears to have been a deliberate strategy designed to overcome bureaucratic inertia 
and to preserve the authority of the President by preventing the emergence of a unified 
administration (Williams 1987; Pfiffner 1994:51-3). 
The fact that these problems led to the adoption of freedom of information rather than 
the establishment of alternative mechanisms of coordination can partly be attributed to 
the manner in which – and the context within which – this increasing state interven-
tion occurred. The historical fragmentation of the American economy along geographic 
and sectoral lines meant that businesses usually confronted regulatory authorities from 
a position of individual weakness rather than collective strength. Moreover, they did 
  226 
not confront a single coherent state, but rather a patchwork of opaque institutions of 
varying degrees of effectiveness and with overlapping and ill–coordinated responsibili-
ties. This arguably made the task of establishing centralised coordination far more diffi-
cult and thus far less appealing, even without taking account of the lack of sufficient 
organisational capacity among businesses. The problems this incoherence posed were 
compounded by a tradition of administrative secrecy which – although not enshrined in 
law and not often recognised by contemporary scholars – was the equal of any in conti-
nental Europe. 
It might seem that this argument about state incoherence undermines the claimed im-
portance of organisation among non-state economic groups, but the similarities be-
tween state structures in the USA and Germany tend to militate against this. Both are 
described as having “weak” political output structures (Kitschelt 1986), meaning that at 
a constitutional level state authority is circumscribed and divided in ways which pro-
vide similar opportunities for disaffected interests to block the implementation of gov-
ernment decisions after they have been taken. Both are federal systems in which state 
governments retain considerable rights and powers. Both have written constitutions, 
and courts which are empowered to assess legislation and administrative activity for 
conformity. Germany is, perhaps, slightly less prone to fragmentation because it has 
more disciplined parties and lacks a separation of powers between executive and legis-
lature, but nevertheless it seems reasonable to conclude that enough similarities re-
main to discount checks and balances as a sufficient explanation on their own. 
Administrative fragmentation should, rather, be understood as an outcome of the way 
differing levels of organisation among firms were mediated by these constitutionally-
fragmented states. In Germany, a historical legacy of highly-organised economic inter-
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est groups persisted into the post-war era. There was no pressure from economically-
divided groups which might have operated though the checks and balances imposed on 
the Federal Republic by the Basic Law to prevent either the re-establishment or the 
maintenance of coherent administrative structures in the later 20th Century. In the USA, 
by contrast, efforts at centralised economic regulation have historically been resisted 
by a wide variety of entrenched interest groups (Steinmo 2010:149-206). A good exam-
ple of this is financial regulation. In the earliest days of the Republic, for example, local 
commercial interests resisted centralised control of the financial system, which origi-
nally meant a Federal bank. When the national Office of the Comptroller of Currency 
was finally established in the 1860s it confronted a well-entrenched system of state-
based regulation which had grown up in the meantime (Peretz and Schroedel 2009). The 
ease with which entrenched opponents could block reform efforts through the courts 
or Congress encouraged reformist presidents to create entirely new institutions to deal 
with specific problems rather than modify existing structures and risk a confrontation 
with their entrenched constituencies. These new institutions, in turn, encouraged the 
development of constituencies of their own, became entrenched over time, and so 
fragmentation begat further fragmentation (Busch 2009:72-74). As a result, American 
banks are currently subject to overlapping and somewhat inconsistent oversight from 
the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Commission, the Office of the Comp-
troller of Currency, the National Credit Union Administration, specialised units of the 
Federal Treasury such as the Office of Thrift Supervision, and a patchwork of state-
based regimes (Busch 2009:49-55). From this perspective, Roosevelt’s tendency to frag-
ment rather than consolidate regulatory authority was not unique: it conformed to and 
continued an established pattern of governance, one which arose out of interaction be-
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tween a disorganised, regionally-fragmented, competitive economy and a fragmented 
state. 
Although economic interests were central to the establishment of the APA, they were 
far less significant influences on the transformation of its public access provisions into 
the Freedom of Information Act 1966. The Moss Subcommittee was obviously aware of the 
potential conflict between capitalist and democratic concerns, because the Act explicit-
ly exempted “trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a 
person and privileged or confidential”. But neither it nor Congress as a whole appears 
to have given much serious thought to the matter: the exemption was rapidly recog-
nised as poorly-worded and difficult to apply (Davis 1967:787-92; United States 1967:32 
et sqq). Interestingly, its very existence appears to have been a response to disquiet 
within the administration at the harm an overly–expansive disclosure law might do to 
its relations with private enterprise (e.g. Feldesman 1966; Freeman 1966). Unlike Ger-
many, there is little evidence of concern among firms at this stage. Quite the contrary, 
Moss himself claimed the support of the American Chamber of Commerce when rec-
ommending the bill to Congress (United States 1966). Furthermore, the bill would not 
have existed without the active support of one very specific business interest: the press 
(Kennedy 1996). It is, of course, important to recognise that the press is not simply an 
economic interest group like any other; it also has a vital democratic role to play, one 
which is specifically protected in the USA by the First Amendment. It is difficult – and 
arguably not particularly meaningful – to disentangle the economic and normative mo-
tivations for the American Society of Newspaper Editors’ decision to campaign against 
government secrecy (cf. San Francisco Chronicle 1997; Lemov 2007). That the two con-
cerns were actually present is inescapable, however: the editors who directed the cam-
  229 
paign considered executive assertions of control over information to threaten both 
their commercial and political interests (cf. Rourke 1960:685). 
During the third phase, which culminated in the 1974 amendments, organisation among 
business interests contributed in the negative sense that its absence was associated 
with the inability to effectively resist consolidation of a law which was increasingly 
recognised as a threat. Chapter Five has already shown that relations between industri-
al producers and regulators were an important underlying driver of these amendments, 
even if most public debate focussed on Nixon’s abuses of executive privilege. The activi-
ties of the public interest movement naturally made businesses far more aware of the 
potential risks associated with public access to files held by an interventionist state 
(Mezzacapo 2006): it had already allowed considerable amounts of commercially–
sensitive information to fall into the hands of what were euphemistically called “frivo-
lous” requesters (i.e. competitors and external pressure groups; cf. Feldesman 1966), 
and had led to a good deal of negative publicity in the automobile, food and pharmaceu-
ticals industries. The emergence in the 1970s of so–called “reverse–FOIA” suits, by 
which businesses sought to prevent the disclosure of sensitive information to third par-
ties, testifies that the risks were judged to be sufficiently serious to make legal action 
appealing despite its cost and uncertainty (United States 1978:15-21). 
The basic configuration of interests which emerged during this period was similar to 
that which prevailed in Germany throughout the post-war era: administrators shared a 
hostility towards public rights of access with an increasing number of businesses. The 
USA differed, however, in that this alignment did not form the basis of decisive opposi-
tion to the extension of transparency. This is partly because close relations between 
regulators and regulated in the economic sphere were never widely considered to be 
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normatively legitimate; they were always susceptible to being characterised as collu-
sion rather than cooperation by those they excluded. “Iron triangles” and other similar 
arrangements were denounced as a kind of corruption, one which justified the need for 
more rigorous disclosure laws. Furthermore, the attitudes of businesses were far more 
ambivalent than in Germany. Although those whose competitive position was at risk 
due to disclosure tended to oppose access requests (United States 1978:6-7), the mid-
1970s also saw the emergence of commercial organisations who relied on requests to 
obtain a variety of commercially-exploitable information about regulators and competi-
tors alike. This included details of internal business processes, the terms government 
tenders and trends in regulatory activity (United States 1978:5-11; Thomas 2000:406-7). 
The commercial threat to legitimate businesses who merely happened to have divulged 
information to the state was acknowledged to be problematic, but did not lead to con-
certed opposition partly because the attitudes of businesses per se were divided in ways 
which encouraged entrenchment of freedom of information rather than radical reform. 
Partial and Early Routes to Non-Conformity 
There are at least two significant countries which do not appear to conform to theoreti-
cal expectations about political economy and the timing of freedom of information: the 
United Kingdom and Sweden. Close examination suggests that, although they do actual-
ly conform in many important respects to the expectations of the approach outlined at 
the start of this chapter, they also demonstrate the limits of what can be achieved by a 
narrow focus on political economy. 
Entrenched Transparency in Sweden 
Sweden appears to present problems for the hypothesised link between neo–
corporatism and opacity. If coordinated macroeconomic structures really do hamper 
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freedom of information, then how can this country, with its highly centralised unions 
and employer organisations and its system of comprehensive coordinated bargaining, 
have consistently provided the paradigm case of transparent public administration, 
possibly surpassing even the USA? 
It is important to be clear on exactly what an examination of Sweden can contribute. 
Germany, the USA and the UK are interesting because the establishment of access rights 
occurred after the consolidation of their forms economic coordination, making it possi-
ble to examine the effect of these structures on the emergence of transparency. In Swe-
den, the question cannot be put in these terms because public access to government 
files existed before the establishment of modern mechanisms of neo-corporatist eco-
nomic coordination; indeed, the regime entirely pre–dates the emergence of a modern 
industrial capitalist economy, which only began in the mid–19th Century (Meijer 1969). 
A study of Sweden cannot, in other words, help to explain the effect of economic coor-
dination on the origins of freedom of information - although a good case can be made 
that the nature of relations between the state and private enterprise were a major con-
tributor to the Swedish law of 1766. The small group of liberal politicians who advocat-
ed, drafted and introduced it were clearly motivated by a desire to overturn decades of 
collusion between their political opponents and mercantile interests, collusion which 
had contributed to pervasive corruption, endemic financial mismanagement and even-
tually outright bankruptcy of the treasury (Roberts 1986:106,155-66). The Act on the 
Freedom of Pen and Printing Press was, in part, an attempt to transform the relationship 
between political and economic spheres, to prevent ministers from using the power of 
the state to favour the businesses of their associates. To the extent that the aim was to 
prevent certain styles of decision–making and certain sorts of decisions from being 
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made, this law displays certain very broad parallels with the British experience de-
scribed below. These parallels should not be pushed too far, however: any attempt to 
explain the origins of Swedish transparency in terms of late 20th Century political 
economy runs the risk of serious anachronism. 
Modern Sweden deserves attention because it provides the opportunity to examine the 
conditions under which – and extent to which – transparency can be maintained under 
economic circumstances which proved to be unfavourable to its introduction else-
where: why did neo–corporatism not prevent the transformation of Sweden’s 18th–
Century access regime into its modern one, and why did neo-corporatism not weaken 
access rights even once they were in place? After all, the processes of investigation 
which led to the 1937 and 1949 amendments took place during precisely the same peri-
od as the Social Democrats were putting in place Sweden’s emblematic system of tripar-
tite economic concertation: the Saltsjöbaden Agreement which formed the basis of sub-
sequent concertation was concluded in December 1938 (Einhorn and Logue 1989:233). 
Moreover, these amendments were no isolated incident: since then, as previous chap-
ters mentioned, access has continued to form a central element in Swedish public ad-
ministration, undergoing at least one major refurbishment as part of the constitutional 
review process of the late 1970s, and numerous minor updates to keep pace with chang-
ing technology and Sweden’s place in the wider world. 
One obvious explanation for this apparent lack of contradiction between neo-
corporatism and access is that Swedish businesses were less hostile because they did 
not have any privileged access to lose in the 1930s. The consolidation of access was not 
opposed because its benefits were available to businesses as well as other groups. Many 
of these benefits have been touched upon in earlier chapters, but they are worth reiter-
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ating here. Not least is its importance within the system of administrative dispute reso-
lution, where it is sometimes described as being the single most important institution 
in ensuring affected parties are able to defend their interests against bureaucratic error 
in the implementation of existing policy (Anderson 1973:427 note 40). Transparency 
also contributes to a policymaking culture which is responsive to the needs of external 
interest groups, a culture which manifests itself especially in widespread pro–active 
consultation during the early stages of policymaking discussed in the previous chapter. 
This pro-active consultation might theoretically represent a cost to businesses, insofar 
as it also benefits competitors and therefore reduces the influence the former might 
expect to exert. This particular cost is substantially mitigated by the emphasis on ra-
tional, evidence–based policymaking common to all the Nordic countries. This system-
atically advantages those interest groups whose interests are primarily distributional, 
which can formulate their policy positions in terms susceptible to rational cost-benefit 
analysis, and with the resources to provide research justifying their claims. Producers 
are in a far better position to do this than most other groups, with the possible excep-
tion of unions. It is no accident that these two are often the main contributors of policy-
relevant expertise apart from the bureaucracy itself (Einhorn and Logue 1989:53). 
A second explanation for the apparent lack of resistance to transparency is that it is on-
ly apparent: the highly-centralised system of tripartite concertation has, in fact, led to 
the establishment and maintenance of a very high degree of secrecy in certain crucial 
areas of the political process. It is certainly true that policy development begins in Swe-
den with an extremely open process of consultation, and that implementation is also 
remarkably open. But the process by which particular policies are chosen, and by which 
political bargains are struck, is just as closed as in Germany. Indeed, it almost seems to 
have been designed specifically to avoid disclosure under the Tryckfrihetsförordning. As 
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in other countries, Sweden’s law mandates the disclosure of documents rather than in-
formation. No minutes are taken at the regular top–level meetings between political 
leaders and the representatives of economic interest groups. As if in an effort to pre-
empt the charge that minutes should be taken and documents should be created, all 
participants are at pains to present these meetings as unofficial: they are routinely de-
scribed as “informal information–sharing sessions” rather than formal negotiations 
(Anton 1969; Einhorn 1977:264-6). The secrecy of political negotiations extends well be-
yond meetings over economic concertation in the narrow sense, and covers much of 
the general process of political bargaining. By convention, party archives and the delib-
erations of parliamentary committees (where most of these deals are actually struck) 
are private, and neither reports nor minutes are routinely released to the public 
(Einhorn 1977). This remains the rule despite a recent trend towards more frequent 
open committee meetings (Arter 2008:208-215). 
This secrecy benefits those organisations which have established ties to the political 
parties – the unions in the case of the Social Democrats, and to a lesser extent business 
groups in the case of the right wing parties – to the detriment of others. Interestingly, 
this pervasive tendency to avoid creating documents has parallels within the ministries 
responsible for policymaking, where there apparently exists a culture of oral decision–
making designed to circumvent disclosure rules by exploiting the same strict definition 
of a “document” in the law. It is reportedly routine to destroy all draft documents and 
working papers which are not required to be made available to the public before files 
are closed and fall under the ambit of the Act. Similar tendencies are present in other 
countries, but there is evidence that they are far more pervasive in Sweden, with the 
result that official files often contain very little information which has not already been 
pro–actively released anyway (Einhorn 1977; Östberg and Eriksson 2009:115-21). In 
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short, although the Swedish access regime largely survived the introduction of econom-
ic concertation, the tripartite system has nevertheless found ways of preserving a space 
for privileged discussion and political negotiation protected from publicity. 
Late Transparency in the United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom is, at first sight, a particularly egregious outlier in any attempt to 
explain the adoption of freedom of information in the terms proposed here. Its Freedom 
of Information Act 2000 was one of the last to be introduced in a consolidated democracy, 
yet the UK is typically classified as pluralist by comparative political economists (e.g. 
Hall and Soskice 2001:19). A close examination suggests that this country in fact demon-
strates the limits of what economic factors can explain on their own, and that the au-
tonomous role of the state must also be taken into account. 
In fact, the United Kingdom only partly deviates from the expected behaviour of plural-
ist countries because it has not been unquestionably pluralist until relatively recently. 
It is certainly true that British firms have always been far more disorganised than those 
in Germany, and neither unions nor peak organisations have ever enjoyed the same de-
gree of formal influence over government (Crouch 1993:194-5,220-1,250-1,275). But pri-
or to the reforms undertaken by the Thatcher government in the 1980s, unions enjoyed 
considerable informal influence , especially when Labour was in power. There is some 
evidence that these relations contributed to reluctance on the part of the Labour party 
leadership to embrace freedom of information despite pressure from the backbench: E. 
P. Thompson (1980) reports that Wilson found official secrecy to be particularly useful 
as a means of balancing the competing imperatives of loyalty to the movement and po-
litical responsibility for economic management during the national seamen’s strike of 
1966 
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In addition, British pluralism – such as it was - was complicated by the fact that the 
state owned many significant industries including coal, electricity generation, water, 
public transport infrastructure, shipbuilding, aerospace and car manufacturing. Alt-
hough these were not neo-corporatist arrangements, in that the government was own-
er rather than negotiating partner, the formal nature of the relationship and the fusion 
of interests appears to have encouraged a preference for secrecy among the parties in-
volved. Evidence given to the Franks Committee’s 1972 investigation into official secre-
cy suggested industry representatives were guardedly sympathetic to the general need 
to improve communication with society at large – it could hardly have been otherwise, 
given the political realities implied by the very existence of the Committee – but execu-
tives in nationalised industries were nevertheless discreetly but firmly in favour of con-
fidentiality in their own particular cases (e.g. United Kingdom 1972b:173 et sqq.). These 
arrangements appear to have encouraged a similar attitude in the civil service, alt-
hough their justifications for secrecy were often couched in terms of “good govern-
ment” rather than the imperatives of profitability and economic stability (e.g. 
Department of Trade and Industry, in United Kingdom 1972c:29 et sqq). 
Significantly, a high degree of secrecy also prevailed in relations between the state and 
private industry in the UK despite the absence of formal corporatist arrangements (cf. 
the Confederation of British Industry, in United Kingdom 1972d:351 et sqq). This proved 
remarkably persistent, partly because it constituted a benefit to both parties as it made 
possible a pervasive recourse to informal modes of regulation. A good example is the 
enforcement of pollution and product safety standards, in which regulators systemati-
cally avoided litigation and negative publicity as enforcement mechanisms, preferring 
instead to have a “quiet word” with offenders on the assumption they would make ef-
forts to avoid particularly egregious breaches in future. By this means, regulators and 
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industry alike benefited, not merely because adversarial dispute resolution proceedings 
were costly, but above all because they were risky: convictions were obviously likely to 
be costly to businesses, while regulators faced considerable reputational costs from 
failed prosecutions, and the establishment of formal proceedings provided a focus for 
public interest campaigns. Not surprisingly, these arrangements were criticized by 
those same campaigners as coming at the expense of effectiveness and the public inter-
est (Frankel 1984b:43 et sqq; Winder 1986). 
The pervasive presence of official secrecy in economic affairs in the UK is not obviously 
consistent with the first claim about pluralist countries: that they should be over-
represented among early adopters. It is, however, consistent with the second claim: 
that a lack of organisation among firms suggests their preferences should be less deci-
sive overall (or, to put it another way, that under pluralism, the timing of freedom of 
information is more likely to be due to other factors). In Britain, secrecy cannot primar-
ily be explained in terms of the influence which economic interest groups had over the 
state, but rather the reverse. Political and administrative authority is far more central-
ised in Britain than in the USA, and this allowed the state to established a set of opaque 
relations with (disorganised) capitalist interests which, in the final analysis, reflected 
its own interests.  
That British secrecy was primarily an outcome of political rather than capitalist imper-
atives is further suggested by the fact that these secretive arrangements were disman-
tled as part of a thorough programme of administrative reform under Thatcher and Ma-
jor, without significant resistance from the business community. Pluralist capitalism 
was not irrelevant, however. As the following chapter shows, transparency in various 
forms constituted a fundamental part of a programme which explicitly sought to trans-
  238 
form Britain into a pluralist political economy by eliminating direct state intervention 
and restricting the influence of special interests (above all the unions) over the state. 
Moreover, although neither Thatcher nor Major were particularly supportive of free-
dom of information per se, it was nevertheless an unintended outcome of reforms de-
signed to establish a specifically pluralist set of relations between economy and state, 
reforms which were undertaken with the support of key producer groups. Thus, while 
the persistence of secrecy in the UK suggests the factors identified in the first part of 
this chapter are not a complete explanation, the circumstances under which freedom of 
information was introduced suggests they are merely incomplete, not fundamentally 
incorrect. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined whether the manner in which influential interest groups are 
organised affects the development and adoption of freedom of information by consider-
ing relations between producer groups and the state. The four–way comparison under-
taken between the USA, Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom has broadly con-
firmed that their propensity to favour formal access rights and their influence over the 
state both vary with the institutional structure of their relations with the state. 
As a general proposition, individual firms favour the disclosure of information which 
makes government more predictable and amenable to their influence. On the other 
hand, they generally oppose public access to files containing commercially–sensitive 
information which they have divulged to the state where access would result in disclo-
sure to third parties. 
On the specific question of freedom of information, the extent to which these compet-
ing demands express themselves as successful resistance to legislation or not depends 
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on the structure of relations between state and market. Under neo–corporatism, firms 
are highly organised, which facilitates the development of a coherent set of preferences 
with respect to information rights and dramatically improves their capacity to articu-
late those preferences as a group. Furthermore, the representational monopoly enjoyed 
by peak industry associations strongly favours a preference for ongoing secrecy, espe-
cially at the point of choice between alternative policies. Privileged access constitutes a 
power resource for these groups as they compete to influence the policy–making pro-
cess by making it much more difficult for other interests to organise and press their 
claims on the state. It also constitutes an internal power resource by which the hierar-
chy can discipline its own members. The more competitive conditions prevalent under 
pluralism, by contrast, are structurally favourable to the development of a positive 
preference for general public rights of access, but this selfsame lack of organisation is 
also less favourable to the development or decisive articulation of any coherent set of 
preferences. As a result, pluralism is structurally more favourable to the influence of 
other, non–economic factors, and such countries exhibit greater variation in the timing 
of access rights despite their common economic structure. 
The importance of pluralism for the development and successful articulation of calls for 
access is further supported by the circumstances under which most neo–corporatist 
countries eventually introduced access rights. Whether it be because of diplomatic 
pressure to remove barriers to equal participation in domestic markets, the challenges 
of financial and fiscal management in an age of increasing capital mobility, or the diffu-
sion of models of government at élite level, most of these countries undertook pro-
grammes of administrative reform starting in the late 1990s. In almost all cases, these 
involved the weakening – although rarely the outright dissolution – of established 
structures regulating the political economy in favour of more fluid and competitive ar-
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rangements. This almost always coincided with a shift in opinion among officials to-
wards greater support for access rights, even if this support did not always translate 
into decisive action. For this reason, it is to the question of government attitudes in 
general, and the effect of public sector modernisation in particular, that we now turn. 
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Chapter 7: Transparency as a 
Tool of Public Sector 
Governance 
This chapter examines the effect on the introduction of freedom of information of rela-
tions between the elected political executive and the administrative bureaucracy. It ar-
gues that political executives are most likely to support freedom of information where 
the administrative bureaucracy operates at arm’s length, because such arrangements 
mitigate the incentives for executives to engage in secrecy inherent in classic Weberian 
hierarchical modes of control. It also shows that active support for freedom of infor-
mation typically emerges where prevailing political conditions make it an appealing 
response to the problems of democratic legitimation and administrative control which 
devolved, autonomous or semi-independent authorities pose. 
The first part of the chapter shows that the institutional-political approach proposed 
here is preferable to existing studies of the administrative politics of information. Con-
temporary activist accounts and scholars of public administration often assume that 
freedom of information forms an unproblematic part of a trend towards the use of 
transparency as a tool of public sector management in the information age. They tend 
to under-emphasise the importance of institutional variations on the interests at stake, 
and assume that the shifts towards transparency can be explained in ideological terms. 
Studies of freedom of information are much more sensitive to the interests of the par-
ties involved, but generally see relations between executives and administrators as 
sources of resistance to access rights. Support from members of the political executive 
is usually explained in terms of other considerations overwhelming the imperatives of 
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administrative control. Individual deviations from this pattern have been studied as 
isolated cases, but there has not yet been any attempt to systematically identify influ-
ences on attitudes towards freedom of information. 
The second and third parts of the chapter support these claims about the combined im-
portance of institutional structure and political strategy, and the relative unimportance  
of purely ideological change, by conducting a series of paired comparisons. The second 
part examines two countries in which a highly-ideological rhetoric of reform was a 
prominent feature of political discourse in the 1980s and 1990s, and in which substan-
tial alterations to the structure and operations of the state were put in place, but in 
which their effects on freedom of information are understood to have been quite differ-
ent. In the United Kingdom, New Public Management and New Labour’s Third Way con-
tributed to the introduction of rights of access in 2000. In the USA, by contrast, reform 
is widely claimed to have made access more difficult. Although some of this divergence 
can be attributed to differences in the historical sequencing of access rights and reform, 
a comparison suggests that structures of political accountability are also important. 
The third part of the chapter examines two countries with divergent experiences in 
which reform was pragmatic rather than ideological. The first is Sweden, where what-
ever corrosive effects reform may have had on pre-existing mechanisms of transparen-
cy were offset by the political uses elected governments made of an entrenched separa-
tion between centralised policy development and transparent, devolved public imple-
mentation. It concludes by examining France, where an access law also existed prior to 
the onset of reform. Here, the conducive institutional structures identified as relevant 
in the UK and Sweden were – and remain – largely absent, and the adoption of a dis-
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course emphasising transparency and accountability at senior political level led to an 
amendment act which essentially did nothing to extend existing rights of access. 
Isomorphism and the Administrative Politics of Information 
The relationship between political executives and career bureaucrats has been central 
to studies of the politics of information since at least Weber’s day, and following Weber 
the consensus has been that institutional structures are contributors to secrecy rather 
than transparency. Weber himself provided the seminal analysis of the bureaucratic 
interest in secrecy, which was discussed in Chapter Two. Subsequent scholars, activists 
and commentators have generally assumed that the political executive takes on this 
structural interest, and only supports access rights when other considerations over-
whelm the imperatives arising specifically from the administrative relationship. 
Most explanations for why political executives and bureaucrats might support access 
rights despite these institutional interests emphasise what sociologists of institutional 
change call “normative isomorphism”. This holds that the structure and operation of 
organisations in a single field come to resemble each other over time because some al-
ternatives are perceived by those in charge to be more legitimate or appropriate than 
others, rather than because of they are more efficient or effective (DiMaggio and Powell 
1983:152-3). As Chapter One showed, freedom of information activists have devoted 
considerable efforts to building consensus around the (democratic) merits of access 
laws. Their attempts to have access rights adopted on the grounds of their consistency 
with overarching principles have benefited enormously from the recent development 
of a consensus among administrators and commentators that certain transparency 
mechanisms are effective and widely-applicable mechanisms of public sector legitima-
tion and control (e.g. Flinders and McConnel 1997; Scott 2000; Stirton and Lodge 2001; 
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OECD 2002b; Hood 2010). By the start of the new millennium, this consensus was so per-
vasive that there were even attempts to frame public sector management per se in terms 
of information management (e.g. OECD 2002a; Flinders 2004; Dunleavy, et al. 2005; 2007). 
Freedom of information has been incorporated into this discourse, and is now often de-
scribed in similarly technocratic terms as an unproblematic tool of public sector man-
agement. This incorporation is due, in no small part, to the actions of international 
government organisations. Starting in the mid-1990s, the OECD, EU, United Nations and 
IMF among others began to these laws as an essential institutional support for trans-
parency (Roberts 2006a:110). As Chapter Two noted, this pressure is often argued to 
have contributed to the adoption of access rights in the developing world, and it is at 
least possible that the imperatives of harmonisation and the emergence of an interna-
tional consensus might also have favoured advocates of access rights among the consol-
idated democracies.  
Empirically-oriented studies give reason to doubt normative isomorphism as a signifi-
cant influence on the introduction of freedom of information acts, however. An im-
portant body of scholarship documents the opportunities which the rhetoric and prac-
tice of reform has given bureaucrats and politicians in North America to legitimise their 
standing interest in avoiding disclosure (Roberts 1998; 2000; 2001a; 2004; 2006c; 2006b; 
Piotrowski 2007). This conclusion is not unanimous, but variations between countries 
do not obviously correspond with the prominence of reformist ideology. Kenneth Rob-
ertson argued that freedom of information would not have been introduced in the UK 
were it not for the Thatcher and Major reforms (Robertson 1999:142), and Ben Worthy’s 
PhD thesis argued that freedom of information was an integral feature of New Labour’s 
approach to governance and public administration (Worthy 2007b:103-123). There is 
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reason to think that public sector reform might have made a positive contribution out-
side the UK as well, including in Italy (Cain, et al. 2003:120-2) and Germany (for reasons 
discussed in the previous chapter). Thus far, however, explicitly comparative work on 
the link between access and reform has largely focussed on the similarity of experience 
in the English-speaking countries. There has not been any broader, empirically-
oriented effort at understanding why the attitudes of executives appear to have dif-
fered so dramatically from country to country, or why freedom of information fared 
differently in countries with similar political climates and histories of reform. 
There is good reason to think that the observed relationship between reform and access 
rights might be better explained by the influence of existing institutional structures on 
politicians and officials (cf. Thelen 1999:386; Hall and Soskice 2001:17 et sqq.; Beckert 
2010:157). Robertson’s earlier (1982) work on secrecy, one of the very few comparative 
studies in this field, showed that the regulation of official secrecy varied cross-
nationally with institutional structure. He argued, on this basis, that the supervision of 
a bureaucracy by a unified executive encourages a preference for secrecy for at least 
two reasons. Electoral accountability provides strong incentives for prime ministers 
and presidents alike to retain control over the disclosure of information relevant to 
their re-election prospects, as a point already discussed in Chapter Three. Hierarchical 
authority provides a second reason which has not yet been discussed: the right to 
command the bureaucracy is one of the reasons politicians seek public office, and this 
benefit is diluted by the introduction of access rights, since they expose the bureaucra-
cy to direct pressure from outside parties. 
If Robertson is correct in identifying unified, hierarchical political authority over a We-
berian bureaucracy as a reason political executives and bureaucrats alike prefer official 
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secrecy, then it seems reasonable to expect the prospects for freedom of information to 
be most favourable where such arrangements are absent. Where the bureaucracy oper-
ates at arm’s length, the political executive will have few reasons to resist the introduc-
tion of access rights because the electoral risks will be lower, and the private benefits of 
holding executive office which access undermines will be absent. Indeed, there may be 
positive benefits in supporting access rights under these circumstances. Autonomous 
public bodies sit outside the democratic chain of responsibility which normatively justi-
fies the existence of the administrative state. Practically, devolved institutions still 
need to be directed and held to account despite their autonomy. Transparency – insofar 
as it provides an alternative means of ensuring responsiveness to external stakeholders 
– may provide alternative means of achieving both ends. Under devolved systems, pub-
lic authorities may also find it in their interests to be transparent, both as a means of 
legitimising their own existence to the public at large, and as a strategy for building 
supportive constituencies (although the impact of constituency relations is likely to 
vary with the factors examined in the previous two chapters).  
The implementation of New Public Management (NPM) reforms in the 1980s and early 
1990s provides a suitable opportunity for testing these competing explanations. NPM is 
appealing because it incorporated a strongly ideological component which varied in 
intensity in different countries, and whose origins and development can be identified 
with confidence. NPM emerged out of a strain of New Right economic thought which 
identified bureaucratic control over information, among other things, as a source of the 
pathologies of late 20th Century public administration (e.g. Hayek 1945; Niskanen 1971). 
The influence of New Right thinking was particularly prominent in mainstream politi-
cal discourse among the early adopters, especially in the Anglo-Saxon world. It tended 
to diminish over time and as NPM spread to other countries, leaving behind a relatively 
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technocratic discourse about information technology and rules governing disclosure as 
tools of public sector management. The consensus about transparency mentioned earli-
er is a direct descendant of this earlier discourse on information as a tool of govern-
ance, albeit one couched in the language of a democratic reaction to some of its unpop-
ular technocratic consequences (cf. Roberts 2010:10-16). New Public Management is 
preferable to more recent alternatives for present purposes because its core beliefs 
were actually invoked by political executives and the administrative bureaucracy to the 
justify reforms undertaken in many countries, and not just by academics or non-
government advocates of reform. 
NPM is also appealing because it was not just an ideological phenomenon: it was associ-
ated with a suite of concrete public sector reforms which varied from place to place and 
evolved over time while still remaining recognisably part of the same broad trend 
(Hood 1991:4-5; Osborne and McLaughlin 2002; Ansell and Gingrich 2003). The “menu” 
of NPM reforms is usually divided into three groups of policies (cf. Hood 1991:4-5; 
Schedler and Proeller 2002:168-70; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004:247-51). First, privatisa-
tion (the sale of public sector assets and the transformation of public bodies to private 
companies). Second, modernisation, a kind of catch-all term for the use of private sec-
tor financial, personnel and management techniques within the public sector. Examples 
include the use of contracts rather than hierarchical control, the separation of respon-
sibility for policy development from service delivery, and a reliance on performance 
management (assessment of outputs and outcomes against pre–determined standards) 
rather than detailed legal codes. Third, marketisation: the use of competition and mar-
ket-like pressure to improve the efficiency of public-sector organisations. These re-
forms are useful here because they share a basic concern with official practices of 
communication, but each seeks to favour the disclosure of different kinds of infor-
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mation and to empower different recipients. More importantly, each has different im-
plications for the direct supervision of the bureaucracy by the political executive. Some 
kinds of modernisation, for example, are quite compatible with leaving intact or even 
reinforcing the institutional structures which Robertson identified as conducive to se-
crecy, while marketisation and other kinds of modernisation require disclosure to the 
public at large. Careful attention to the effects of different kinds of reform in countries 
with similar degrees of ideological rhetoric provide the opportunity to test the claims 
made earlier about the greater importance of institutional factors. 
Divergence among Neoliberals 
This first section of the chapter seeks to demonstrate that the support among political 
executives for freedom of information was influenced by the institutional structure of 
their relations with bureaucrats, even where public sector reform was advocated and 
carried out in a highly ideological context.. It does this by comparing the UK and the 
USA. These are two countries in which similar suites reforms were advocated on broad-
ly similar ideological grounds, but in which they appear to have had quite different ef-
fects on freedom of information due, in part, to the institutional structure of relations 
between the political executive and the bureaucracy.  
Reform and Transparency in the UK 
The United Kingdom constitutes a paradigm case of New Public Management contrib-
uting to the establishment of freedom of information by transforming the institutional 
basis of political authority over – and accountability for – the administrative state. This 
occurred in three phases, corresponding with the Thatcher, Major and Blair eras. The 
distinction between these phases matters: freedom of information only gained the ac-
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tive support of the political executive in later stages, but this support was in large part 
due to changes which had occurred earlier. 
The claim that Mrs Thatcher contributed to the development of freedom of information 
might seem strange given the resistance she showed the Campaign for Freedom of In-
formation. It is important to distinguish between her attitude towards this specific poli-
cy, which is sometimes portrayed as a doctrinaire reflex, and her general attitude to-
wards information as a policy tool, which was actually quite nuanced. In fact, her maid-
en speech The Conservative Party which came to power in 1979 was firmly convinced 
that the public service had succeeded in insulating itself so thoroughly from its political 
masters and the public at large that it was contributing a cause of Britain’s economic 
and political malaise rather than the solution (Willman 1994:74). Its response empha-
sised a combination of privatisation and modernisation: a reduction in direct public 
service provision and a tightening of political control over what remained of the public 
sector. This second element aimed, specifically, to restore a traditional Westminster 
system of Cabinet authority and parliamentary supremacy, and with it came a re-
assertion of traditional Westminster official secrecy: full access to central government 
files was opposed as incompatible with both accountability of officials to ministers, and 
ministerial accountability to parliament (Tant 1993; Flinders 2000:424). 
As Chapter Four noted, however, Mrs Thatcher did not oppose laws granting access to 
information which did not threaten this traditional structure of authority Furthermore, 
many government-sponsored reforms during this era displayed a keen awareness of the 
usefulness of enforced disclosure in reinforcing Cabinet authority. Two of the earliest 
were piloted in the Department of the Environment: an electronic budgeting system 
called MAXIS was introduced in 1981, followed in 1982 MINIS, a system designed to fa-
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cilitate cost–cutting by providing ministers with comprehensive and up–to–date infor-
mation on operational matters (United Kingdom 1989). Although MINIS was not rolled 
out more widely, systems similar to MAXIS were in use throughout central government 
by 1984. MINIS and MAXIS were quickly followed by the Financial Management Initiative 
(United Kingdom 1982), which called for the use of outcomes frameworks, performance 
management and the devolution of responsibilities for budgeting. In 1988, the so-called 
“Next Steps” reforms proposed that “executive functions of government, as distinct 
from policy advice, should be carried out by units clearly designated within Depart-
ments, referred to as ‘agencies’” and that agencies be given managerial autonomy with-
in the parameters established by the political executive (United Kingdom 1988; 1989).  
Although Mrs Thatcher resisted the introduction of freedom of information itself, these 
structural reforms laid the groundwork for the first formal moves towards their intro-
duction under John Major. Major’s distinctive approach to public sector reform and 
public access to information is sometimes explained in terms of his personal beliefs and 
proclivities (Worthy 2007a:5,7). This was undoubtedly a factor. Major’s personal atti-
tude towards public disclosure of official information was unquestionably more liberal 
than Mrs Thatcher’s (cf. United Kingdom 1993:2), and as prime minister he could rely 
on the authority of office to impose his own views on reluctant Cabinet colleagues and 
civil servants alike. But personal preferences only account for so much, and he was by 
no means the only Cabinet minister in favour of more liberal disclosure laws. His re-
forms were, moreover, evolutionary developments rather than revolutionary depar-
tures from Thatcher’s, and were in many ways responses to unanticipated contradic-
tions and limitations which began to emerge from them in the early 1990s. The Financial 
Management Initiative and Next Steps reforms were attempts to divest the political exec-
utive of responsibility for operational decisions by devolving them onto civil servants. 
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They did so, however, by centralising control over the flow of information about those 
decisions in the Cabinet. As a result, they strengthened political control over the bu-
reaucracy even as they purported to devolve authority. In combination with Mrs 
Thatcher’s repeated insistence on Parliamentary supremacy, this effectively meant that 
Cabinet remained electorally responsible for the bureaucracy, despite the aim of de-
volving responsibility onto it (the House of Lords remarked on the failure to 
acknowledge these contradictions in United Kingdom 1998b:¶65). Secondly, Major was 
also among the first senior Conservatives to recognise a difficulty with the other major 
component of Thatcher-era public sector reform: there were some parts of the state 
which could not be privatised, even if only for political reasons (Major 1999:247-8). 
Major’s contribution to freedom of information was the Citizen’s Charter. This self–
proclaimed “policy plan for the 1990s” (Timmins 1991; Major 1999:245-6) was launched 
in 1991, and contained over 70 detailed proposals for the marketisation and modernisa-
tion of public administration in ways which overcame these contradictions in Thatcher-
ite policy. According to Major himself (1999:246-6), the Charter sought to improve the 
quality and efficiency of the public service by taking advantage of the opportunities of-
fered by new technology to subject it to more effective external scrutiny. Specific re-
forms included requirements for service–level agencies to publish standards and per-
formance reports, the systematic devolution of responsibility for managerial decisions 
and the establishment of independent inspection bureaux to confirm the accuracy of 
reporting. 
The emphasis on publicity in the Citizen’s Charter had two sources. The first was its goal 
of transforming “citizens” into individual “consumers” or “customers” (cf. Timmins 
1991; Birkinshaw 1997:29; Major 1999:262,253) who would subject public bodies to mar-
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ket–like pressure to improve their performance (cf. Major 1999:255). This led to the 
pro–active publication of a good deal of information, most of which was factual and in-
tended to enable these citizen–consumers to chose between the different service pro-
viders available to them, or make complaints if service fell below expected standards. 
The Citizen’s Charter was, thus, not intended to allow citizens to exert direct influence 
over decision–making in central government; it was an attempt by the central govern-
ment to harness the power of public opinion in order to impose financial and operating 
discipline the public sector (Robertson 1999:147). 
The second source was slightly more democratic: the belief that one of the reasons for 
the failure of the bureaucracy to provide good service was its habit of using official se-
crecy to hide mismanagement and poor decision–making (cf. the discussion of schools 
and league tables at Major 1999:400). To overcome this, in 1994 Major also introduced a 
Code of Practice on Government Information (the most widely-cited edition of this is the 
second, United Kingdom 1997a; see also Flinders 2000:423). This mandated the pro–
active publication of a range of information which had hitherto been kept confidential, 
including the membership of cabinet committees, the reasons for administrative deci-
sions, and background information on past policy decisions (Hennessy 2000). It also in-
cluded a regulatory right to request other information from government departments, 
subject only to specified exemptions. 
The Code of Practice was unquestionably a step towards freedom of information rather 
than a full access regime in its own right, and it was perceived as such at the time. It 
received a lukewarm reception from the Campaign for Freedom of Information (e.g. 
Frankel 1995; Robertson 1999:141) on the grounds that it was regulatory rather than 
legislative, and applied to information not documents. The Campaign appears have 
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feared that it represented another attempt at heading off fundamental reform through 
partial concessions, and that it allowed the government too much leeway in deciding 
what would be released. There is some evidence that MPs and journalists used it in their 
dealings with the administrative government (Timmins 1991; 1996), but the general 
consensus is that lack of awareness that it existed, departmental resistance and lack of 
political support resulted in a low number of requests (United Kingdom 1995:3) and the 
release of less information than might ideally have occurred (United Kingdom 2005; 
Worthy 2007a:7-9). 
Nevertheless, the Code represented a major advance. It was clearly a major advance in 
its own right , in that it constituted a positive and public commitment to the principle 
of access by the political executive. It was also understood, in retrospect, to have facili-
tated the eventual introduction of the Freedom of Information Act, in part by easing 
traditionally secretive departments into the idea of establishing a more open relation-
ship with their constituents (United Kingdom 2005:34). The Code’s effects were not just 
cultural, however. By allowing appeals to the Parliamentary Commissioner, Major (per-
haps inadvertently) allowed the Commissioner to play a similar role to his counterparts 
in other jurisdictions as a major source of institutional support for increasing access to 
information. His decision that requests for information under the Code should usually 
be met by providing documents (United Kingdom 1997b:12), for example, effectively 
transformed it into a regulatory freedom of information act. More than this, the deci-
sion to allow appeals to the Parliamentary Commissioner effectively transformed its 
associated Parliamentary Select Committee into a platform within parliament from 
which advocates of more fundamental reform could conduct their campaign (Feintuck 
1996:349; Robertson 1999:148). Its 1996 report on the Code, entitled Open Government, 
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called for a freedom of information act (United Kingdom 1996)– the first time a Select 
Committee in the UK had done so. 
Chapter Three showed that the introduction of the Freedom of Information Act owed a 
great deal to electoral politics, but this was only part of the story: it also owed a great 
deal to the way New Labour built on the favourable structural conditions put in place 
by the Conservatives. Under Major, “outlying” parts of the civil service were made part-
ly transparent as an alternative way of addressing dysfunctional bureaucratic admin-
istration where the preferred cure – privatisation – was not feasible. Under Blair, full 
transparency became a fundamental principle of government in the information age, 
and was the freedom of information act was introduced as part of a widespread reliance 
on the devolution, not just of responsibility for implementation, but of whole areas of 
policymaking to autonomous administrative units working in coordination with exter-
nal stakeholder groups. 
Organisations which operate at arm’s length from the political executive have been a 
long-standing feature of the British administrative landscape, for a range of political 
and practical reasons (Flinders 2004:884). Since the 1970s, they have also been an in-
creasingly controversial feature, in part because they are difficult to accommodate 
within the normative framework of Westminster democracy: administrative autonomy 
implies that the elected executive exercises less ongoing, direct control over their op-
erations (cf. Majone 1997). One indicator of this is that both the main parties have regu-
larly promised to reduce the number of autonomous bodies when in opposition 
(Flinders 1997). Significantly, however, neither has followed through with this com-
mitment when in office. The Conservatives’ use of the agency model under Next Steps 
was a variation on this old theme. Labour expanded the practice still further, delegating 
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policy development, specialist advice, regulation of industry, the provision of local ser-
vices and regional development and a range of other activities to quasi-autonomous 
organisations (Skelcher, et al. 2000; Flinders 2004:887).27 
The proliferation of quasi-autonomous government organisations gave rise to wide-
spread concern over democratic accountability and policy coherence (Flinders and 
McConnel 1997; Harden and Marquand 1997), often expressed as complaints about se-
crecy. Prior to the introduction of the Freedom of Information Act, standards of disclosure 
and rights of public access to documents controlled by these bodies were unclear: a sur-
vey by the Parliamentary Select Committee on Public Administration found that almost 
all those with executive functions published annual reports and accounts, while about 
four–fifths maintained publicly–accessible registers of members’ interests 
(United Kingdom 1999). Under two thirds were subject to annual independent audits, 
only fifteen percent were required to hold public meetings, one tenth were obliged to 
allow the public to inspect minutes, and under one twentieth to make their agendas or 
meetings public. 
Under New Labour, freedom of information served two purposes. It was, firstly, a means 
of pre-emptively addressing these concerns. But it was also, and more importantly, a 
founding principle of what was claimed to be a new model of interaction between state 
and citizens which would overcome the shortcomings of traditional representa-
tive/bureaucratic government (Worthy 2007b:103-123). This new form, now sometimes 
called “distributed public governance” (OECD 2002a), emphasised pervasive collabora-
tion and communication between interested non-state actors and specialised state bod-
                                                                           
 
27Estimates of the number of autonomous administrative bodies differ, even within government (Flinders 2004). A 
1994 report estimated that there were 6,500, of which 5,521 were actively engaged in policy development and ser-
vice delivery (as opposed to being merely advisory). Of these, 4,732 were engaged in providing services at a local 
level (Weir and Hall 1994). 
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ies whose main purpose was no longer the direct provision of services or the mainte-
nance of markets, but the regulation of relations between interested parties. This model 
required a far more radical kind of transparency than had hitherto existed in the Brit-
ish state (cf. Worthy 2007b:118-20): it was a structural necessity, serving both as a 
means by which the state organised its relations with its constituents and coordinated 
policy among its component parts, as Tony Blair himself recognised at a speech to the 
Campaign for Freedom of Information’s annual awards not long before his election 
(Blair 1996). 
The mutually-reinforcing importance of distributed governance and freedom of infor-
mation was not always recognised at the time by commentators, may of whom still un-
derstood freedom of information primarily in terms of electoral control over ministers 
rather than as a founding principle in a new kind of intra-executive control (e.g. 
Flinders 2004). This is not entirely surprising, as the two principles are difficult to rec-
oncile within a traditional Westminster framework, and even today the British state 
remains highly centralised in important respects. Yet the fact remains that freedom of 
information was explicitly advocated by leading theorists and political figures in New 
Labour prior to its election in 1997, at a time when the Party was abandoning many of 
its other long-standing policy commitments, due in no small part on its usefulness as a 
means of legitimising and reinforcing the independence of the autonomous institutions 
of which the British state is increasingly composed. 
Reform and the Legitimisation of Opacity in the USA 
It has already been noted that neoliberalism grew out of specific critique of public ad-
ministration. This developed in the USA in the 1950s and 1960s, and it is hardly surpris-
ing that New Public Management subsequently became a prominent feature of Ameri-
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can political and administrative discourse. The USA shared more than this common 
ideological foundation with the UK: NPM came to prominence as a definite political 
programme at more or less the same time, and was implemented in two stages of simi-
lar emphasis to the Thatcher and Major eras, corresponding roughly with the decades 
of the 1980s and the 1990s. 
Ronald Reagan was elected to the presidency in 1981 on a platform which explicitly 
identified the federal bureaucracy as both an economic burden and profoundly dys-
functional. This view was exemplified by the oft-quoted comment in his inaugural ad-
dress that “government is not the solution to our problem; government is the prob-
lem”. Although Reagan tended to emphasise the prominent streak of liberal individual-
ism in American political culture, and was not always quite so explicit about the intel-
lectual roots of his position as Mrs Thatcher, his platform drew just as heavily on New 
Right economic and political thought. It included tax cuts, reform of the budgetary pro-
cess and a wide–ranging programme of privatisation in order to reduce the cost of the 
state and its impact on the lives of its citizens. Like Thatcher, Reagan also believed that 
the executive should be relatively free from institutional constraints in areas of core 
responsibility like defence, national security and law enforcement. Consistent with this, 
he was distinctly hostile towards freedom of information, and in a move with certain 
superficial similarities to Mrs Thatcher’s 1989 revisions to the UK’s Official Secrets Act, he 
successfully sponsored amendments to access which extended the scope of exemptions 
covering law enforcement and other security matters (Relyea 1983:26; United States 
1996:10). 
The election of Bill Clinton in 1993 marked the start of a second phase of reform, one 
which displayed a number of similarities with the Major government’s approach. The 
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counterpart of the Citizen’s Charter was the National Performance Review, launched under 
the direction of Vice–President Gore in March of that year. This aimed to make “the en-
tire federal government less expensive and more efficient, and to change the culture of 
our national bureaucracy away from complacency and entitlement towards initiative 
and empowerment” (United States 1993b:350). The review continued throughout the 
Clinton/Gore era, and produced a veritable library of background papers, recommenda-
tions, status report and other documents. For present purposes the most interesting 
and important of these is the initial report, From Red Tape to Results (United States 
1993a). This laid out four key principles for reform: “cutting red tape”, “putting cus-
tomers first”, “empowering employees to get results” and “cutting back to basics”. The 
concrete reforms which flowed from these principles were similar to those proposed 
under the Financial Management Initiative, Next Steps and the Citizen’s Charter, although 
they tended to emphasise operational modernisation rather than structural change. 
They included performance-based budgeting, reporting and auditing, the devolution of 
managerial decisions within the bureaucracy, the greater use of outsourcing to reduce 
direct costs, and the establishment of service charters and publication of reports on 
performance in service–oriented agencies to encourage efficiency and responsiveness. 
Despite the similarities in the tempo and ideological underpinnings of reform in these 
two countries, opinions differ on their effects. Where Mrs Thatcher’s reforms laid the 
groundwork and Major’s Code of Practice represented a significant step towards full ac-
cess, Reagan’s reforms had no equivalent unintended consequence, and the Clin-
ton/Gore reforms are often claimed to have undermined the Freedom of Information Act 
rather than contributed to its consolidation. Nor is the USA the only country in which 
this is said to have occurred: similar views about the negative impact of New Public 
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Management are also expressed in and of Australia and Canada (Bell and Watchirs 1988; 
Nilsen 1994; Roberts 1998; Terrill 1998; Roberts 2000). 
Freedom of information is argued to have suffered as a result of administrative reform 
in the USA in several ways, all of which share a common foundation: that the National 
Performance Review provided opportunities for officials to legitimise and pursue their 
long-standing lack of enthusiasm for public access to documents. 
One opportunity was presented by the imperatives to “cut back to basics” and demon-
strate efficiency and efficacy. As Piotrowski shows (2007:45-58), this was used to justify 
cutting back on staff responsible for processing requests and charging fees at cost–
recovery levels (for a similar argument on Canada, see Roberts 2000). The logic here is 
that it is difficult to portray “responding to freedom of information requests” as a core 
function of any public authority, its de-prioritisation was readily justifiable within the 
terms of the National Performance Review. This approach had the additional advantage, 
from the bureaucracy’s perspective, of obscuring its own effects: it rendered the Act 
less effective without requiring it to be openly repudiated. In some Departments, such 
as Defence, State and Justice, “responsiveness to freedom of information requests” was 
included among the measures of customer service performance against which adminis-
trators were assessed, and performance did not suffer greatly (Piotrowski 2007:65). But 
these were isolated examples, and the net effect of performance management on access 
rights is judged to have been negative.28 
                                                                           
 
28 This somewhat surprising commitment to freedom of information among authorities usually associated with offi-
cial secrecy in its classic sense is also apparent in the UK. In discussion with the author, officials have suggested it is 
part of a strategy by these departments to be “good citizens” by faithfully implementing the act in respect of those 
parts of their operations which are not exempt on the grounds of national security, the administration of justice 
and so on. 
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A second line of argument emphasises the opportunities presented by subcontracting 
(Piotrowski 2007:82-88), reliance on state–owned corporations (Roberts 2001a), and the 
introduction of managerial autonomy into the public sector through the adoption of 
private-sector institutional forms (Roberts 2001b; Roberts 2006b:171). This argument 
holds that modernising reforms blurred the boundaries between the state and the pri-
vate realms to such a degree that it was often extremely unclear whether many organi-
sations providing public services were public or private. This presented a problem for 
requesters, because freedom of information is a public law whose normative rationale 
rests on the democratic accountability of the state to the people. The Act does not apply 
to private corporations, because they are not normatively accountable to the democrat-
ic public (notwithstanding the efforts of the public interest campaigners discussed in 
Chapters Five and Six).  
The ambiguity which many modernising reforms introduced made it possible, so the 
argument runs, for officials to resist disclosure by arguing that information could legit-
imately be withheld because its release would adversely affect “private” interests, even 
though the organisations in question were public authorities “masquerading” as private 
companies (Roberts 1998; 2000). Significantly, the question of whether these claims 
were strictly accurate in law was often less important than whether they were plausible 
enough to be arguable before a court. The time and cost involved in appealing refusals 
and establishing the invalidity of the grounds on which they were based often proved 
sufficient to deter disappointed requesters from disputing all but the most egregious of 
claims. These organisational changes, combined with the time–sensitive nature of much 
political information, thus provided an alternative means of reducing the effectiveness 
of the American access regime in practice, without repudiating it in principle. 
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There are two reasons why New Public Management had differing effects on access 
rights in the UK and the USA. The difference is, in part, merely perceived, and produced 
by the fact that access preceded reform in the latter but not the former. Close examina-
tion shows that most of the effects identified by commentators in one country were al-
so present in the other, and that their experiences were therefore much more similar 
than the existing literature might suggest. This is only part of the story, however: there 
were also substantive differences in the reforms themselves and the context into which 
they were introduced. 
That the different experiences of the UK and the USA are, in part, merely perceived is 
suggested by the fact that the UK Code of Practice and Freedom of Information Act suffered 
from similar problems to those identified in the USA and Canada. Politicians, journalists 
and scholars alike have criticised the long delays produced by under-resourcing, both 
within the departments and agencies responding to requests and the Information 
Commissioner to whom appeals are directed (Hazell and Worthy 2010:356). Public au-
thorities’ invocations of commercial-in-confidence exemptions have also proved a long-
running source of controversy. One particularly prominent early case concerned the 
Skye Bridge. This was constructed under a private finance initiative drafted in 1995, and 
replaced a ferry service linking the Isle of Skye with the British mainland. Controversy 
arose when the private operator began charging what was described as “the highest toll 
per mile of road in the world” (Monbiot 2004). The island’s residents sought access to 
the contracts between the government and the construction company in order to es-
tablish whether the toll bore any reasonable relationship with the costs the company 
was incurring, but this was refused on the basis that release would harm the interests of 
a third party – the construction company to whom the tolls were being paid. The Skye 
Bridge controversy arose before the introduction of the Freedom of Information Act, and 
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debate over where the appropriate boundary between commercial secrecy and public 
interest disclosure lies in the UK has moved on considerably since then. It is relevant 
here because it constitutes a prominent example, contemporary with the Gore/Clinton 
reforms in the USA, of the government exploiting the ambiguous boundary between 
public and private to justify secrecy on what were widely understood as political 
grounds. 
Despite these problems, the Code of Practice was experienced as a positive step towards 
openness because it provided a coherent and relatively comprehensive right of access. 
However many problems it may have had in practice, the Code was far easier to under-
stand than the patchwork quilt of mechanisms which preceded it, most of which were 
of extremely limited scope and did not cover central government. In the USA, by con-
trast, there was no need for Clinton to introduce a Code of Practice because the Freedom of 
Information Act already existed. This had two consequences: it meant that the negative 
effects of reform appeared to be more prominent simply because they were not coun-
terbalanced by the introduction of access rights; and secondly, it meant that there was 
already a large, established community of requesters and scholars in place who would 
be more likely to experience these negative effects and complain about them. 
Conversely, while the order in which reform and access rights were introduced may 
have encouraged negative assessments among American commentators, many of the 
National Performance Review reforms relied on publicity in the same way as did the Citi-
zen’s Charter. Published standards and performance audits were clearly intended to as-
sist citizens in making informed choices in their relations with public bodies, and also 
to discipline the bureaucracy through fear of the negative publicity and budgetary im-
plications of with poor performance. Secondly, although Clinton did not need to create 
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new rights in order to empower citizens to take up their grievances directly with civil 
servants, he did strengthen pre-existing rights: an executive order (United States 1995) 
reversed Reagan’s policy, instructing agencies to pro-actively declassify information 
and respond positively to access requests. The sponsor of the National Performance Re-
view was just as personally sympathetic to access as his counterpart in the UK. 
Although historical sequencing can account for a good deal of the perceived difference 
between the UK and the USA on this issue, there were some small but significant differ-
ences in the reforms themselves which must also be taken into account. Like the Citi-
zen’s Charter, the National Performance Review emphasised the goals of efficiency and val-
ue-for-money over democratic participation (Aberbach and Rockman 2001). Unlike the 
Charter, however, the Review was not followed by a wholehearted embrace of full free-
dom of information as a means of restructuring relations between state and society or 
of legitimising that new structure. As a result, the contribution of reform to access was 
the release of specific, often technical information useful for imposing financial disci-
pline on a state which was – as previous chapters have showed – already characterised 
by a high degree of administrative and political decentralisation. The tendency of the 
bureaucracy to use austerity as an opportunity to legitimise secrecy was, thus, not 
counterbalanced by  a wholehearted embrace of transparency at the political level to 
anything like the same extent as in the UK under Blair.  The absence of a fundamental 
commitment to pervasive transparency within the executive is, if anything, confirmed 
by the fact that Congress subsequently passed the Electronic Freedom of Information Act 
1996. This ensured access to electronic records, and put in place new pro–active publica-
tion requirements for frequently-requested documents. It was a Congressional rather 
than a Presidential initiative, a reaction to discontent with falling responsiveness to re-
quests caused by agencies treating their obligations under the Act as secondary rather 
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than as core responsibilities (United States 1996:13-4). This amendment act was, in oth-
er words, a re-assertion of a mechanism which had evolved in response to the pre-
existing distributed nature of administrative authority in the American state, and the 
constitutionally-mandated arm’s length relationship which exists between Congress 
and the administrative state, rather than an attempt by the executive to impose or le-
gitimise a new internal structure of authority and responsibility. 
Low-Intensity Reform and Structural Transparency 
The comparison between the UK and the USA suggests that the mere presence of a 
prominent reform movement emphasising transparency as a tool of public sector re-
form is unlikely to lead to the consolidation of full access rights in and of itself. In both 
the USA and the UK, political support for access rights was contingent on administra-
tive structures which effectively devolve authority within the state, and on deliberate 
attempts by the political executive to use disclosure to the public at large as means of 
legitimising and controlling that devolved structure. Unfortunately, although the com-
parison between the USA and the UK suggests the rhetoric and ideological foundation 
of reform may be less important than is often assumed, the USA is not an ideal case for 
testing the specific claim about institutional structure because its complex political and 
administrative apparatus displays several intersecting kinds of disaggregation and au-
tonomy. The federal system and the separation of powers are, as Chapter Six noted, as-
sociated with a vast and often quite inconsistent array of institutions with different, 
and sometimes competing, lines of accountability. The relative lack of control exercised 
by the President over the legislative agenda complicates assessments of the influence of 
intra-executive politics on legislated access rights. 
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Of the three other countries on which this thesis focusses, the most appropriate for 
testing the specific effect of administrative structures are Sweden and France. Both un-
dertook reasonably extensive public sector reforms in the 1980s and 1990s, but in both 
cases these were pragmatic and only superficially connected with New Public Manage-
ment ideology. Both, moreover, resembled the USA in that they had access rights in 
place before the onset of . In Sweden, these rights were deliberately reinforced for 
structural and political reasons. In France, by contrast,  amendments to the access law 
in 2000 amounted to little more than legislative housekeeping, and the absence of sub-
stantial reform can be connected directly to the lack of propitious institutional condi-
tions. 
Sweden and the Political Uses of Decentralisation 
In common with many of the advanced capitalist democracies, Swedish governments 
undertook several waves of reform over the 1980s and 1990s. Sweden is interesting be-
cause, although the ideological foundation of these reform was moderate by Anglo Sax-
on standards, the Social Democratic government legislated in 1987 to reinforce access 
to certain important kinds of information. Furthermore, although the reforms them-
selves resembled those of the USA in important respects and although Sweden also had 
a well-entrenched access law long before the onset of reform rooted in a highly-
decentralised administrative structure, whatever negative effects reform may have had 
on access were offset by deliberate attempts on the part of the central government to 
exploit this entrenched link between transparency and devolved public administration. 
Divergences from both the UK and US experience can be attributed to the institutional 
structure of the relationship between the political executive and the administrative 
state. 
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The reinforcement of access rights in Sweden can only be attributed to the kind of ideo-
logical consensus identified at the start of this chapter with difficulty, because the intel-
lectual foundations of public sector reform in Sweden were far less doctrinaire than in 
the Anglo-Saxon countries. Neoliberalism is not entirely absent from mainstream Swe-
dish political discourse, but its main bases of support have historically been narrow, 
lying mainly in a few central government agencies such as the Agency for Administra-
tive Development, the National Audit Office and the Ministry of Finance (Pierre 
2001:139). The early 1990s represented the high water mark of explicit neoliberal think-
ing in Sweden, thanks to advocacy by the OECD and the election of the first Conserva-
tive prime minister since 1930. This influence faded after the re-election of the Social 
Democrats in 1994. 
Consistent with this ideological moderation, the reforms which were actually undertak-
en in Sweden were incremental modifications of long-standing domestic reform tradi-
tions, and were taken largely in response to two local conditions rather than in con-
formity with an emerging international consensus (Premfors 1998:148-52).  The first 
was local contributor the budget deficit, which had been a problem for governments 
since the oil shocks of the 1970s (Premfors 1998:152-3), but became particularly acute in 
the early 1990s with the development of a financial crisis sparked by the bursting of a 
commercial property bubble (Pierre 2001:132-6). The recourse to privatisation was 
largely intended as a response to this problem, and was particularly prominent during 
the brief periods during which the Conservatives held power. The actual extent of pri-
vatisation was, as in the USA, relatively modest, not least because of relatively low lev-
els of direct state ownership of readily-privatisable assets. The second contributor to 
reform was partly a consequence of the first: during the 1980s and early 1990s , the So-
cial Democrats had the unusual experience of being in opposition on several occasions, 
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and this encouraged them to re-evaluate their image and policy platform. They appear 
to have come the conclusion relatively early that their close association with the wel-
fare state – which had long been an electoral asset – could also be a liability under con-
ditions of public dissatisfaction with a bureaucracy which was seen to be both expen-
sive and too insulated from popular democratic control (Pierre 1993; Pollitt and 
Bouckaert 2004:264). In response, they adopted a programme of administrative modern-
isation emphasising management by objectives (målstyrning) and steering towards re-
sults (resultatstyrning) at the central level, and increased democracy and public partici-
pation at the local level (Gustafsson 1987). Although some aspects of this programme 
resembled New Public Management in its emphasis on the desirability of managerial 
autonomy (Pierre 2001:135), overall it is best understood as part of a long-term tenden-
cy to reduce the importance of elected politicians for operational decisions in favour of 
governance through direct interaction between the administration and external social 
interests (Pierre 2001:138). 
The differing impact of reform on access rights cannot reasonably be attributed to the 
peculiarities of the reforms themselves, since despite contextual and ideological differ-
ences they were fairly similar to those undertaken in the USA. Although privatisation 
provoked discussion of whether the shifting boundary between public and private 
would adversely affect the existing transparency regime, these concerns were offset by 
the central government’s reinforcement of the pre-existing system in the parts of the 
state which remained public. This reliance was clearly evident in the most significant 
structural reform which occurred in this period: the radical decentralisation of finan-
cial, political and administrative authority in the late 1980s (Premfors 1991; OECD 
1997:152-8; OECD/PUMA 1997:403,9,11). As part of this, the Social Democrats amended 
the Administrative Procedure Act in 1987 to require local authorities to pro-actively dis-
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seminate information concerning individual rights and entitlements, even as they 
forced these authorities to choose which services to cut back (Gustafsson 1987:185-7). 
Decentralisation thus encouraged the government to strengthening the “publicity prin-
ciple” which has long played a vital role in legitimising the existence of pervasive, de-
volved administration in Sweden – a system which resembles that put in place in the 
UK over the 1990s and early 2000s in several important respects. Since the late 19th Cen-
tury, Swedish public administration has been characterised by an institutional separa-
tion between policymaking on the one hand and implementation and service provision 
on the other which is functionally similar to aspects of modernisation. The former has 
traditionally been carried out by relatively small ministries located in central govern-
ment, whereas the latter is carried out by a mixture of countrywide boards, regional 
and local government authorities and state-regulated co–operatives (Flinders 1997:66; 
OECD 1997:93). All of these service providers operate under legal rules established at 
national level, and are subject to supervision by national agencies like the Auditor and 
Ombudsman. They are not, however, under the direct authority of individual ministers; 
Chapter 11, Article 7 of the Instrument of Government formally forbids them from direct-
ing boards on how they are to apply general rules in specific cases (OECD 1997:93; Pollitt 
and Bouckaert 2004:264). Within this context, transparency provides a partial substitute 
for direct electoral accountability, and ensures that officials of all kinds are responsive 
to public preferences as a matter of practice (Wennergren 1983:15-6). The reforms men-
tioned above reinforced these structures, in part, because the Social Democrats were 
genuinely interested in responding to grassroots demands for greater public participa-
tion and administrative responsiveness to local conditions. But executives also 
strengthened access rights because they provided a means of shifting the political costs 
of unpopular decisions about how budget cuts were to be implemented onto regional 
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and local governments and autonomous boards (Grønnegaard Christensen 2001:126-7; 
Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004:263).  
Formal Transparency in Étatist France 
The final country examined here is France. Its 1978 access law was amended in 2000 by 
the Jospin government, which was also championing a programme of reform couched 
in the late-stage New Public Management discourse linking public sector transparency 
and accountability. Despite this coincidence between rhetoric and legislative activity, 
the French case actually supports the claim that normative consensus is unlikely to 
have a positive effect on freedom of information in the absence of conducive structural 
relations between bureaucrats and politicians. Although the structure of political au-
thority in France has changed significantly over the last 30 years, it has not been ac-
companied by the establishment conducive institutional structures of the kind found in 
the UK or Sweden. Consistent with this, the amendments to the access law which were 
put in place were largely cosmetic, involving legislative codification of existing juris-
prudence rather than the transformation of authority within the state. 
That France’s transparency law was introduced in a period of weak executive control, as 
noted in previous chapters, is entirely consistent with the claims made at the start of 
this chapter about the institutional influences on attitudes among senior officials to-
wards access. The French state is far more centralised, than, say, Sweden, and hence far 
less conducive to the use of transparency as a means by which politicians control the 
administration. French thinking about the state is dominated by a “Jacobin” tradition 
which emphasises the unity of the state, the desirability of its playing a pro-active role 
in social and economic regulation, and the normative value of legally-guaranteed equal-
ity of service to all citizens. This perspective enjoys widespread legitimacy among civil 
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servants, and is reflected in dominant traditions of political theory on both the left and 
the right (Elgie 2003). It is, moreover, associated with a relative under-reliance on inde-
pendent administrative authorities (France 2001). There are only a few dozen of these 
even today, and the Commission d’Accès aux Documents Administratifs which is charged 
with administering the access law, was one of the first to be established (France 2011). 
France has also proved notably resistant to New Public Management (Pollitt and 
Bouckaert 2004:227-8), especially when the term is used prescriptively to designate a 
programme grounded in a particular ideology about the superiority of markets and pri-
vate-sector norms over states and the public sector. This is partly ideological: the dom-
inance of the Jacobin tradition is often invoked by both the French and outsiders to ex-
plain the absence of serious attempts at marketisation or performance management 
techniques borrowed from the private sector (Clark 1998:111; Guyomarch 1999:171-2). It 
is also partly social. Civil servants and politicians alike see NPM as a fashion of the An-
glo-Saxon world with little intrinsic appeal or local relevance (Guyomarch 1999:189). 
This view is undoubtedly underpinned the lack of differentiation between the roles of 
bureaucrat and politician in France, where the two groups are drawn from similar mi-
lieux and attend the same institutions of higher education (such as the famous École Na-
tionale d’Administration); moreover, the two career paths are closely intertwined, with 
individuals moving between political and administrative roles at various points in their 
careers. All three of the reforms discussed in the first part of the chapter are predicat-
ed, in one way or another, on a functional distinction between these roles, with the re-
sult that “for a French political executive, engaging in administrative reform is the best 
way to shatter the system upon which its claims to legitimacy29 rest” (Bezes 2001:60). 
                                                                           
 
29 “Legitimacy” is to be understood here in its normative and its Weberian sense. 
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Whatever its sources, this resistance has meant that public sector reform, which has 
been a prominent matter of political debate since at least the early 1980s, has differed 
significantly from elsewhere.  
Broadly, there have been two phases of public sector reform in France since the start of 
the 1980s. The first occurred in the early-mid 1980s under François Mitterrand, and in-
volved two distinct aspects. The first aspect is less relevant to the present discussion, 
since it would not have been expected to affect transparency in any case: a wave of na-
tionalisation followed soon after by a wave of privatisation under right-wing Prime 
Minister Chirac during Mitterrand’s first period of cohabitation. The second was decen-
tralisation, and is relevant mainly for the manner in which it differed from that under-
taken in Sweden and the UK. In France it was accomplished by restricting the supervi-
sory authority of the representatives of the central state – the préfets – over elected 
bodies at local and regional level (OECD/PUMA 1997:199; Rohr 2003:49-50). It involved, 
in other words, a removal of centralised administrative control over a decentralised po-
litical system, rather than an attempt to shift political responsibility for operational de-
cisions onto devolved administrative authorities. Décentralisation had little immediate 
effect on the structure or operations of the senior civil service or of political authority, 
both of which remain largely centralised in Paris (Thoenig 2005). The Assemblée Natio-
nale and the Presidency retain their monopolies over law-making and the promulgation 
of regulations, and the lower levels of government are both formally dependent on and 
subordinate to them. Decentralisation was, in particular, not intended to institutional-
ise a split between (centralised) policy development and (decentralised) service deliv-
ery, although there are some indications it may have exacerbated pre-existing tensions 
between the “politico-administrative élite” in Paris, and the field offices of ministries 
and regional authorities on the other (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004:228,37). 
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The second phase of reform, which coincided roughly with the 1990s and early 2000s 
under Mitterrand and then Chirac, and emphasised various kinds of modernisation ra-
ther than privatisation or decentralisation. Prime Ministers Rocard, Juppé and Jospin 
each undertook programmes of reform which adopted, to varying degrees, language 
similar to that found in New Public Management. Significantly, their success was in-
versely proportional to the extent to which they adopted an explicitly ideological 
stance inspired by the Anglo-Saxon model. 
The modernisation undertaken by Prime Minister Rocard in the late 1980s was manage-
rial without being neoliberal. His reforms are usually understood to be the most suc-
cessful of any in the modern era when measured against their stated objectives (Bezes 
2001:48), largely because they did not significantly disrupt existing practices and insti-
tutions. Rocard emphasised communication, education and mutual appraisals among 
civil servants, but left intact the grands corps which underpinned the collective identity 
of the politico-administrative class (Guyomarch 1999:172-5) and did not seriously chal-
lenge the dominant Jacobin tradition of thinking about the state. 
The efforts of Juppé in the mid-1990s were the most explicitly neoliberal of the three, 
and also the least successful. Although nowhere near as hostile towards the state per se 
as, say, Mrs Thatcher, Juppé explicitly identified the civil service as exercising an unjus-
tifiable monopoly over the reform agenda and the political process more generally. He 
attempted to put in place a number of solutions to these “problems”, including the im-
plementation of a separation between centralised policy development and decentral-
ised service delivery within the ministries, and the use of contracts and performance 
management (Clark 1998:106-7). He also established a separate “Civil Service Ministry in 
charge of State Reform, Decentralisation and Citizenship” which was intended to force 
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change on a public sector presumed at the outset to be unwilling to reform itself. The 
use of the word “citizenship” was criticised at the time as little more than a rhetorical 
flourish taken from Major’s Citizen’s Charter (Bezes 2001:57). That said, these reforms de-
liberately sought to reform inter-executive relations, and, had they been successful, 
transparency might have become much more important as a principle of administrative 
control in France. As it happens, Juppé’s effort collapsed in the face of a series of gen-
eral strikes, and failed to achieve long–lasting institutional or procedural change (Bezes 
2001:51). 
As noted earlier, the French access law was eventually amended in 2000 under Jospin, 
who was also pursuing a public sector reform agenda which bore rhetorical similarity to 
late-stage New Public Management. It is probable that Jospin’s emphasis on the trans-
parency and accountability of the state, and his advocacy of some of the less controver-
sial aspects of performance management, facilitated the passage of these amendments. 
But like Rocard’s, Jospin’s overall reform programme essentially left the structure of 
the civil service untouched. Within this, the substance of his transparency reforms 
were strikingly similar to those of Giscard d’Estaing and Barre two and a half decades 
earlier: the term “transparency” referred primarily to the clarity and accessibility of 
the laws which the state was charged with implementing rather than to access to files, 
and formed part of a broader effort to lighten the burden which bureaucracy imposed 
on individual citizens rather than an effort to improve accountability or participation. 
Consistent with this, the revisions to the access law which were brought by the Minister 
for Public Service, State Reform and Decentralisation (France 1998a) primarily involved 
the codification of jurisprudence developed by the Commission d’Accès aux Documents 
Administratifs and the Conseil d’État to overcome inconsistencies and ambiguities of the 
original law (France 1999:05097). Their purpose was far less radical in substance that 
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those of any the key political figures in the countries discussed above. They did not seek 
to use disclosure as an alternative mechanism of bureaucratic discipline or control; to 
the contrary, this law reinforced the pre-existing and fundamentally juridical framework 
of relations between citizen and state (Clark 1998:111). Significantly, and in stark con-
trast with both the UK and Sweden, these amendments were neither particularly prom-
inent matters of political debate (cf. France 1999), nor do they appear to have had much 
of an impact on the broader reform agenda or the right of access itself since their pas-
sage. The Commission continues to identify a low level of awareness of – and sympathy 
for – access among civil servants as the major barrier to their implementation (France 
2000:44-7), suggesting that traditional structural interests remain very much in place. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has conducted a study of the effects of administrative reform in four coun-
tries, as a means of identifying the structural features of the relationship between polit-
ical executives and bureaucrats which are most likely to encourage support at among 
political executives for freedom of information. It began by noting that there are two 
broad bodies of opinion on the effects of this relationship, corresponding roughly with 
scholars of public administration who identify information in rather technocratic terms 
as a tool of public sector governance, and scholars of freedom of information who are 
more sensitive to the power interests at stake in disclosure. It has shown that neither of 
these approaches is entirely correct. The political executive is neither likely to embrace 
freedom of information simply because it recognises the instrumental value of public 
disclosure of some information about the state, nor will it always have an interest in 
allowing bureaucrats to exploit the organisational ambiguities of structural reform and 
avoid disclosure.  
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This chapter has shown that Robertson’s (1982) argument about the institutional de-
terminants of official secrecy can also be applied to freedom of information: support for 
access rights among political executives in the countries studied here has been shown 
to be a function of organisational structure –and specifically the prevalence of public 
authorities operating at arm’s length from the political executive. Three out of the four 
countries examined here now rely widely on autonomous public authorities. These are 
also the countries in which access laws enjoy greatest support from senior politicians, 
and where they work reasonably well. Moreover, in one of the three – the UK – access 
rights were introduced as an integral part of a governance agenda which relied heavily 
on administrative autonomy. The fourth country is France, where relevant aspects of 
the state remain far more highly-centralised, where legislation exists despite the atti-
tudes of the political executive, and where subsequent amendments have not substan-
tially extended access. 
This chapter has also shown that the effects of public sector reform on freedom of in-
formation depend on the goals of the political executive, rather than on ideological or 
rhetorical commitment to information-based administrative control. It has identified 
two basic reasons why elected executives might support access rights: as a means of 
pro-actively transferring responsibility to the bureaucracy, and as a means of legitimis-
ing the existence of a devolved public administration. Where the goal of legitimation 
alone is present, reform is likely to be superficial because it suggests existing power 
structures remain in place. France is an example of this: reform under Jospin was essen-
tially undertaken because the temper of the times favoured reforms which could be 
presented as promoting transparency and accountability. Where the aim was solely a 
(limited) transfer of responsibility as part of an attempt to harness the power of public 
opinion as a means of exerting control over the bureaucracy, as in the UK under Major 
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and the USA under Clinton and Gore, there were important changes to patterns of dis-
closure but the kinds of information and the recipients involved did not necessarily 
correspond with full freedom of information. Where the goal was to transfer a greater 
degree of responsibility and to legitimise that transfer, as in Sweden or the UK under 
Blair, full rights of access prospered. 
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Chapter 8: The Institutional 
Foundations of Freedom of 
Information 
We live in an age obsessed with information. The popularisation of technologies such as 
the personal computer, the World-Wide Web and satellite television has effectively 
eliminated many costs once associated with obtaining, storing, processing and diffusing 
information. These innovations have made possible the development of social, econom-
ic and political habits and patterns of organisation which depend on swifter access to 
larger amounts of data than ever before (Castells 1996; Keohane and Nye 1999). With 
these new practices have come expectations that information will be available, whether 
it be from businesses, governments or other organisations (Margetts 2011:518). The 
transition from industrial to post-industrial capitalism is argued to have both driven 
and been driven by these technological changes (Castells 2001). The shift in productive 
activity towards symbolic and financial rather than physical capital, the establishment 
of fluid and unstable patterns of material production, and the rhetorical privileging of 
consumer choice in a range of economic, social and political contexts have all served to 
raise the value of “information” in the abstract (Piore and Sabel 1984; Lash and Urry 
1993). In the political sphere, the collapse of the Soviet Union was widely hailed, at least 
in the 1990s, as leaving liberal democracy – normatively founded on individual electoral 
choice and requiring widespread public access to information (Dahl 1989) – uncontested 
as the sole legitimate form for government (Fukuyama 1992). 
The widespread adoption of freedom of information laws over recent decades is often 
framed as an instance of convergence driven by these profound transformations. Yet 
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there remain considerable differences in the timing and manner of adoption of these 
laws among the consolidated democracies, where there exist reasonably strong domes-
tic constituencies, and where ideological and material conditions should have been 
most favourable. It is these differences that this thesis has sought to explain, and it has 
done so by arguing that the adoption of access laws is not the result of straightforward 
convergence driven by a small number of common causes, but rather equifinality driv-
en by different causes in different countries.  
This thesis has argued that these differences are primarily due to the institutional 
structure of politics, and has made its case by conducting a comparative historical study 
of the origins of access laws in five countries. It has showed that adoption is not the 
outcome of adaptation to the informatisation of society, dispassionate technocratic 
harnessing of the power of information, demand from beneficiaries in civil society or 
ideological progress towards a fixed, uncontroversial goal of “greater democracy” 
(whatever that might mean). During the 20th Century, Sweden, the USA, France, Germa-
ny and the UK all faced a range of circumstances which proved conducive to the emer-
gence of access rights in some but not others. These circumstances generally grew out 
of the interaction between bureaucratic public administration and democratic politics, 
but manifested themselves in different ways: as concern over electoral accountability, 
over the need to protect individual liberty from bureaucratic error and capriciousness, 
or over access to the policymaking system and struggles for control and legitimacy 
within the state itself.  
That these putatively-relevant circumstances did not always contribute to the devel-
opment of freedom of information has been traced here to the institutional arrange-
ments governing the getting, keeping and using of political power in each. These insti-
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tutions mediated these pressures in different ways. In so doing, they affected the pro-
cesses by which aspects of the modern bureaucratic state came to be defined as prob-
lematic, by which official control over information was identified as a cause of that 
problem, and by which laws mandating public access to it were adopted as the solution.  
This final chapter does three things. It begins by drawing together the discussion of the 
preceding chapters and summarising the findings in relation to the specific organisa-
tional and institutional arrangements which were identified as relevant. It then shows 
how these combined in the five countries which formed the main object of analysis to 
produce their very different approaches to freedom of information. This second part is 
important because the main empirical chapters focussed not on whole countries, as is 
standard practice in comparative historical studies, but on five political relationships 
present in each of them. There were sound reasons for this, laid out in Chapter Two, but 
it means that the thesis has yet to synthesise its specific claims into coherent explana-
tions for overall variation among the countries it has examined. The chapter then con-
cludes with a somewhat more speculative discussion of the broader significance of this 
study, and the possible avenues of future research it might inform. 
Institutions and Transparency in the Five Cases 
This thesis began by arguing that cross-national variation in transparency could not be 
explained simply in terms of its theoretical merit. Rather, following Weber’s study of 
bureaucratic secrecy, it should be grounded in an appreciation of how organised power 
relations affect the value of information and the conduct of disputes over it. It also not-
ed that information is only meaningful in the context of concrete social relations, and 
argued that bilateral relations between four important political actors were particularly 
worthy of attention. Finally, it identified factors as likely to be particularly important: 
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the internal organisation of these collective actors (understood largely, but not exclu-
sively, in terms of the extent of hierarchical authority relations prevailing within 
them), and the position of each of these actors in the overall structure of political ac-
countability and authority. The empirical chapters examined the impact of organisation 
and institutional structure by focussing on different political relationships. The follow-
ing discussion identifies the specific factors which were revealed to be important, and 
then summarises the ways they were shown to interact in the five country-cases. 
Hierarchical Organisation and the Tendency towards Secrecy 
Several empirical chapters identified the importance of a widespread, if complex, dis-
tinction between two different sorts of collective political actor: those within which hi-
erarchical authority relations are strong, and those where such relations are either 
weak or absent. Hierarchical organisation commonly has two effects, which become 
more pronounced as the organisation approximates Weber’s ideal-typical bureaucracy: 
it encourages a preference for secrecy, and it means an organisation’s preferences are 
more likely to be politically-consequential. Disorganised groups, by contrast, tend to be 
more diverse in their preferences, and relatively less capable of ensuring their prefer-
ences are enshrined in law. 
Groups displaying strong, centralised and hierarchical authority relations generally en-
joy greater political influence for two reasons. These relations tend to facilitate the de-
velopment of shared and coherent preferences among their members. This may occur 
either because senior officials actively suppress divergent views (as arguably occurs 
within highly-disciplined political parties, as discussed in Chapter Five), or by providing 
opportunities for the development of genuinely shared perspectives among their mem-
bers (as arguably occurs among firms in highly-coordinated economies, discussed in 
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Chapter Six). These relations also tend to favour the active pursuit of these more coher-
ent preferences through direct action, largely because highly-organised groups are in a 
better position to deploy the political resources of their members to greatest effect. 
Bureaucratic organisation is frequently associated with a preference for secrecy for 
several reasons. Bureaucracy is, per Weber, a form of organisation with inherently se-
cretive predispositions inasmuch as it is designed to control information and to domi-
nate through information. Internally, information and rules concerning disclosure are 
mechanisms by which those at the summit discipline their subordinates, as Chapters 
Two, Six and Seven discussed. Externally, information is useful as a strategic resource in 
managing relations with other powerful actors, as Chapters Five and Six showed. Bu-
reaucratic groups, thus, often have the capacity to keep secrets, and an interest in op-
posing general public rights of access to them. 
Members of groups which are weakly organised are, by contrast, both more likely to 
support freedom of information and more dependent on favourable circumstances to 
realise that preference. These favourable attitudes have two sources. They are, firstly, 
an artefact of the absence of internal discipline: the preferences of members of these 
groups are likely to be more diverse, and consequently more favourable on average 
than those subject to hierarchical authority relations. More precisely, the absence of 
internal discipline means the preferences of disorganised groups are more likely to be 
influenced by concerns other than the interests of the group as such, as the discussion 
of weak party discipline in Chapter Five showed. Secondly, the absence of coherent or-
ganisation can encourage a positive preference for formal rights of access under the 
right circumstances. 
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A positive relationship between a lack of organisation and transparency is sometimes 
posited on the functionalist basis that networked coordination requires transparency 
whereas Weberian bureaucracy does not (Fountain 1999; Nye 1999). This thesis has pro-
posed a different explanation on the basis of its historical analysis. It has suggested that 
disorganised groups lack the capacity to pursue the collective interests of their mem-
bers, including ensuring access to politically-important information. Members of these 
kinds of groups include independent members of parliament (and some backbench or 
junior members of parties), firms in liberal market economies, and public interest 
groups on the periphery of important policy networks. These kinds of actors are more 
likely to find themselves excluded from negotiations between more powerful and bet-
ter-organised actors which affect their interests. It does not matter whether these ne-
gotiations occur between political parties, members of a policy network or within the 
bureaucratic state: from the perspective of excluded stakeholders, they are all opaque. 
Support for freedom of information is, as Chapters Five and Six showed, encouraged by 
real or perceived status as an outsider, and it appeals because it helps to overcome ex-
clusion in a way which does not depend on possessing greater organisational capacity 
or other political resources. 
The Institutional Structure of Authority and Accountability 
The five empirical chapters of this thesis also showed that the development of freedom 
of information laws varies cross-nationally with the institutional structure of the five 
key relationships identified in Chapter Two. These chapters identified several institu-
tions as relevant: electoral competition for legislative office, the structure of relations 
between the legislature and the executive, the balance of power within the legislature, 
the organisation of interest groups, and the relationship between the political execu-
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tive and the administrative bureaucracy. The following discussion focusses on each in 
turn, before demonstrating how they interacted in the five main country-cases. 
Chapter Three showed that the manner in which parties compete for office is of crucial 
importance to the development of freedom of information. A competitive two-party 
system is more favourable to the politicisation of access rights than a multiparty system 
(and, implicitly, a non-competitive two-party system). This is largely because there is a 
simpler, more direct relationship between the vote in a two-party system and the char-
acter of the government which must eventually assume responsibility for official deci-
sions and actions. Multiparty parliaments usually require the building of coalitions, a 
process which is both more difficult under conditions of transparency and which does 
not give rise to similar expectations of retrospective accountability. Coalitions are 
much rarer in two-party parliaments, while the simpler electoral mechanisms with 
which they are elected make it easier for voters to at least imagine they are holding 
identifiable elected officials to account for their actions. In combination, these provide 
greater incentives for candidates in two-party systems to compete with each other by 
signalling their support for the principle of retrospective democratic accountability. 
Chapters Three and Four showed that the relationship between the legislature and the 
executive is also an important contributor. This is partly because the separation of 
powers and the electoral cycle can, under the right conditions, encourage legislators to 
introduce access laws despite their electoral risks. In presidential systems, parliament 
legislates knowing the risk will mainly fall on the president; in parliamentary regimes, 
support for access rights among incumbents is generally high for the brief period dur-
ing which most disclosures are likely to discredit the outgoing government. The im-
portance of the structure of political accountability was further examined in Chapter 
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Four, which showed that countries where elected officials are considered to be directly 
responsible for the behaviour of the administrative bureaucracy are particularly sus-
ceptible to the politicisation of access. This is especially true of Westminster systems, 
where the centralisation of legislative, executive and administrative power in the Cabi-
net tended to encourage the politicisation of individual matters which were resolved 
judicially in Continental Europe. This tendency towards politicisation is much less 
widespread in countries where control of individual bureaucrats relies on the law ra-
ther than direct hierarchical authority. In these countries, rights of access to files con-
cerning matters in dispute tend to be relatively well-developed, as are rights of access 
which relate to legally-protected interests. 
Chapter Five showed that political parties are crucial to the development of freedom of 
information, not just for the manner in which they seek to win office but because of the 
way they act once in power. One tool which policymakers have frequently used to con-
trol policy demands is selective communication with some groups in order to weaken 
the influence of others. For this reason, freedom of information laws have often re-
ceived their most vigorous, active support from groups which find themselves on the 
periphery of important policy networks. The extent to which the executive is able to 
exert autonomous control over the legislative agenda is a crucial determinant of 
whether these groups are able to have freedom of information introduced. Executive 
autonomy is generally higher in two-party systems, because a single party usually con-
trols a majority of seats and hence the legislative agenda. This depends, however, on 
the degree of control which party whips exercise over their parliamentary caucus; it is 
no accident that the USA was both relatively early to adopt freedom of information and 
characterised by extremely weak party discipline. Executive control over the legislative 
agenda is generally weaker in multiparty systems, although this weakness manifests 
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itself in different ways depending on whether governments tend to be composed of ma-
jority coalitions or single-party minorities. Where coalitions are the rule, governments 
are able to resist pressure for access laws most of the time. The potential for splits be-
tween coalition partners is always present, however, and contributed to the passage of 
laws in two of the countries examined here. Chapter Three discussed the contribution 
of coalition unity in France. The final passage of the Informationsfreiheitsgesetz through 
the Bundesrat was also facilitated in this way, through the decision of the FDP to break 
with its coalition partner (the CDU/CSU) and abstain from a crucial vote (Germany 
2005:278; Redelfs 2005:32-3). In countries where minority cabinets are a frequent occur-
rence, as in the Nordic world, the prospects for freedom of information are brighter. 
Here, opposition parties and interest groups alike are in a particularly strong position 
to demand access rights in return for support for the rest of the government’s policy 
agenda. 
One implication of this claim about the importance of the configuration of partisan 
power in parliament is that other institutions which are sometimes argued to be rele-
vant to the development of access rights appear to be of secondary importance. Institu-
tions such as independent courts, ombudsmen, the separation of powers and hybrid in-
stitutions with influence over the legislative agenda like the Conseil d’État all contribut-
ed at various times, and may well be of crucial relevance to the way these rights are im-
plemented. But, from a comparative perspective, the differences in their contributions 
to the adoption of access laws from country to country are striking. This is perhaps best 
demonstrated by the divergent experiences of the USA and France. Both have a separa-
tion of powers and constitutional courts with the power to review legislation. Yet only 
in the USA, where party discipline is notably weak, was freedom of information intro-
duced early. In France, the other institutions which might potentially have circum-
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scribed the authority of the executive only became relevant under favourable condi-
tions within the party system: during the breakdown of Giscard’s authority in the 1970s, 
and during the period of cohabitation between Chirac and Jospin in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s. This suggests that the widely-accepted importance of the separation of 
powers (Robertson 1982; Persson, et al. 1997), although real, is contingent. The separate 
electoral mandates in presidential systems may only favour the introduction of free-
dom of information laws by lowering the electoral risks to legislators if they do not con-
sider themselves members of an organisation which also holds the presidency. 
The complex and occasionally contradictory implications of the different modes of col-
lective organisation discussed earlier are exemplified by the varying attitudes of eco-
nomic actors towards freedom of information. Chapter Six showed that countries in 
which firms are organised into a limited number of non-competitive and highly-
organised representative associations are likely to introduce freedom of information 
later than those in which interest groups are more numerous, less well-organised and 
tend to compete with one another. Under neo-corporatism, the high degree of organi-
sation which prevails among producer interests allows them to form privileged rela-
tionships with the state, and to minimise the influence which non-economic interest 
groups are able to bring to bear on the policymaking process. These privileged relations 
are threatened by freedom of information, and are generally resisted (although, as the 
case of Sweden showed, this resistance may be highly focussed). Under pluralism, pow-
erful actors within individual economic sectors or policy domains may sometimes be 
able to establish comparable relations with policymakers. These relations tend to be of 
more limited scope, and are far more likely to be the subject of attack from the more 
numerous and heterogeneous excluded interests which exist in these polities. 
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Finally, Chapter Seven showed that the attitudes of senior political figures towards 
freedom of information are not just influenced by direct electoral concerns, the chal-
lenges of ensuring individual citizens are protected from the bureaucracy or normative 
isomorphic pressures; they also vary with the structure of their authority relations with 
the bureaucracy. These attitudes are likely to be more favourable where administrative 
authorities operate at arm’s length from the supervision and control of political actors. 
This chapter also showed, through an examination of recent episodes of public sector 
reform, that executive support for access is likely to be strongest where disclosure to 
the public serves either the practical goal of harnessing public opinion as a means of 
encouraging bureaucratic efficiency, or as a means of legitimising increased reliance on 
devolved administrative bodies as a policy tool. 
Five Paths to Freedom of Information 
This thesis has undertaken a classically Weberian project, in that it has shown how 
purportedly general processes work themselves out in different ways in different places 
due to historically-contingent local conditions. Comparing on the basis of the different 
dates on which Sweden, the USA, France, the UK and Germany introduced similar laws, 
it has demonstrated that these countries did not just differ in the timing of their legisla-
tive activity, nor were the differences between them purely idiosyncratic. It has shown 
that the broader character of political disputes over access to information varied in 
other ways as well: the tendency for general public rights of access to emerge as a mat-
ter of widespread political debate; the composition and breadth of its supportive con-
stituency (and its opponents), both in civil society and within government; and the 
kinds of information those in power had an interest in making available to the public.  
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The sheer age of the Swedish freedom of information act makes it difficult to draw con-
clusions about its origins through comparisons with more recent laws, but insofar as it 
is possible to tell from the available sources these appear consistent with the institu-
tional explanation offered here. Sweden has had a centralised and powerful bureaucra-
cy since at least the late 18th Century (Peters 2001:145-6). Its early access law can partly 
be understood as a reaction to this centralised power, encouraged by the emergence of 
a prototypical form of two-party competition – albeit, significantly, one which had not 
yet developed to the point where the institutional interests or capacities of the parties 
per se mitigated the appeal of access rights or the ability of individual members of par-
liament to pursue it. The law was also made possible by the unusually liberal nature of 
its parliamentary regime: the separation of powers meant the Crown and bureaucracy 
were unable to resist the law once it had gathered sufficient political support. 
In the modern era, Swedish freedom of information became consolidated thanks to a 
mix of cohesive social and political organisation, coupled with two crucial institutional-
ised divisions of political power. Modern access rights were introduced in two stages in 
1937 and 1949, in response to demands by groups occupying important positions out-
side government in the institutions of the liberal democratic order: journalists, lawyers, 
academics and backbench politicians. The immediate cause of this mobilisation was the 
threat to individual liberty posed by the growth of the welfare state in the middle part 
of the 20th Century. These demands were translated into law relatively quickly, despite 
the existence of strong neo-corporatism, as a result of the strategy adopted by minority 
Social Democratic governments of pro-actively identifying and formally incorporating 
nascent social demands into the policymaking process as early as possible. Freedom of 
information has become entrenched in contemporary Sweden, partly because it con-
tinues to contribute to the openness of its policymaking process, and partly because it 
  289 
underpins a system of bureaucratic accountability and control characterised by a con-
stitutional separation of powers between the political executive and the administrative 
bureaucracy. 
The early and comprehensive consolidation of freedom of information in the USA, in 
contrast, was due to the combination of a disorganised society and a state in which po-
litical power is fragmented by design. This has made both information and legislation 
important mechanisms of political coordination and control, and official information 
became an object of political struggle almost from the moment the state began to inter-
vene systematically in society in the 1930s. The combination of the separation of pow-
ers and the relative absence of party discipline were of particular importance in trans-
lating these structural features into legislative access rights. They facilitated the early 
development of a comprehensive body of administrative law which purported to in-
clude a general right of access to official files. The ill-fated access provisions of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act were part of an attempt to address discontent among (disor-
ganised) businesses with expanding but often incoherent regulation under the sprawl-
ing New Deal bureaucracy. Disorganisation within the parties contributed to the trans-
formation of these early provisions into a comprehensive, functioning access regime by 
allowing mobilisation within Congress and the press to exert a disproportionate effect 
compared with elsewhere. The Freedom of Information Act 1966 and its subsequent 
amendments played a similar role in later periods, especially once civil society groups 
became engaged with the issue. On the two most important occasions, 1966 and 1974, 
the separation of powers and weak party discipline prevented the executive from 
blocking proposals outright (as occurred in the UK, and as arguably occurs most of the 
time in France, albeit only implicitly). These laws, moreover, had a self-reinforcing ef-
fect, rendering Congress more open to influence by outside groups, especially during 
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periods such as the aftermath of Watergate when it was electorally advantageous to be 
publicly associated with laws that purported to improve executive accountability, and 
making access to information an ever more-important feature of American political life. 
France is in the unusual position of having had an access law for over three decades, but 
one of which the public is largely unaware and which is essentially absent from main-
stream political discourse. It has not developed a supportive constituency in the same 
way as has occurred in the USA, Sweden or even the UK; despite regular political scan-
dals, the principle of access to official information per se is not even a particularly prom-
inent matter of public debate in either the press or parliament. This unusual lack of po-
liticisation can largely be attributed to the predominance of the bureaucratic state 
within the political system, its autonomy from society at large, and the dampening ef-
fect these characteristics have had on the tendency to frame problems of politico-
administrative control in terms of secrecy and transparency. The central fact of French 
political life for much of the modern era has been a centralised and infrastructurally-
powerful bureaucracy which is often able to act independently not just of major social 
and economic interest groups, but also its nominal political masters (Peters 2001:144-5). 
Although the Fifth Republic is a presidential system as in the USA, the centre of power 
almost always lies in the executive branch rather than being shared with a legislature. 
France is thus usually characterised by the fusion of executive and legislative functions 
which proved conducive to political secrecy in other countries most of the time. It is no 
accident that the introduction of its access law occurred during a period when the con-
trol of the presidency over the assembly was unusually weak, and when it was obliged 
by political circumstances to accept a law it would have preferred to resist. That the 
French law exists despite a hostile institutional environment is underlined by the para-
doxical fact that the bureaucracy has also been the single most important constituency 
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for freedom of information, albeit far from an enthusiastic one. The strongest support-
ers of access have been the Conseil d’État and the Médiateur de la République, joined occa-
sionally by senior political figures for whom it constitutes a means of being seen to pro-
tect individual rights from the bureaucracy and to ensure legally-mandated equality of 
treatment. The absence of politicisation can also be traced to the fact that, even today, 
access to official files in France is simply taken to be a mechanism of administrative 
dispute resolution rather than a support for democratic accountability or participation 
in policymaking. 
In Germany, access rights were also introduced relatively late, a fact which this thesis 
has suggested can be attributed to significant structural resistance to the principle of 
public access to information, coupled with a relatively narrow supportive constituency. 
The two main political parties and the main interest groups in Germany are highly-
centralised, and establish formal, ongoing relations with each other and the bureaucra-
cy. As a result, the interests of the most important and influential political actors have 
been aligned with the bureaucracy against the introduction of formal access rights for 
most of the post-war era (Germany 1986b:19098-9). The multiparty electoral system 
provides few countervailing incentives to compete on cognate issues of trust, and the 
two main parties actively resisted attempts by civil rights campaigners and the Greens 
to explicitly politicise freedom of information from the late 1970s to the early 1990s 
(Riley 1983b:10-1; Redelfs and Leif 2004; Redelfs 2005). Furthermore, Germany has a long 
tradition of administrative responsibility to a detailed body of positive law rather than 
to politicians, a system designed in part, to insulate the state from politics. This meant 
that pressures arising from state growth were largely accommodated through legal 
rights framed in individual terms. Rights of access to and control over specific kinds of 
information in Germany are relatively generous, and appear to have satisfied grievanc-
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es which were expressed elsewhere as demands for freedom of information. The fact 
that access rights exist at all in Germany is a testament to the strength of the Green 
movement, its long-standing desire to open the planning and policy process to broader 
participation, and the opportunity to enter a coalition with the SPD in the late 1990s. 
The development of freedom of information in the UK is the outcome of a complex and 
contested interaction between its centralised political and administrative systems, and 
their gradual evolution over time. Here, as elsewhere, the growth of the bureaucratic 
state was the central problem, but unlike France (which also combines a strong state 
with a pluralist society), this occurred in the context of a competitive two-party system 
which favoured the politicisation of concerns about official secrecy and state power in 
terms of public access to information. This made the electoral calculus of senior party 
figures a crucial determinant of legislative outcomes, and the late introduction of its 
access law was largely due to the capacity of the political executive to ignore unwel-
come demands it was unable to stifle. The foundations of this autonomy lie the centrali-
sation of legislative and executive power in a Cabinet composed of ministers drawn 
from a single, disciplined political party elected under a disproportional electoral sys-
tem. Paradoxically, however, the fact that the foundation of political authority in the 
United Kingdom is located firmly in the legislature also facilitated the resolution of this 
contradiction, by allowing the establishment of something like a Swedish-style division 
between the political executive and the administrative state favourable to the institu-
tionalisation of transparency in the 1980s and 1990s. 
The introduction of freedom of information under Blair, and the current Conservative-
Liberal Coalition’s so-called “Transparency Agenda” (United Kingdom 2010a:20-1) both 
bear witness to the competing incentives produced by the profound but somewhat in-
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consistent changes to the British state which occurred during this period. On the one 
hand, information rights remain a popular basis of electoral competition because the 
two-party electoral system remains in place, and Cabinet retains its position at the 
summit of the state. Symptomatically, both Blair and Cameron have emphasised their 
support for access as a means of distinguishing themselves from their “untrustworthy” 
predecessors (Blair 1996; United Kingdom 2010d) These factors continue to encourage 
Ministers to retain control over information relating to policy and the high affairs of 
state. But on the other hand, attempts to divest Cabinet of electoral accountability for 
the behaviour of bureaucrats have at least partly reduced the risks of full rights of ac-
cess. These have made mechanisms which favour the release of information about op-
erational matters appealing as a means of following through on commitments to be 
more transparent. Such mechanisms also serve as non-electoral means of disciplining 
and legitimising the activities of a bureaucracy whose complexity and size have ren-
dered hierarchical control and parliamentary accountability increasingly difficult. 
Further Questions, Other Cases and Future Directions 
This thesis grew out of a desire to understand the contested and often contradictory 
boundary between secrecy and transparency in contemporary government, and specif-
ically why it lies in different places in different countries. It is hoped that it has offered 
sound justifications for its conclusions, but the institutional approach and the compara-
tive method it has employed have shortcomings as well as strengths, and these suggest 
prudence. The claims made above ought to be understood as invitations to further re-
search rather than the last word on this subject – albeit invitations which deserve to be 
taken seriously since they are now supported by a substantial body of evidence and ar-
gument. By way of conclusion, the following discussion seeks to demonstrate that the 
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broader significance of this thesis lies partly in its potential to do just this: inform fur-
ther research. It does so by discussing two avenues which seem particularly fruitful: the 
adoption of freedom of information in the other consolidated democracies, and the 
broad politics of transparency after the introduction of a freedom of information act. 
Comparative Historical Research on Freedom of Information in the Democracies 
The first contribution this thesis makes is to provide a possible foundation for further 
comparative analysis of the adoption of freedom of information in the consolidated 
democracies. These comparisons might be undertaken with at least two aims in mind: 
to confirm the claims made here about the effect of specific institutional configura-
tions, and to illuminate the causes in countries with different arrangements. 
If the historical-institutionalist claims made here hold true, countries with similar insti-
tutional configurations should share a common historical trajectory towards the estab-
lishment of access rights: they should respond to similar pressures and circumstances 
in similar ways, the constituencies for and against legislative rights should be similar, as 
should the prominence of public access to information as a matter of debate. Differ-
ences in the timing of adoption between countries which share institutional arrange-
ments should be relatively minor compared with those between countries whose insti-
tutions are dissimilar. Differences between countries with similar institutions should, 
moreover, be explicable in different terms – perhaps the degrees to which relevant 
causal factors were present, the times at which these causes arose, or the anticipated 
impact of specific features of their transparency mechanisms. 
The Netherlands provides a good example of how comparison might be undertaken in 
pursuit of the first aim. This country introduced a freedom of information act in the 
late 1970s, at more or less the same time as Germany and Luxembourg strengthened 
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their administrative procedure laws. It is likely this was associated with the breakdown 
of the Netherlands’ highly segmented system of interest group intermediation in the 
1960s, and its replacement with a form of neo-corporatism in which businesses are rela-
tively disorganised compared with their German or Nordic counterparts (cf. Huber, et al. 
2004). This “depillarisation” opened the way for a critical re-examination of the increas-
ingly large, complex, and all-pervasive welfare state (United Kingdom 1979a:38), of the 
role played by state control over information in enabling administrative intervention 
(Brasz 1977:204-5), and of the capacity of traditional parliamentary forms of control to 
meet these challenges (de Vos 1993:121-2). From this point of view the Dutch case is a 
counterpoint to Germany for the early date on which its law was passed, but might well 
confirm the claims made in earlier chapters about the importance of highly structured 
patterns of interest group intermediation. 
There are some obvious groups within which further comparisons of this nature might 
be conducted. Sweden might be compared with the other Nordic countries – and indeed 
this thesis made use of several significant similarities within this group to overcome 
methodological problems posed by Sweden’s early access law. The most obvious cases 
for comparison with the UK are the other Westminster countries; such comparisons 
would be relatively easy to conduct because of the wealth of extant secondary material 
on their transparency mechanisms. The other countries examined here do not form 
part of similarly well-recognised and sharply-defined groups, but tests of the different 
ways particular institutions interact might be conducted between Germany and other 
continental countries (e.g. Luxembourg or Austria), or between France and countries 
like Belgium or Italy. It is not immediately obvious which consolidated democracies the 
USA might be compared with, given the famous distinctiveness of its institutional ar-
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rangements, but the role of social and economic development might be investigated by 
comparing with Costa Rica, another two-party presidential regime. 
The second possible goal of conducting further comparisons is to illuminate the causes 
of adoption in consolidated democracies with different configurations of institutions. 
An example of this approach is Switzerland, where a low rate of requests under its 2004 
law is widely noted as puzzling, and often explained on the grounds that its long history 
of consensual, direct democracy makes formal access unnecessary (e.g. Hazell and 
Worthy 2010:354). If this were so, then one might equally have expected Switzerland to 
introduce its access law earlier than it did. This thesis suggests an alternative line of 
inquiry, focussing on the fact that this tradition of open democracy exists alongside in-
stitutions which discouraged a vigorous interest in access rights elsewhere. The Federal 
Council operates at arm’s length from the parliament despite being appointed by it, and 
is appointed according to strict rules which might be interpreted as reducing the incen-
tives for parties to compete with each other by signalling their support for public access 
to official information. As in Germany, the Council undertakes confidential and cooper-
ative negotiations with relatively well-organised economic interest groups, and main-
tains an internal system of administrative dispute resolution and appeals which resem-
bles that in France. 
The Politics of Transparency and Secrecy 
The findings of this thesis might also provide a basis for enriching the study of trans-
parency in countries which have adopted freedom of information laws. At present, as 
Chapter One noted, most existing studies approach this issue by attempting to assess 
the effectiveness of freedom of information acts against particular normative stand-
ards – often standards chosen by the researchers, but sometimes derived from claims 
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made by proponents at the time of introduction. For the reasons already discussed, the-
se studies usually amount to evaluations of the extent to which access laws fail to 
achieve aspirations which may or may not be particularly realistic.  
Normatively-oriented studies will rightly remain an important part of the literature on 
this subject, especially that produced by activists, but a broader, empirically-grounded 
approach grounded in an appreciation of how social and political context influences the 
politics of secrecy and transparency also has merit. Freedom of information, like many 
other governance reforms, spread to the newly-democratising and developing world 
thanks to the encouragement of international government and civil society organiza-
tions (in some cases coupled with a desire by local élites to display their democratic 
credentials to this international audience). It is increasingly agreed that these laws have 
fallen short of the lofty goals set for them at their introduction, and that “universal 
standards… have proved to be particularly unrealistic and frustrating, especially for 
countries that have farthest to go” (Grindle 2011:415). Part of this shortfall has been at-
tributed to “unrealistic assumptions about the predictability of relationships between 
policy actions and their consequences”, which fail to take account of “the importance of 
knowing the context in which reformed policies, institutions and processes are to be 
introduced” (Grindle 2011:415).  
One response to the growing consensus that one-size-fits-all reforms agendas are prob-
lematic has been a turn to “comparative history of development processes across coun-
tries and the historical context of individual countries” (cf. Raadschelders 2010; Grindle 
2011:416) as useful sources of knowledge concerning the environment within which re-
forms will operate. As yet, however, there are few studies which have attempted to sys-
tematically identify, through historical study, the aspects of social or political context 
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which might prove relevant to freedom of information –indeed, such studies are still 
relatively rare in the literature on governance reforms more generally (Andrews 
2010:31). By examining conflicts over transparency and secrecy at a particularly signifi-
cant set of points in multiple countries, this thesis has identified a set of factors which 
might plausibly be expected to influence those conflicts at other points as well. Two as-
pects of this thesis’ findings seem particularly appealing as a basis for further research 
in this direction.  
This thesis suggests, firstly, that expectations about transparency mechanisms should 
take into account the fact that the very idea of public access to information may be seen 
as a more important principle in some countries than in others. Countries in which this 
principle is both more prominent as a matter of debate and seen as of greater norma-
tively importance in a greater range of contexts are more likely to display discontent 
with existing levels of disclosure than those in which access is seen as less important – 
even if similar practices of disclosure exist in each. This suggests attempts to produce 
ratings based on qualitative assessments by requester groups, journalists or academics 
working in the countries concerned may be systematically biased. There is some evi-
dence for this claim: in the Global Integrity Index assessment of freedom of information 
(e.g. 2011), countries in which a strong access law is widely held to be important tend to 
receive lower ratings than countries than those where it is not, even if the law in the 
former is used far more regularly to obtain information of major political significance 
than in the latter.30 
                                                                           
 
30 To give one particularly egregious example, the Global Integrity Index rates freedom of information mechanisms in 
Australia as less effective than in France, and only marginally more effective than in Costa Rica. This appears to re-
flect dissatisfaction among Australian journalists with a few high-profile instances of official refusal to disclose pa-
pers relating to important policy decisions. The Australian law is unquestionably more effective than its French 
equivalent, which is essentially never used, while Costa Rica has no law. It is difficult to explain these relative as-
sessments except as measures of how far the law in each country falls below local expectations.  
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This thesis also suggests that the implementation of access laws might fruitfully be 
studied by examining its benefits to actors beyond an undifferentiated democratic 
“public”, and other than in terms of its facilitating the achievement of broad goals such 
as “improved accountability”. These concepts may be extremely important in principle 
or as bases for advocacy. But they designate too broad a range of actors and processes 
to be particularly useful for empirical work, and they encourage the presumption of a 
monolithic state which is inherently secretive facing a homogenous society whose 
members are all equally interested in transparency. Rather, this thesis suggests a focus 
on how public rights of access to official files are used by organised groups, including 
politicians and bureaucrats, to structure and conduct their relations with each other. 
Two specific findings seem particularly likely to provide further insights, even in coun-
tries where the institutional structures and socio-political context differ from the coun-
tries examined here. The first is a focus on how access rights affect relations between 
peripheral groups and the state, which is to say how they affect the formation of  and 
negotiations within policy networks. The second is a focus on how institutions which 
aggregate individual attitudes and decisions affect élite behaviour, as an alternative to a 
focus on “demands” from a hypothesised “democratic public”.  
Whether these avenues prove fruitful or not, the final conclusion must be one of cau-
tious optimism. The establishment of public access to official information is often de-
scribed as a right dragged from unwilling politicians and exercised over the objections 
of reluctant or recalcitrant bureaucrats. This is very often true, and the resistance of 
these groups was decisive in delaying legislation in the countries examined here. But 
both have occasionally found it in their interests to support the introduction of legally-
protected public rights of access to official information, and the historical analysis con-
ducted here has shown that their attitudes towards transparency were far more com-
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plex than the assumptions embedded in normative democratic theory suggest. Infor-
mation is power, as advocates of transparency are fond of saying, and freedom of in-
formation is an attempt to reform institutionalised forms of power. Optimism is war-
ranted because, under the right balance of organisational and institutional conditions, 
even those in power have come to support the introduction of general public rights of 
access to official files. These were adopted at different times in the five countries con-
sidered here due to variations in their structure of political authority over and account-
ability for the great leviathan of the modern bureaucratic state, and the differing op-
portunities and imperatives these produced to bind it, harness it, shackle it.   
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